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Chapter 1
Introduction
The production of economic goods is fundamentally linked to environmental degra-
dation by means of pollution, waste and land conversion. This link gives rise to
a management problem that lies at the heart of environmental and resource eco-
nomics.1 Research addressing this problem has two main objectives: (a) to find the
optimal balance between gains from economic production and costs of the associ-
ated environmental degradation given a set of technologies; (b) to optimally invest
into research fostering technological progress that relaxes the trade-off between pro-
ductive activities and the natural environment and human health. Meeting those
objectives at the same time constitutes the optimal pollution and research policies.
The optimal pollution policy tackles the optimal scale of production and the optimal
mix of technologies at any point in time. The optimal research policy determines the
optimal timing, size (quantity) and type (quality) of innovations. In principle, all of
these factors are to some degree endogenous. Starting with the scale of production
(Pigou 1920), this endogeneity has been incorporated into the economic literature.
The impact of new technologies on the optimal extraction path and the optimal
mix of technologies has first been studied in resource economics. Dasgupta and Heal
(1974) analyze the optimal extraction of an essential but exhaustible natural resource
assuming an exogenous and uncertain arrival of a backstop technology. A backstop
technology in the resource extraction problem is a technology giving access to a
resource with an infinite stock. More recently, in the literature on stock pollutants,
”the backstop” has become a shorthand for perfectly clean technologies that solve
the pollution problem once and for all. Hence, in both cases innovation is able to
provide a terminal solution to the extraction or pollution problem. Hung and Quyen
(1993) introduce the issue of optimal timing of research investments in a resource
1For a review of research questions in environmental economics see Cropper and Oates (1992).
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exploitation model, while Baudry (2000) does so in the context of stock pollution.
Both endogenize the decision when to invest in the development of a backstop.
The above literature is concerned with the optimal timing of innovations, but
keeps the type of technology, i.e. the backstop, fixed. Moreover, it assumes that
the new technology is a backstop implying that research always solves the pollution
problem once and for all. Therefore the question how often R&D is best carried out
is trivial. A major contribution of this thesis is to consider a new type of innovation
that makes the timing and frequency decisions in R&D more realistic.
1.1 Green Horizontal Innovation
Parts I to III broaden the concept environmental innovation by introducing the idea
of ‘green’ horizontal innovation. It incorporates the important empirical observation
that new technologies designed to solve a particular pollution problem often come
with strings attached. They are generally not strictly superior to the old technology.
This non-superiority is characteristic for horizontal innovation. In order to qualify
for the ‘green’ innovation category, the technology has to differ from the others in the
type of pollution emitted. Given pollutants contribute to different environmental
problems that do not interact differentiation of the pollution, and hence technol-
ogy portfolio, is socially desirable if marginal damages are increasing within each
pollution type. In contrast to the well established product differentiation argument
(Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) the social gain of a new technology does not rest on the
creation of additional demand. All technologies produce perfect substitutes. The
social gain of a new technology builds on the opportunity to spread output between
more technologies with specific pollutants and thereby reduce the marginal damage
of emissions per unit of output.
A prominent example for green horizontal innovation is the history of refriger-
ation. In the 30’s poisonous cooling agents have been substituted by chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs), which later turned out to deplete the ozone layer. After the ban
of CFCs by the Montreal Protocol, newly developed substitutes became available.
However, they are associated with stock pollution and health risks of their own. En-
ergy production faces similar trade-offs between the lesser of two evils. While fossil
fuels such as oil, gas and coal contribute to global warming, the main alternative
for electricity production, nuclear power, results in the build up of radioactive waste
and has the ’residual’ risk of a catastrophic accident. Moreover, most end-of-pipe
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technologies convert one type of pollution into another one. For example, scrub-
bers and electrostatic precipitators remove lead and particulate matter (PM) from
exhaust air by converting them into other forms of waste.
Green horizontal innovation occurs at all relevant scales. It reaches from entirely
different production processes (as in the case of energy production) to small scale
end-of-pipe solutions, like catalytic converters in cars. The latter reduce emissions
of hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide at the cost of higher sulphur oxide emissions.
All these examples have in common that, by reducing one type of damage, the
new technology gives rise to another. Research might therefore not solve the pollu-
tion problem but dilute it. Sequences of innovations as in the case of refrigeration
are a naturally arising pattern under green horizontal innovation. This very nature
of green horizontal innovation poses new challenges to the management problem.
Both, the optimal timing of R&D and the management of the available technology
portfolio, become more sophisticated. Instead of only one, an endogenous number
of innovations is considered that are undertaken at endogenously determined points
in time. Therefore, a more demanding methodical approach has to be employed.
However, the case where all new technologies are horizontal innovations is only a
special case of the more general model analyzed in part I. The second contribution is
to allow for technological uncertainty associated with the R&D process. Ex-ante the
planner attaches beliefs about the type of technology to be developed by the next
innovative step. Technologies come in two varieties: as green horizontal innovations,
labeled ’boomerangs’, and as backstops that solve the pollution problem once and
for all. In the baseline model the planner’s beliefs are fixed. However, chapter 6
allows for rational learning based on the outcome of previous R&D projects.
1.2 Implementation and the Choice of Instruments
Deriving socially optimal plans for production and research is only the first step
toward an actual policy. The literature on the implementation of environmental
policies was started by the seminal contribution of Pigou (1920). Over time, the set
of employed policy instruments has grown and now includes command and control,
tradeable permits, several forms of liabilities, auctions and combinations thereof.
Moreover, it is necessary to consider instruments such as patents and R&D prizes,
in order to discuss the optimal timing of research.
The joint implementation of optimal pollution and research policies gives rise to
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another set of issues, namely the interaction between the two types of instruments
and the resulting trade-offs between static and dynamic efficiency.2 This strand of
the literature focuses on the impact of environmental policies on research incentives.
Initiated by Magat (1978), who compares emission taxes with a command and con-
trol scheme, the set of instruments and cases covered has been extended, e.g. by
Milliman and Prince (1989) and Jung et al. (1996). These studies focus on industry
wide adoption. This approach has been criticized by Requate and Unold (2003),
who consider the equilibrium incentives of individual firms to adopt.
A more explicit analysis of the effect of environmental policies on the incen-
tives created by patents is conducted by Laffont and Tirole (1996b) and Denicolo`
(1999). Under certain conditions, they establish equivalence of taxes and permits
both with respect to static efficiency as well as in terms of dynamic incentives for
R&D. However, dynamic efficiency can be seriously limited if the government is
unable to commit on future environmental policy ex-ante.
The reverse interaction, namely whether patents affect the performance of en-
vironmental instruments, has largely been ignored so far. A notable exception is
Requate (2005a). He finds that the market power created by patents distorts adop-
tion decisions both under emission taxes and permits. Part II extends this approach
to various settings and qualifies previous findings by Denicolo` (1999).
Moreover, green horizontal innovation calls for new implementation strategies.
Part II shows why conventional instruments such as a combination of patents with
taxes or permits might fail to implement the desired plans and develops strategies
that - at least in principle - are able to overcome these obstacles. If research incen-
tives are provided by patents, only hybrid tax-permit schemes are able to achieve
both static efficiency and positive research incentives. That is, because by definition
patents create monopoly power.
Allowing for more flexibility with respect to the design of environmental in-
struments, however, poses challenges in situations with only one pollutant and a
government which is unable to commit to details of future policies. Hybrid schemes
give the government more controll over equilibrium quantities. Although increased
control generally improves static efficiency, it can be detrimental to research incen-
tives in situations where there is a trade-off between the two objectives. Part III
shows for a number of exemplary cases that an endogenous design of environmental
instruments often reduces and sometimes destroys incentives to invest in R&D. In
2For reviews see Jaffe et al. (2002) and Requate (2005b).
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addition to the endogenous design of instruments, the impact of a revenue objec-
tive by the government is analyzed. Somewhat surprisingly its effect on research
incentives is ambiguous. Although one might expect this objective to increase the
incentives to effectively expropriate the patent holding firm (or not to grant a patent
in the first place), this consequence only holds in some situations.
The results of part III highlight the well known conflict between static and
dynamic efficiency with patent based research incentives and show that it is relevant
in the context of environmental innovation. Previous studies have tended to ignore
this issue.
The insights of parts II and III are used to derive implementation strategies for
the optimal policies under multiple green horizontal innovation presented in part I.
1.3 Implementation and the Ability of a Government to
Commit
Endogenous design of environmental instruments reflect an increase in the govern-
ment’s set of choice variables. Moreover, in some cases revenue objectives intensify
the time-inconsistency problem in policy making. Credible commitments to future
instrument choice and design bear a large potential to increase the long-run efficiency
of the economy. Part IV investigates how the internal organization of government
can increase its ability to commit.
Rogoff (1985) proposed delegation of specific tasks to an independent agency
as an effective mean for a government to credibly bind its hands . However, this
view has been criticized for taking commitment on the institutional structure, i.e.
delegation, for granted (McCallum 1995). Part IV takes up this critique and uses
the same commitment technologies to induce credibility in policies as well as in
institutional choices. It presents a model where both delegation and the level of
commitment are endogenous. While in a deterministic setting delegation has no
effect on commitment, as predicted by McCallum (1995), this relation no longer
holds if exogenous shocks to the economy become relevant. Delegation then allows
to reduce the trade-off between flexibility and credibility. Without delegation the
commitment not to change a specific policy reduces the government’s ability to
adjust to shocks. If, however, the policy choice is transfered to an independent
party, the level of commitment and the ability to adjust to unforeseen changes are
no longer equivalent. As a result, a government has more incentives to invest in
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commitment if it delegates. Hence, although both, the actual policy choice and the
institutional structure, are subject to the same commitment technology, policies are
more credible under delegation. This finding is in line with empirical evidence on
central bank independence. The results derived in part IV are of relevance beyond
the area of optimal environmental regulation.
1.4 Methodology
The starting point of this thesis is to incorporate an empirical observation, green
horizontal innovation, into the economic literature. The analysis, however, is theo-
retical in nature. The employed models are tailored to capture the essence of the
problems and results are stylized. Nevertheless, the policies derived are in line with
real world phenomena. An econometric analysis testing and calibrating the results
lies beyond the scope of this thesis, but provides fruitful research for the future.
Part I takes a social planner’s perspective and studies first best pollution and
R&D policies in an infinite horizon, continuous time, multi-stage optimal control
problem. In this setting the number of state and control variables is endogenous.
New technologies introduce a new stock pollutant and a new output to be controlled
by the planner. Moreover, the timing and number of innovations are subject to
the planner’s discretion. The tools to study multi-stage dynamic optimal controll
problems have recently been developed by Tomiyama (1985) and Makris (2001).
However, in order to allow for technological uncertainty, i.e. that R&D efforts ei-
ther produce a green horizontal innovation or a backstop, the established necessary
conditions have to be adjusted. The incorporation of a simple form of uncertainty
at the switching instances constitutes the methodical contribution of this thesis.
The models in parts II to IV are formulated in a game theoretic setting and
the social planner is, generally, replaced by a benevolent government and a private
sector. The resulting strategic interaction between players, such as monopoly pricing
and time-inconsistency, allows to model relevant issues of implementation and to
derive detailed policy recommendations. The setting in parts II and III, with the
exception of chapters 14 and 21, spans only two discrete periods in time. Chapters
14 and 21 join the continuous, multi-stage optimal controll problem of part I with
the decentralized framework of parts II and III. They show that there is a first best
closed loop equilibrium and present the corresponding implementation strategies.
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Part I
Green Horizontal Innovation:
The Social Optimum3
3This part is based on three papers jointly written with Timo Goeschl (Goeschl and Perino
2007a,b,c)
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Part I
2.1 Backstop Technologies and the Environment
Backstop technologies are a common point of reference in dynamic models of the
environment and natural resources, beginning with the influential study by Nordhaus
(1973) on exhaustible sources of energy. He defines a backstop as
”. . . a set of processes that is capable of meeting demand requirements
and has a virtually infinite resource base.” (Nordhaus 1973, pp. 547-548)
More recently, in the context of the expanding literature on the economics of stock
pollutants, ”the backstop” has become a shorthand for perfectly clean technologies
that do not suffer from a stock pollution problem. In both cases, the backstop allows
the decision maker to escape a binding constraint forever.
The existing literature on backstops offers optimal timing rules regarding the
phasing in of a backstop in a variety of different settings and under varying degrees
of uncertainty. In the area of non-renewable resources, Dasgupta and Heal (1974)
study optimal exhaustion when the arrival time of the exogenously provided backstop
technology is stochastic. Hung and Quyen (1993) endogenize the decision when
to invest in R&D in a setting where the length of time required to develop the
backstop is uncertain. Tsur and Zemel (2003) develop a deterministic model with the
difference that the backstop can be continuously improved through additional R&D.
Just et al. (2005) provide a stochastic, but discrete analysis of a similar problem. In
the context of stock pollution Baudry (2000) applies real options theory in a setting
where the backstop arrives stochastically after R&D is commenced; and Fischer
et al. (2004) consider the optimal investment path for an existing clean backstop
technology.
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2.2 Green Horizontal Innovation
One type of uncertainty that has not been considered so far in the literature is
uncertainty about the characteristics of new technologies. Commonly, models rely
on an assumption of technological certainty in R&D: If the backstop is not already
available, the next technology to be invented will constitute a backstop. A well de-
fined R&D investment will therefore generate a final resolution of the intertemporal
constraint. Although there are a few exceptions (e.g. Baudry (2000)) that allow for
the new technology to be cleaner but still polluting, they keep the assumption that
the new technology is strictly superior.
Looking at the empirical record, this idea is at least arguable. Some prominent
examples like the history of refrigeration illustrate this point. The most important
cooling agents, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), are a pollutant blamed for the deple-
tion of the ozone layer. Their introduction resulted from the search for a substitute
for poisonous refrigerants such as ammonia and sulphur dioxide that due to leak-
ages caused a significant number of casualties. Even such well known figures as
Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard, who jointly invented and patented three different
refrigeration technologies, each with its own specific drawbacks, were involved in the
search for less dangerous technological solutions (Dannen 1997). When CFCs were
discovered, they seemed to constitute a backstop since no adverse environmental or
health effects were apparent at the time and production sufficiently cheap to allow
for widespread diffusion during the mid-20th century. However, after humanity be-
came aware of their ozone-depleting effect and the associated damages, they were
banned by the Montreal Protocol. However, although newly developed substitutes
such as HCFC-123 were demonstrated to feature a more benign stratospheric chem-
istry, they also imply a different stock pollution problem on account of decaying into
toxic pollutants such as trifluoroacetic acid (Likens et al. 1997).
Primary substitutes for fossil fuels, nuclear energy and ethanol, may provide
advantageous properties with respect to exhaustibility and climate impact, but while
the former involves the production of long-lived stocks of radioactive waste the latter
is suspected to induce increases in ozone-related mortality in major cities (Jacobson
2007). Other examples of green horizontal innovation are petrol and diesel engines
used in cars and chlorine1 production.
Moreover, most end-of-pipe technologies fit into the green horizontal innovation
1See Snyder et al. (2003)
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category. In automobiles catalytic converters reduce emissions of hydrocarbons and
carbon monoxide but at the cost of higher sulphur oxide concentrations (Tietenberg
1992). Hydrocarbons are precursors of low level ozone, carbon monoxide is poisonous
and sulphur oxides cause acid rain. Scrubbers and electrostatic precipitators remove
lead and particulate matter (PM) from exhaust air by converting them into waste
water or solids.2 Harrison and Antweiler (2003) find that the Canadian industry
has made extensive use of end-of-pipe solutions and that significant shifts in the
composition of pollution has occurred during the nineties.
These are only some illustrations of a more general observation, namely that
technologies developed in response to binding intertemporal constraints may relax
those constraints, but will not always allow decision-makers to escape them indef-
initely. In such a situation, investments in R&D have to be considered under the
premise that the arrival of a backstop is only one of two possible outcomes of the
innovation process. Instead, R&D may generate a technology that is novel, but has
strings attached in the form of an intertemporal pollution dynamic of its own. The
possibility of the intertemporal constraint recurring even after R&D resources have
been expended is the possibility of technological ’boomerangs’.
Despite its practical importance, green horizontal innovation has received little
attention in the economics literature so far. Moslener and Lange (2004) compare
the prospects of a new technology with initially uncertain environmental effects
to an established one that causes well known damages. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for a new polluting technology to be desirable have recently been derived
by Winkler (2005). There is also a related growth literature where technologies using
different environmental resources compete (Chakravorty et al. 1997) or innovation
creates a new damage (Smulders et al. 2005). However, the optimal mix of different
damages, the potential for multiple innovations and technological uncertainty are
not considered.
2.3 Research Questions
In this part, the implications of allowing for technological uncertainty over innovation
outcomes on optimal R&D timing is studied, choosing the context of stock pollutants
as a setting. To model technological uncertainty, consider a decision-maker who
attaches a probability to the possibility that new technologies may not turn out
2See Greenstone (2003)
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to be the clean backstop that will solve the pollution problem once and for all,
and allow these beliefs about the probabilities to become decision-relevant. This
small change in the assumptions about the decision-maker’s view about the likely
environmental characteristics of new technologies has important repercussions for
his thinking about pollution policies and R&D timing. The change extends the set
of possible future states of the world to situations where new technologies turn out
to have undesirable properties. This means that R&D may have to be undertaken
more than once in order to solve the pollution problem. In fact, the possibility of
lengthy sequences of failures to find a backstop despite R&D investment can no
longer be excluded by the planner. This has repercussions for the optimal pollution
policy since future costs of current emissions depend on the degree of uncertainty
over the discovery of a backstop.
While it seems clear that the possibility of receiving (possibly multiple) technolo-
gies of the ’boomerang ’ type in the quest for a backstop should change the optimal
prescriptions both for environmental and for technology policy, the precise nature
of these changes is less obvious. Should the policymaker respond to the presence of
technological uncertainty with higher or lower R&D efforts? Should R&D be car-
ried out on a large scale right at the start (front loaded) or spread out over time?
How should the policymaker respond to the invention of a ’boomerang’ technology
- with more R&D right away or with waiting? Should R&D ever stop even though
a backstop has not been found yet? In what follows, a specific setting is developed
in which these questions can be answered on the basis of analytical solutions. This
is in order to develop a first intuition on the impact of technological uncertainty on
optimal R&D and in order to provide a building block for considering more general
cases in the future.
Nevertheless, some extensions are discussed in chapter 6. Among these are ex-
ogenous and endogenous changes in the costs of R&D, evolving beliefs of the social
planner about the probability to develop a backstop by conducting an additional
R&D project, asymmetric boomerang technologies and more general social welfare
functions. However, in some cases the results remain sketchy, since no analytical
solutions exist, e.g. due to the lack of necessary conditions for infinite horizon,
multi-stage optimal control problems with an infinite number of switches.
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2.4 Outline of the Model and the Methodology Used
The simple and tractable model consists of a production sector producing a single
product up to a fixed output constraint, with one technology of the boomerang type
available ab initio. Production generates a profile of technology-specific pollutants.
Once a backstop is available, that part of production carried out using the backstop
will produce no pollution at all. Damages are convex in the stock of each pollutant
and additive across pollutants, giving rise to gains from diversification in pollutants
and hence incentives for conducting R&D even when a backstop is not feasible. To
retain a clear focus on the role of uncertainty, other important R&D drivers, such
as reductions in unit costs, whose impacts have been established in the literature
are excluded from the analysis. R&D has a deterministic component in that at any
given time, a new technology with zero stock of initial pollution can be provided at
a fixed cost. What is uncertain, however, are the environmental characteristics of
the new technology. Under the decision-maker’s beliefs, R&D carried out at a given
point in time will fail to generate a backstop with a certain probability and will
generate a technology involving a new stock pollutant instead. Given this setting,
the optimal timing of R&D and the optimal pollution policy are studied. This part
focuses on the social planner’s perspective. Issues of implementation are treated in
subsequent parts.
In order to derive the optimal R&D trajectory recent results on multi-stage
optimal control with infinite horizons are utilized. This technique allows to capture
a process of technological evolution in which new technologies are added in a discrete
fashion. In addition to applying this technique to the question of optimal R&D
trajectories, the first application of this technique to a situation characterized by
uncertainty over the properties of the next stage of the optimal control problem is
presented. This involves a suitable modification of the necessary conditions derived
by Makris (2001) and Tomiyama (1985).3
2.5 Key Results
Key findings are that in this setting the optimal R&D program (i) is strictly sequen-
tial, (ii) has an endogenous stopping point and (iii) there is a constant pollution
stock threshold level that triggers research and is above the long run steady state of
3For a more formal treatment of deterministic infinite horizon multi-stage optimal control prob-
lems see Babad (1995).
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pollution stocks (overshooting). Technological uncertainty affects both the optimal
timing and the maximum size of the technology portfolio. The optimal pollution
policy becomes more sophisticated if research fails to deliver a backstop technology.
Relaxing some of the assumptions of the model yields the following qualifica-
tions. If the costs of R&D are decreasing either in the number of already developed
technologies (learning by doing) or in time (exogenous technological change) more
technologies are developed. The maximum size of the technology portfolio can even
approach infinity. In the opposite case, where the costs of R&D increase, innovations
become less frequent. Endogenizing the probability to develop a backstop comes in
two varieties. If, on the one hand, the social planner believes that sequences of R&D
’failures’ (i.e. boomerang technologies) make the arrival of a backstop more likely,
then more innovation occurs than under the baseline. However, the sequence of in-
novations is always finite which contrasts the case of decreasing costs of research. If,
on the other hand, the social planner becomes disaffected by a series of boomerangs,
the number of attempts (and hence the change to end up with a backstop) decrease
compared to the baseline. Relaxing the symmetry assumptions regarding the char-
acteristics of boomerang technologies does not change the qualitative pattern of the
pollution and research policies. One exception, however, are different costs of pro-
duction. If they vary sufficiently across technologies the more expensive types might
be abandoned forever at some stage even if no backstop is developed. A feature not
present in the baseline model.
The structure of this part is as follows: In the next chapter, the model set-up is
described. Chapter 4 develops the optimal pollution policy for a given number of
technologies. In chapter 5 the optimal timing of R&D under technological uncer-
tainty is studied. Extensions to the baseline are presented in chapter 6 and chapter
7 concludes this part.
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Chapter 3
The Model
The model presented in this chapter is intended to capture the discrete nature of
technological change arising from the development of distinct technologies and the
uncertainties inherent in developing technologies with previously unknown environ-
mental properties. Key features of the model are a potentially very large number of
technologies, an infinite planning horizon, and endogenous timing of R&D. At the
same time the model retains the ability to generate analytical results.
3.1 The Environment-Economy Link
First, the environmental side of the model is described, which together with the
innovation side describes a setting in which pollution and R&D policies are jointly
determined. Environmental outcomes are modeled in the form of the standard
stock pollution model common in the literature (Fischer et al. 2004, Baudry 2000).
With n (t) potential pollutants i ∈ {1, ...n (t)} present at time t, the stock of each
individual pollutant Si (t) evolves according to
S˙i(t) = αiqi(t)− δiSi(t), (3.1)
with αi denoting the accumulation coefficient per unit of emissions qi of pollutant i
and δi denoting the natural rate of decay of its stock.
Technologies and pollutants in this model have a one-to-one relationship such
that i denotes both the pollutant and its generating technology. Pollution damage
at time t D
(
S1 (t) , ..., Sn(t) (t)
)
is determined by pollution stocks only and is given
by
D(S1(t), ..., Sn(t)(t)) =
n(t)∑
i=1
di
2
Si(t)2, (3.2)
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with di denoting the marginal damage coefficient of pollutant i. Note that pollution
damage is additively separable in the square of stocks of individual pollutants and
that pollutants therefore do not interact with each other.
The general form of the instantaneous welfare from production at time t is as-
sumed to be additively separable
W (t) =
n(t)∑
i=1
[
qi (t)
β − ci (qi, t)− di2 Si(t)
2
]
(3.3)
with ci (qi, t) denoting the production cost at time t given output qi and 0 < β ≤ 1.
Given the general form of (3.3), there are at least five reasons for conducting R&D
in such a setting: (1) Cost reduction (Tirole 1988), thus targeting ci (qi, t)); (2)
improvements in the output-emission ratio (e.g. Denicolo` 1999, Fischer et al. 2003)
through searching for products with lower αi, a backstop being a special case with
αi = 0; (3) amelioration of environmental damages through finding less harmful
or less persistent pollutants, implying a lower di (where di = 0 again represents a
backstop) or a higher δi; (4) technological diversification that increases the variety
of consumer goods on account of new technologies (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) if β < 1
and marginal welfare is hence decreasing in the output of each individual product;
and finally (5) technological diversification that increases the variety of existing
pollutants because damage is convex in each individual pollution stock but additive
across stocks.
All of the reasons mentioned above individually provide positive incentives for
resources to be devoted to R&D. Most relevant for a policy problem involving un-
certainty about whether the R&D process delivers perfectly clean backstops or im-
perfect boomerang technologies are the extreme versions of the second and the third
case and the last setting where diversification in pollutants is the primary reason for
devoting resources to R&D. Therefore, we design a model that strips out all these
other well established drivers before exploring the implications of additional factors
in chapter 6.
One mechanism underpinning R&D investments then is similar in spirit to the
well-known product differentiation models of the ”horizontal innovation” type (Gan-
cia and Zilibotti 2005), with one important difference: Instead of increases in the
variety of products, it is increases in the variety of pollutants that generates welfare
gains by decreasing marginal damages associated with production. In this sense, a
process of ”green” horizontal innovation of pollution differentiation is modeled. A
second mechanism is the quest for a final solution to the pollution problem. The
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chance to develop a backstop (see next section), adds to the attractiveness of R&D.
As a consequence, the model that follows contains some important simplifications
regarding the heterogeneity of pollutants and the shape of the social welfare function:
With the exception of the backstop, technologies (and therefore pollutants) are
assumed to be symmetric in terms of their coefficient of accumulation αi = α, rate of
decay δi = δ, and the marginal damage coefficient di = d. The backstop on the other
hand, representing a ’perfectly clean’ technology, is characterized by zero damages
and no accumulation such that dB = 0 and αB = 0. For all technologies, costs
are assumed symmetric and zero such that ci (qi, t) = 0. Technologies are perfect
substitutes (β = 1) and symmetric in terms of net marginal benefits which are
normalized to 1 per unit of output. Aggregate output is exogenously bounded from
above as in Baudry (2000). This is an indirect way of taking a downward-sloping
demand function and capital stock constraints into account
n(t)∑
i=1
qi(t) ≤ 1, (3.4)
0 ≤ qi(t), ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n (t)}. (3.5)
The symmetry of the technologies in terms of the production-pollution side of the
model then simplifies the instantaneous welfare function (3.3) to
W (t) =
n(t)∑
i=1
[
qi(t)− di2 Si(t)
2
]
(3.6)
in which boomerang technologies now differ in terms of vintage only and the backstop
technology differs in terms of damage intensity. Both the symmetry assumption
with respect to boomerang technologies and the shape of the welfare function will
be somewhat relaxed in chapter 6.
3.2 The R&D Process
Innovation is modeled as follows: At any time t, society can choose to spend resources
R (t) which will make available instantaneously and with certainty the n+1st tech-
nology. The point in time when the n + 1st technology is developed is denoted
by tn+1. The number of technologies n(t) available for production at t therefore
depends on the sequence of past investments {t1, ..., tn}. The environmental charac-
teristics of the new technology are not known prior to its arrival. With probability
p, the n+ 1st technology turns out to constitute a technology of the backstop type.
In the event, the number of technologies remains fixed from then on as there is no
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further rationale for resources to be spent on R&D in a setting where technologies
are otherwise perfect substitutes. With probability (1− p), the n+1st technology is
of the boomerang type. Use of the new technology therefore involves the generation
of a novel, technology-specific pollutant (see Figure 3.1).
1
2
3
4
p
1-p
d2=0
d4=0
d3=0d2=d
d3=d
d4=d
p
p
1-p
1-p
d1=d
Figure 3.1: Potential Sequence of Innovations
While it is possible in principle that the decision-maker would choose to develop
more than one technology at a single point in time, the presentation in the main part
abstracts from this possibility. Allowing for multiple innovations at a single point in
time significantly adds to the notational burden. It is shown in appendix A.4 that
innovation is indeed sequential. Hence, in what follows attention is restricted to a
situation in which at any given point in time t, at most one technology is developed.
All new technologies start with an initial stock of pollution Sn (tn) = 0 and can
at once be used at any level of intensity.1 For convenience, it is assumed that the
current cost of R&D is independent of time such that R (t) = R and that initially,
one technology is available such that n (0) = 1. Furthermore, it is assumed that
there is an arbitrarily large but finite number of potential technological solutions M
that can possibly be developed. Each of these solutions is a simple lottery. At the
instant they are converted into technologies by R&D they materialize either as a
backstop (with probability p) or as a ’boomerang’ (with probability 1 − p). Hence,
p is independent of both the maximum number of technologies feasible, M , and of
the number of technologies already developed, n. This independence is relaxed in
section 6.2 when the social planner’s belief about the arrival probability p is evolving
depending on observation of previous R&D outcomes.
1Questions about the optimal accumulation of technology specific capital (as e.g. Fischer et al.
(2004)) are not studied.
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In this stylized model there are two motives for carrying out R&D. The first is
the chance to acquire a backstop and thereby solve the pollution problem once and
for all; the second is pollution differentiation: Due to increasing marginal damages
in pollution stocks and additive damages across pollutants, a new technology with
a new pollutant and a zero stock creates social gains. Individually, these motives
generate distinct R&D trajectories. In the absence of gains from pollution differen-
tiation, it is readily apparent that the backstop motive will imply that it is either
never optimal to undertake research or, once a certain pollution threshold is reached,
investment continues until a backstop is developed. Which state prevails depends
on the cost of R&D and the probability to develop a backstop. In the absence of
a backstop motive, there exists an optimal sequential and finite R&D program (see
chapter 5.3).
3.3 The Social Planner’s Problem
The decision-maker’s problem is therefore characterized by two linkages between
the innovation and pollution policy: Firstly, the past history of R&D determines
the planner’s current degrees of freedom in allocating production to different tech-
nologies. Secondly, depending on research success regarding the backstop, additional
R&D may optimally be undertaken or not.
The solution to the social planner’s problem involves characterizing the control
processes of production quantities and R&D timing given the state processes of stock
dynamics. The heuristic strategy involves separating the problems into an optimal
pollution policy given the number and type of technologies already developed and
the optimal R&D policy that determines the extension of the set of technologies at
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any given point in time. The problem is then
max
{qi(t)},{t2,t3,...,tN},{N}
=
∫ t2
0
e−rt
[(
q1 − d12 S
2
1
)]
dt− e−rt2R
+ p
∫ ∞
t2
e−rt
[
2∑
i=1
(
qi − di2 S
2
i
)]
dt
+ (1− p)
{∫ t3
t2
e−rt
[
2∑
i=1
(
qi − d2S
2
i
)]
dt− e−rt3R
+ p
∫ ∞
t3
e−rt
[
3∑
i=1
(
qi − di2 S
2
i
)]
dt
+ (1− p)
{∫ t4
t3
e−rt
[
3∑
i=1
(
qi − d2S
2
i
)]
dt− e−rt4R
+ p...
+ (1− p)
∫ ∞
tN
e−rt
[
N∑
i=1
(
qi − d2S
2
i
)]
dt
}
...
}
, (3.7)
subject to conditions (3.1), (3.4) and (3.5).
To sum up, the nature of the planner’s problem describes a situation in which the
choices of pollution policy and R&D policy are linked in two ways. Firstly, the past
history of R&D determines the planner’s current degrees of freedom in allocating
production shares to different technologies. Secondly, depending on research success
regarding the backstop, additional R&D may optimally be undertaken or not.
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Chapter 4
The Optimal Pollution Policy
4.1 The First Order Conditions
With uncertainty only entering at instants of innovation, the optimal pollution pol-
icy between any two innovation events is a standard deterministic Markov-process
where the number of state variables equals the number of available technologies.
Conditional on the number and type of technologies and the pollution stocks at the
beginning of the considered planning period, the optimal policy can be derived. This
is done in this chapter while the optimal R&D policy is studied in chapter 5. Note
that while studying the optimal pollution policy the number of technologies remains
fixed at n = n(ti) for all t ∈ [ti, ti+1), i = {1, ..., N}, where t1 = 0 is the arrival time
of the first (free) technology.
Before deriving the optimal pollution policy, two observations are made regard-
ing the optimal pollution and post-backstop R&D policy that greatly simplify the
subsequent analysis. The first is that with a perfectly clean technology at hand, it
will be used to the capacity limit while output of all polluting technologies is zero.
Second, if a backstop is developed no further innovation takes place. Given the
model’s specification both statements are intuitive and easy to prove.
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Given the number of technologies n, the Hamiltonian of problem (3.7) is
Hn =
n∑
j=2
[
p(1− p)j−2e−rtWBackj (t)
]
+ (1− p)n−1e−rtWBoomn(t)
+
n∑
j=2
{
p(1− p)j−2
j∑
i=1
[
µ
Backj
i (t)
(
αiq
Backj
i − δiSBackji
)]}
+(1− p)n−1
n∑
i=1
[
µBoomni (t)
(
αqBoomni − δSBoomni
)]
+
n∑
j=2
[
p(1− p)j−2e−rtκBackj (t)
(
1−
n∑
i=1
q
Backj
i (t)
)]
+(1− p)n−1e−rtκBoomn(t)
(
1−
n∑
i=1
qBoomni (t)
)
,
whereWBackj (t) is instantaneous welfare given technology j is a backstop and hence
j is the size of the technology portfolio andWBoomn(t) is instantaneous welfare given
all n technologies are of the boomerang type. The same notational conventions apply
to the shadow prices of pollution stocks, µ, and the shadow prices of the output
constraint, κ.
The corresponding first order conditions yield
e−rt + αµBoomni (t)− e−rtκBoomn(t) = 0, (4.1)
e−rtdSBoomni (t) + δµ
Boomn
i (t) = µ˙
Boomn
i , (4.2)
that together with the transversality condition
lim
t→∞H
∗
N (t) = 0, (4.3)
where H∗N is the maximized Hamiltonian, determine the optimal pollution policy.
Note that (4.1) holds only along the singular path and therefore gives rise to the
following switching function (Spence and Starrett 1975)
σi(t) = e−rt + αµBoomni (t)− e−rtκBoomn(t)

< 0 ⇒ qBoomni (t) = 0
= 0 ⇒ qBoomni (t) = qBoom
∗
n
i (t)
> 0 ⇒ qBoomni (t) = 1
(4.4)
The pollution policy is more complex in the case where only technologies of
the boomerang type are available than in a situation with a backstop. Depending
on pollution stocks, three relevant cases require consideration: Case (a) features
pollution stocks that are symmetric across all technologies. This is the singular case
presented in section 4.2. Case (b) is characterized by one technology initially having
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a zero stock while the stocks of all other technologies are symmetric and positive.
This is a non-singular case presented in section 4.3. Finally, we consider another
non-singular case (c) with one technology initially at a zero pollution stock while
the stocks of other technologies are at different positive levels (see section 4.4). This
selection is exhaustive because by assumption new technologies always start with
a zero pollution stock. Case (a) describes the case before the first innovation and
after convergence of new and incumbent technologies. If innovation occurs while the
economy is in phase (a), then case (b) is relevant. However, if the economy is in
phase (b) or (c) when innovation occurs, then case (c) applies.
4.2 The Singular Solution
The singular solution holds for all technologies for which the switching function (4.4)
is zero
σi(t) = 0. (4.5)
Symmetric stock levels are required for the switching function to be zero for more
than one technology. On the singular path, all technologies will obey the following
shadow price dynamics
µBoomni (t) =
e−rt
α
(κn(t)− 1) , (4.6)
µ˙Boomni (t) = −
e−rt
α
[r (κn(t)− 1)− κ˙n(t)] . (4.7)
Three cases have to be considered:1
Case 1: κn = 0 and κ˙n = 0
Case 2: κn > 0 and κ˙n = 0
Case 3: κn > 0 and κ˙n 6= 0
Case 1
In this case, production does not exhaust the capacity constraint (3.4). The con-
straint is therefore not binding (κn = 0). Using the first order condition (4.2) and
the shadow price dynamics (4.6) and (4.7) we obtain
S
Boom∗n
i (t) =
r + δ
αd
, (4.8)
q
Boom∗n
i (t) =
δ(r + δ)
α2d
, (4.9)
1These are the relevant cases because κn can not become negative in this problem.
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with the superscript Boom denoting output levels when no backstop is available.
The steady state defined in case 1 is ”incomplete” in the sense that the marginal
damage of pollution outweighs the marginal benefit of production before the capacity
constraint becomes binding. Output and stock levels of the incomplete steady state
depend positively on the discount rate and negatively on the rate of pollution decay,
the accumulation coefficient and the marginal damages of pollution. In case 1,
equilibrium output and pollution stock of technologies do not depend on the number
of technologies. However, the existence of the ’incomplete’ steady state requires that
n
δ(r + δ)
α2d
≤ 1, (4.10)
which is a function of n. For each set of exogenous parameters thus, there is an
upper bound of n above which the incomplete steady state is not feasible.
Case 2
Here, the steady state is ’complete’: The capacity constraint (3.4) is binding (κn > 0)
at a constant corresponding shadow price (κ˙n = 0). Again, using the symmetry as-
sumptions, (4.2), (4.6) and (4.7), we find
S
Boom∗n
i (t) =
α
δn
, (4.11)
q
Boom∗n
i (t) =
1
n
. (4.12)
The number of available technologies uniquely determines equilibrium output, with
the steady state pollution stocks a function of the accumulation coefficient α, the
depreciation rate of pollution δ and the number of technologies. The discount rate
r and the slope of the damage function d do not affect the steady state. Existence
of the ’complete’ steady state requires that
n
δ(r + δ)
α2d
> 1. (4.13)
Note, that (4.10) and (4.13) are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Case 3
This case is characterized by a binding capacity constraint (κBoomn > 0) and a
changing shadow price of the capacity constraint. Case 3 is therefore not a steady
state. Using symmetry and (4.2), (4.6) and (4.7) we find
S
Boom∗n
i (t) =
α
δn
− α
δn
e−δt, (4.14)
q
Boom∗n
i (t) =
1
n
. (4.15)
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These conditions define a most rapid approach path to a steady state where all
technologies have equal initial pollution stocks. In t = 0 the economy has to be in
this case because by assumption n(0) = 1 and S1(0) = 0.2 As stocks accumulate
according to (4.14) and no innovation occurs, the economy either reaches the in-
complete steady state (Case 1) or approaches the complete steady state (Case 2).
Which steady state is relevant is determined by conditions (4.10) and (4.13).
4.3 Innovation with Symmetric Stocks
The analysis of the singular case restricts attention to situations with symmetric
pollution stocks across all technologies. Obviously, in the event of an innovation
at some point in time tn > 0, this restriction cannot apply: While the incumbent
technologies {1, ..., n−1} have already accumulated some stock, that of the new one,
n, is still zero. As pollution stocks differ across new and established technologies,
so will their respective shadow prices. Assume that this is the first innovation at
some strictly positive point in time (though, it will be shown later that the analysis
also applies to all subsequent innovations). When a boomerang is developed the
pollution stocks are
S
Boom∗n
i (tn) =
α
δ(n− 1) −
α
δ(n− 1)e
−δtn , i = 1, ..., n− 1, (4.16)
SBoom
∗
n
n (tn) = 0. (4.17)
Here, the singular condition (4.5) cannot hold for all technologies simultaneously
but only for one of the two sets of technologies. Since SBoom
∗
n
i (tn) > S
Boom∗n
n (tn)
and therefore µBoomni (tn) < µ
Boomn
n (tn) it has to hold that σi(tn) < σn(tn). Due to
(3.4), (4.5) can only hold for the new technology while for all n− 1 old technologies
σi(tn) < 0 and hence
q
Boom∗n
i (t) = 0, ∀t ∈
[
tn, tˆn
]
, i = 1, ..., n− 1, (4.18)
qBoom
∗
n
n (t) = 1, ∀t ∈
[
tn, tˆn
]
. (4.19)
These conditions define the most rapid approach path to a situation where pollution
stocks of all technologies are equal. The corresponding stock dynamics are
S
Boom∗n
i (t) = S
Boom∗n
i (tn)e
−δ(t−tn), ∀t ∈ [tn, tˆn] , (4.20)
SBoom
∗
n
n (t) =
α
δ
− α
δ
e−δ(t−tn), ∀t ∈ [tn, tˆn] , (4.21)
2The same holds for n(0) > 1. Since for all i ∈ {1, ..., n(0)} it holds that SBoomni (0) = 0.
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where tˆn is the point in time where S
Boom∗n
i (tˆn) = S
Boom∗n
n (tˆn). Using (4.20) and
(4.21) the point of convergence is at
tˆn = tn +
1
δ
ln
[
δ
α
S
Boom∗n
i (tn) + 1
]
. (4.22)
Between tˆn and the next innovation, all technologies are used in equal amounts.
Their stocks grow according to the ’Case 3’-process
S
Boom∗n
l (t) =
α
δn
− α
δn
e−δ(t−t¯n), t > tˆn, l = 1, ..., n. (4.23)
This process has a virtual starting point, t¯n, determined by
S
Boom∗n
l (tˆn) = S
Boom∗n
i (tˆn), i = 1, ..., n− 1, l = 1, ..., n, (4.24)
which yields
t¯n = 0. (4.25)
The path of the pollution stock after innovation and convergence (4.23) is therefore
identical to the one where all n technologies are available at t = 0 (4.14). The process
of analyzing the subsequent arrival of boomerang technologies is therefore analogous,
by substituting in the respective new value for n. This analogy hinges, however, on
the condition that innovation takes places after convergence. The following section
(c) analyzes the alternative case.
4.4 Innovation with Asymmetric Stocks
Here, a boomerang technology arrives at tn ∈ {tn−1, tˆn−1} prior to pollution stocks
of technologies {1, ..., n−1} having converged. Again, the most rapid approach path
is optimal, i.e.
q
Boom∗n
i (t) = 0, ∀t ∈
[
tn, tˆn
]
, i = 1, ..., n− 1, (4.26)
qBoom
∗
n
n (t) = 1, ∀t ∈
[
tn, tˆn
]
. (4.27)
Applying the same heuristics as above for deriving tˆn, the point in time at which
convergence of the stocks of technologies n− 1 and n occurs is
tˆn = tn +
1
δ
ln
[
δ
α
S
Boom∗n
i (tn) + 1
]
. (4.28)
It is a question of the optimal timing of R&D whether or not this case ever arises.
This question is addressed in the following chapter. For this, it is useful to note that
asymmetric stocks do not affect the optimal pollution policy after the development
of a backstop technology.
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Chapter 5
The Optimal Timing of R&D
5.1 Setup of the Optimal Timing Decision for R&D
The previous chapter derived the optimal contingent pollution policies. Given these
policies, the social planner faces the problem at which points in time to invest into
R&D and thereby acquire a new technology that can turn out to be either of the
backstop or the boomerang type.
The following analysis is based on recent results on multi-stage dynamic opti-
mization techniques derived by Makris (2001) and Tomiyama (1985). The applica-
tion of the technique to the problem at hand is natural: Here, a stage is defined
by reference to the number n of technologies available for production. Switching
between stages n and n + 1 involves carrying out R&D at cost R. While the nec-
essary conditions derived by Tomiyama (1985) and Makris (2001) are established
in the context of a deterministic setting, they are easily modified for the simple
discrete probability distribution studied here in order to account for the uncertainty
regarding the type of technology developed at the point of switching.
Given the initial endowment of n(0) = 1 technologies the optimization problem
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is as follows
max
{t2,t3,...,tN},{N}
J =
∫ t2
0
e−rt
[(
q
Boom∗1
1 −
d
2
(SBoom
∗
1
1 )
2
)]
dt− e−rt2R
+ (1− p)
{∫ t3
t2
e−rt
[
2∑
i=1
(
q
Boom∗2
i −
d
2
(SBoom
∗
2
i )
2
)]
dt− e−rt3R
}
+ p
{∫ ∞
t2
e−rt
[
2∑
i=1
(
q
Back∗2
i −
di
2
(SBack
∗
2
i )
2
)]
dt
}
+ . . .
+ (1− p)N−1
∫ ∞
tN
e−rt
[
N∑
i=1
(
q
Boom∗n
i −
d
2
(SBoom
∗
n
i )
2
)]
dt
+ p(1− p)N−2
∫ ∞
tN
e−rt
[
N∑
i=1
(
q
Back∗n
i −
di
2
(SBack
∗
n
i )
2
)]
dt, (5.1)
subject to (3.1) and (3.4). This is equivalent to (3.7) with the exception that the
optimal pollution policy has already been solved and that the path probabilities
(see Figure 3.1) have been multiplied out. The corresponding Hamiltonian for each
stage, where n technologies already exist, is
Hn =
n∑
j=2
[
p(1− p)j−2e−rtWBack∗j (t)
]
+ (1− p)n−1e−rtWBoom∗n(t)
+
n∑
j=2
{
p(1− p)j−2
j∑
i=1
[
µ
Backj
i (t)
(
αiq
Back∗j
i − δiS
Back∗j
i
)]}
(5.2)
+(1− p)n−1
n∑
i=1
[
µBoomni (t)
(
αq
Boom∗n
i − δSBoom
∗
n
i
)]
, n = 1, ..., N.
Given the optimal pollution policies, the applicable necessary conditions for the
optimal switching point are essentially those provided by Tomiyama (1985) and
Makris (2001). However, since there is uncertainty about the type of the technology
developed, they are modified accordingly (proof see appendix). Two conditions then
determine the optimal instant t∗n+1 to undertake R&D in order to develop the n+1st
technology. The first is a matching condition that requires that - in expected terms -
the pollution shadow prices of existing technologies are continuous at the switching
instant, i.e.
µ
Boom∗n
i (t
∗
n+1) = E
(
µˇ∗i (t
∗
n+1)
)
, i = 1, ..., n, (5.3)
where µBoom
∗
n
i (t
∗
n+1) is the shadow price of stock i at t
∗
n+1 with n boomerang tech-
nologies while E
(
µˇ∗i (t
∗
n+1)
)
= pµ
Back∗n+1
i (t
∗
n+1) + (1 − p)µ
Boom∗n+1
i (t
∗
n+1) is the ex-
pected shadow price of the same stock at the switching instant but ’after’ innovation
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given that optimal pollution policies are implemented. The shadow prices of pollu-
tion stocks depend on the optimal pollution policy. Since the latter is conditional
on the type of technology developed, so are the shadow prices. Hence the matching
condition of Tomiyama (1985) and Makris (2001) for the deterministic case (µi = µˇi)
must hold in expected terms.
The second condition is the research arbitrage condition
N−1∑
n=1
{[
H∗n (tn+1) + (1− p)n−1e−rtn+1rR−H∗n+1 (tn+1)
]
δtn+1
} ≤ 0, (5.4)
for any admissible perturbation δtn+1 in the innovation time t∗n+1.
Using both necessary conditions and substituting in the optimal pollution policies
this yields (proof see appendix)
rR ≤ α [E (µˇ∗n+1 (t∗n+1))− E (µˇ∗n (t∗n+1))] ert∗n+1 , t∗n+1 = 0, (5.5)
rR = α
[
E
(
µˇ∗n+1
(
t∗n+1
))− E (µˇ∗n (t∗n+1))] ert∗n+1 , t∗n+1 > 0, (5.6)
for the n+ 1st technology developed at instant t∗n+1. The optimal time to innovate
is when the marginal gain of waiting (the left hand sides) is not higher than the
expected marginal cost of doing so (the right hand sides). The latter is determined by
the difference between the expected shadow price of the new technology (E
(
µˇ∗n+1
)
)
and that of the lowest pollution stock of an active technology (E (µˇ∗n).
5.2 Characterization of the Optimal Innovation Policy
Here the key results on the optimal innovation policy are presented. The emphasis
is on developing the essential heuristic steps for characterizing the optimal policy,
with some of the algebraic manipulation relegated to the appendix where indicated.
Proposition 5.1 There is no upfront innovation at the beginning of the planning
period (t = 0).
Proof. At t = 0, the existing as well as any newly developed technology have -
by definition - a pollution stock of Si(0) = 0. If research produces a boomerang
technology it is perfectly symmetric to any already existing one. Hence, the shadow
prices are the same in this case: µBoom
∗
2
1 (0) = µ
Boom∗2
2 (0). If research produces a
backstop technology instead, the shadow price of the perfectly clean technology is
zero (µBack22 (0) = 0). The shadow price of any polluting technology at the instant a
backstop arrives is given by (see appendix)
µ
Backn+1
i
(
t∗n+1
)
= − d
r + 2δ
SBoomni
(
t∗n+1
)
e−rt
∗
n+1 , i = 1, ..., n. (5.7)
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At the beginning of the planning horizon all pollution stocks are zero and hence
µBack22 (0) = 0. Hence, the expected shadow prices of both the initially freely avail-
able and any newly developed technology at t = 0 are the same: E (µˇ∗2(0)) =
E (µˇ∗1(0)). Plugging this into (5.5) yields that there is no research upfront if R&D
is costly (R > 0) and the social planner not infinitely patient (r > 0). 
Proposition 5.2 Innovation is sequential. At most one technology is developed at
any point in time.
This property of the optimal R&D trajectory has been assumed to hold throughout
chapter 4 and the previous section in order to simplify the presentation. In appendix
A.4 it is proved that this is indeed optimal.
More detail about the optimal timing of research is obtained by replacing the
expected shadow prices in (5.6) with more explicit terms. First, rewrite (5.6) using
µ
Backn+1
n+1 = 0 as follows
rR = α
{
(1− p)µBoomn+1n+1
(
t∗n+1
)
(5.8)
−
[
pµBackn+1n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ (1− p)µBoomn+1n
(
t∗n+1
)]}
ert
∗
n+1 , t∗n+1 > 0.
µ
Backn+1
n
(
t∗n+1
)
is given by (5.7). Note that there is a link between µBoomn+1n+1
(
t∗n+1
)
and µBoomn+1n
(
t∗n+1
)
: Assuming the stocks of both boomerang technologies converge
at some point in time (this assumption is shown to be correct in Proposition 5.3),
technologies are at that point perfectly symmetric with respect to their exogenous
parameters, stocks and optimal future pollution policies. Hence, at the point of
convergence shadow prices of both technologies are the same. Using this link, it is
possible to express one shadow price in terms of the other. Given the optimality of
most rapid convergence except in the case of further innovations occurring in the
meantime (see (4.18) and (4.19)), the relation is as follows (proof see appendix)
µ
Boomn+1
n+1 (t
∗
n+1) = µ
Boomn+1
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ de−rt
∗
n+1
{
S
Boom∗n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
r + 2δ
(5.9)
− α
(r + δ)(r + 2δ)
[
1−
(
δ
α
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ 1
)− r+δ
δ
]}
.
Substituting (5.7) and (5.9) into (5.8) yields the research trigger condition
rR =
αd
r + 2δ
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)− (1− p)α2d
(r + δ)(r + 2δ)
[
1−
(
δ
α
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ 1
)− r+δ
δ
]
.
(5.10)
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This determines the optimal switching times t∗1, ..., t∗N and thereby the optimal num-
ber of technologies N if innovation occurs only when the pollution stocks of all
existing technologies have converged. Hence, the next issue is to proof that this is
indeed the case.
Proposition 5.3 Innovation occurs only at instances at which all available tech-
nologies are used simultaneously.
Proof. For any given interval [t1, t2] during which no innovation occurs, the gains
from innovation are monotonically increasing in the stock of the most recent tech-
nology and hence in time. Note that at the instant a technology is developed the
gains of further innovation are zero. As the pollution stock of the most recent tech-
nology accumulates, gains from innovation increase. The costs of research, on the
other hand, are constant. The single crossing property of this setting determines
the research trigger condition (5.10) as the unique optimal switching point. (5.10)
requires all existing technologies to be used simultaneously. Innovation during con-
vergence is therefore ruled out. 
(5.10) therefore fully characterizes the optimal R&D sequence in this stylized model.
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Figure 5.1: Optimal evolution of stock and R&D sequence (N=3 ) when R&D fails
to develop a backstop (p = 0.25).
Together with the optimal pollution policies derived in chapter 4 the optimal joint
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pollution and R&D program is determined. A specific representation for the corre-
sponding evolution of pollution stocks is given in Figure 5.1. It depicts a situation
with N = 3 where - by construction - no backstop arrives. While the actual equi-
librium stocks are represented by bold lines, the fine (solid) lines are the approach
paths to the steady states given 1, 2 or 3 technologies, respectively. Note that since
the capacity constraint is always binding and technologies of the boomerang type
are symmetric, the approach path to the steady state given one technology is active
is also the evolution of the total aggregate pollution stock. Due to (3.2) this is not
proportional to aggregate damages in the economy. The dashed horizontal lines in-
dicate the (hypothetical) steady state levels for n = 1, n = 2 and n = 3. Based on
(5.10), one can say more about the exact link between pollution (stocks) and R&D.
Proposition 5.4 In the optimum innovation occurs whenever the pollution stock of
any technology reaches a constant threshold level S¯.
Proof. Time enters the research trigger condition (5.10) only via the pollution stock
of the most recent technology. Since all other variables in (5.10) are exogenous
parameters, research is triggered each time SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
= S¯. Moreover, since
all pollution stocks are symmetric in all switching instants (Proposition 5.3) this is
equivalent to any pollution stock reaching the trigger level S¯. 
The dotted horizontal line in Figure 5.1 indicates this pollution threshold level.
Having established this tight relation between pollution stocks and the timing of
innovation, one is now in a position to state some further properties of the optimal
R&D and pollution trajectories. One important feature is the optimal procedure
if R&D (repeatedly) fails to deliver the desired backstop technology. The question
here is whether research is carried out - potentially ad infinitum - until a backstop
is developed or whether R&D eventually ceases even if the pollution problem has
not been solved.
Proposition 5.5 The optimal R&D program has an endogenous stopping point. For
any set of parameters with R > 0 and r > 0, at most N = min[Nˆ ,M ] technologies
are developed. Nˆ is independent of the maximum number of feasible technologies,
M .
Proof. Innovation ceases if a backstop technology is developed. If no backstop
arrives (either because p = 0 or because of bad luck) there is an upper bound on the
number of boomerang technologies developed in the optimum. To see this, recall
that the steady state pollution stock (4.11) is strictly decreasing in the number of
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available technologies n. Moreover, limn→∞ αδn = 0. Hence, there is a number of
boomerang technologies Nˆ for which the condition α
δNˆ
< S¯ ≤ α
δ(Nˆ−1) holds. Once the
Nˆ th boomerang is developed, the innovation trigger level will not be reached again.
Given that M ≥ Nˆ and since p is independent of both M and n, the size of the set
of feasible technologies, M , does not affect the maximum number of technologies,
N , developed in an optimal R&D program. 
The optimal stopping rule for R&D is therefore as follows: no further R&D is
carried out if either a backstop arrives or N = min[Nˆ ,M ] boomerang technolo-
gies have been developed. R&D stops even though a backstop may not have been
developed and even though there are still potential technological solutions to be
discovered. This pattern of R&D timing has repercussions on the optimal evolution
of pollution stocks.
Proposition 5.6 If and only if the optimal R&D policy requires at least one inno-
vation and M is not binding (i.e. 1 ≤ Nˆ ≤M), pollution stocks overshoot.
Proof. Each time innovation occurs all pollution stocks are at S¯ (Propositions 5.3
and 5.4). If a backstop is developed, pollution stocks will fall and approach zero in
the long run. This is a trivial form of overshooting. If no backstop is developed,
then the economy has N boomerang technologies in the long run (Proposition 5.5).
If M ≥ Nˆ , the corresponding steady state level of pollution stocks is below the
innovation trigger level, each time innovation occurs pollution stocks of all available
technologies are above their long run steady state level. Overshooting occurs whether
a backstop arrives in the future or not. However, if it is never optimal to undertake
R&D, i.e. if αδ ≤ S¯, the pollution stock of the only available technology never
exceeds its long run steady state. The same holds if M < Nˆ and the sequence of
innovations stops because the set of potential ideas to solve the pollution problem
is exhausted. In this case the long run steady state is above the innovation trigger
level, but no R&D occurs because the economy is short of new ideas. 
Proposition 5.6 implies that, even if there is a specific long run pollution target
(say for the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere), it can be optimal to
exceed this level for some (repeated) periods of time.1 Moreover, both the periods
when stocks overshoot as well as the time between two such periods increases in the
number of available boomerang technologies.
1Note that this model abstracts from irreversible catastrophic damages triggered at specific
stock levels.
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Proposition 5.7 The time between successive innovations is increasing in the num-
ber of already available technologies.
Proof. After a new technology is developed pollution stocks converge. This process
takes tˆn+1 − tn+1. According to (4.22) the length of this period is independent of
the number of technologies already available. The next innovation is triggered if all
pollution stocks simultaneously reach S¯ again. Since after convergence is completed
all technologies are used at a rate of 1/(n + 1), which is decreasing in n, the time
that passes between successive innovations increases in n. 
Although there is no upfront innovation (Proposition 5.1) the R&D program
is front loaded in a sense that the ’density’ of innovations, i.e. the number of
innovations within a given but sufficiently large interval of time, is decreasing in
time.
5.3 No Backstop is Feasible
How does the optimal R&D program look like if no backstop technology is feasible,
i.e. if p = 0? In this case, where research always yields a boomerang technology,
there is only one reason to carry out R&D: the differentiation of the pollution port-
folio in order to exploit the fact that marginal damages are increasing in each stock
but additive across them. The question arises whether the absence of the second
driver of innovation, the hope to solve the pollution problem once and for all, has a
qualitative impact on the optimal pollution policy and research trajectory.
First note that the optimal pollution policy presented in chapter 4 remains valid,
since it was derived given that only boomerang technologies are available. More-
over, it is independent of the probability to develop a backstop p. However, the
social planner’s problem is no longer stochastic since in this special case there is
no technological uncertainty. The corresponding first order conditions are the ones
derived by Makris (2001) without any adjustments for uncertainty at the switching
instances. The research trigger condition 5.10 therefore simplifies to
rR =
αd
r + 2δ
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)− α2d
(r + δ)(r + 2δ)
[
1−
(
δ
α
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ 1
)− r+δ
δ
]
.
(5.11)
Compared to the case with a strictly positive p, the threshold pollution stock that
triggers R&D is higher if no backstop is feasible. Hence, research occurs later and is
less frequent when there is no chance to escape from the pollution problem. However,
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the overall pattern of the optimal R&D program remains unchanged. Propositions
5.1 - 5.7 are valid for a situation where no backstop technology is feasible (Goeschl
and Perino 2007c).
5.4 The Effects of Technological Uncertainty
So far the probability of a backstop to arrive by virtue of R&D did not affect the
validity of any of the previous propositions. However, it is an important determinant
of the optimal timing of research.
Proposition 5.8 The maximum number of technologies developed, N , is weakly
increasing in the probability, p, that a backstop is developed by R&D. The time
between successive innovations is strictly decreasing in p.
Proof. Making use of the property that SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
= S¯ established in Proposition
5.4 and total differentiating (5.10) yields
dS¯
dp
= − α
r + δ
· 1−
[
δ
α S¯ + 1
]− r+δ
δ
1− (1− p) [ δα S¯ + 1]− r+2δδ < 0. (5.12)
The pollution stock threshold S¯ is decreasing in p. However, N is weakly decreasing
in S¯ (see proof of Proposition 5.5). In addition, the time between successive inno-
vations is increasing in S¯ (see Figure 5.1). Both the time interval pollution stocks
required to converge (see (4.22)) and the time interval spent rebuilding pollution
stocks back to S¯ are reduced. 
The intuition behind Proposition 5.8 is straightforward. A backstop technology
is always more desirable than a technology of the boomerang type. Increasing the
probability that research produces a backstop while keeping the costs of R&D, R,
constant, makes research more attractive. It is carried out earlier and potentially
more often.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the relation between the probability that research produces
a clean backstop and the maximum size of the technology portfolio, N , if M is not
binding. The two bold horizontal lines represent the threshold pollution stock S¯ for
p = 0 and p = 1, respectively. The range in between covers all feasible threshold
levels corresponding to specific probabilities to develop a backstop. Note that the
relation between p and S¯ is concave (see also (5.12)). A marginal increase of p
results in a larger decrease in the threshold if p is small than if it is large. The dots
are steady state pollution stocks for a given number of active technologies, n. All
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Figure 5.2: The upper bound on the technology portfolio.
dots reside on the dotted hyperbolic line that represents the steady state defined by
equation (4.11), SBoomnn =
α
δn , if n is not restricted to natural numbers. However,
since the number of technologies is always a natural number andM might be binding,
the upper bound to the technology portfolio, N , is only weakly increasing in p. In
Figure 5.2 this occurs, e.g. when increasing p from zero to 0.25 (the latter appears
also in Figure 5.1). In both cases N = 3 since it is the largest steady state pollution
stock that is below the respective S¯(p).
Figure 5.3 presents three informative characteristics of the optimal R&D pro-
gram as functions of p. The bold solid line is the maximum number of technologies
developed Nˆ . It is weakly increasing in p since an increase in the chance of devel-
oping a backstop at each trial increases the expected benefits from R&D. However,
the expected number of technologies developed E(N), indicated by the dotted line,
is decreasing in general. Exceptions are instances where the maximum number ex-
hibits a discontinuous upward shift. Both the discontinuous jumps in Nˆ as well as
the non-monotonicity in E(N) are due to the restriction of N to the set of integers.
The dashed line represents the probability that the optimal R&D program fails to
develop a backstop technology at some stage. It is strictly monotonously decreasing
in p. Two distinct effects work in the same discretion. If p increases the proba-
bility for each R&D project to fail is reduced. Moreover, the maximum number of
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Figure 5.3: Maximum and Expected Number of Innovations and Probability that
no Backstop is Developed as Functions of p.
attempts increases as p goes up. For p = 0.5 the probability to end up without a
backstop is only 12.5%. With p = 0.75 it reduces even to 0.39%. Hence, there are
large potential gains from increases in the R&D success rate.
5.5 A Short History of Refrigeration
While clearly stylized, key elements of the predicted pattern generated by this model
are empirically observable phenomena, in particular the temporary displacement of
established technologies by new substitutes, the simultaneous use of different tech-
nologies, and a sequential increase in the portfolio of technologies. These phenomena
will be most easily observed in settings where users are essentially indifferent about
the production technology, justifying the assumption of perfect substitutability, and
the technology-specificity of capital is low, thus justifying the assumption of insignif-
icant investment constraints.
As an example, consider the case of refrigeration. Consumers are arguably in-
different about the technological basis of the refrigeration services they consume;
and the rate of product replacement for smaller devices is sufficiently high and
retrofitting is economical for most existing larger installations (McMullan 2002).
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From the 1890s, when refrigeration became commercially viable, several technologies
based on different refrigerants competed in this market. The three main competi-
tors were technologies based on ammonia, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide, each
with specific health and environmental drawbacks. The quest for a safer technol-
ogy involved such prominent figures as Albert Einstein and Leo Szilard, who jointly
invented and patented at least three different cooling technologies, each which its
own specific drawbacks (Dannen 1997). In the mid-20th century, the poisonous cool-
ing agents were substituted by CFCs on a large scale. After the ozone depleting
effect of CFCs was discovered, three things happened. First, production of CFCs
was phased out (Montreal Protocol). Second, the available alternative technolo-
gies based on ammonia, carbon dioxide and sulphur dioxide were revived (Pearson
2005). Third, research in and subsequently production of new substitutes such as
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and HCFCs increased. Both PFCs and HCFCs have a
considerably lower ozone depleting potential than CFCs. However, both have stock
pollution problems of their own: HCFCs decay into trifluoroacetate (TFA) which
is toxic and accumulates in harmful amounts in soil and vegetation, necessitating
policy intervention in time (Likens et al. 1997). PFCs result in the release of green-
house gases and therefore contribute to an existing stock pollutant problem. As a
result, PFC production is included as a regulatory target in the context of the Kyoto
Protocol (McMullan 2002). Hence, despite the highly stylized nature of the model,
core features of the predicted pattern arise in in suitable real world settings.
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Chapter 6
Extensions
This chapter generalizes the baseline model in several directions. In section 6.1,
alternatives to the assumption of time-invariant R&D costs are considered. In section
6.2, the social planner’s belief about the probability to develop a backstop is allowed
to evolve taking the outcomes of previous R&D efforts into account. In section 6.3,
the effects of allowing for generalized welfare and stock accumulation functions are
studied. It will turn out that the extensions in these sections differ with respect
to their impact on the optimal R&D and pollution policy. All extensions affect the
general properties of the R&D arbitrage equation (5.6), with the extensions of the
first section affecting its left-hand side and those of the second and third affecting
its right-hand side. The general properties of the optimal pollution policy, on the
other hand, are unaffected by changes to the assumption on R&D costs. A precise
characterization of the effects of generalized R&D processes on the innovation and
pollution dynamics in section 6.1 is therefore possible. The same holds for the case of
evolving beliefs. Alternative welfare and stock accumulation functions, by contrast,
can have a profound impact on the optimal pollution policy. As a result, a complete
characterization of pollution and research trajectories in section 6.3 is not possible
within the limits of this thesis. Instead, several partial results are offered as building
blocks for future research.
6.1 Alternative R&D Processes
In this section, the assumption of time-invariant R&D costs are relaxed to study
cases such as an exogenous reduction in research costs over time as well as increas-
ing and decreasing returns to R&D. All have in common that they affect only the
left hand side of condition (5.10). Moreover, the optimal pollution policy between
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innovations remains unaffected and hence, only the specific timing of innovation
changes.
6.1.1 Exogenous Efficiency Improvements in Research
Assume that the costs to develop a new technology exogenously decrease over time
R = R(t), with R˙ < 0.
This can be due to technological progress realized outside of the economy or industry
under concern. The cost to acquire a new technology decreases over time and so does
the innovation trigger level, S¯(tn+1) > S¯(tn+2). Hence, the time between successive
innovations does no longer necessarily increase and is certainly shorter than under
constant research costs at the same initial level. The steeper the slope of the research
cost function the more likely are decreasing intervals between innovations. If the cost
decline is sufficiently steep, the trigger level might be reached before technologies
have completely converged. In this case Proposition 5.3 ceases to hold. Moreover,
if R(t) converges sufficiently fast toward zero, there might be no finite N ≤ M
where innovation stops. If the assumption of a finite upper boundM on the number
of potential innovations is relaxed, the first order condition (5.4) is no longer a
necessary condition and theory, so far, offers no guidance on alternative necessary
conditions (Makris 2001). While the optimal timing of R&D cannot be established,
it is certain that innovation proceeds ad infinitum.
6.1.2 Increasing Returns to R&D
Assume, e.g. due to learning by doing, that the costs of R&D decrease with the
number of technologies already developed
R = R(n), with
∂R
∂n
< 0. (6.1)
According to the same logic as in the previous specification with exogenous cost re-
ductions, innovation occurs earlier than with constant research costs and potentially
more technologies are developed. The former is in line with findings by Tsur and
Zemel (2003). Propositions 5.2 and 5.6 hold while 5.4, 5.3 and 5.5 do not. Again,
the formal analysis is restricted by the lack of a theoretical proof of necessary condi-
tions for optimal control problems with infinite regime switches and an infinite time
horizon.
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Proposition 6.1 If the costs of research decrease over time, at least as many tech-
nologies are developed than in a situation with similar initial but constant research
costs. Innovation might not cease. If it does, research occurs earlier than in a
situation with similar initial but constant research costs.
6.1.3 Decreasing Returns to R&D
Assume the costs of R&D increase with the number of technologies already devel-
oped. For example, it may become more and more difficult to find new solutions to
the same problem
R = R(n), with
∂R
∂n
> 0. (6.2)
Proposition 6.2 If the costs of research increase in the number of already developed
technologies, research occurs later and at most as many technologies are developed
than in a situation with similar initial but constant research costs. Innovation neither
guarantees overshooting nor production at full capacity in the long run.
The innovation trigger level increases in the number of technologies already de-
veloped, since R is increasing in n. Hence, the time between successive innova-
tion increases compared to the case with similar initial but constant research costs.
Propositions 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 hold while 6.1 does not. Overshooting does not occur
if the long run steady state is above the threshold level of the last innovation (oth-
erwise it would not have occurred) but below the new, increased trigger level of the
next (not developed) technology. Hence, Proposition 5.6 does not hold. In contrast
to the original set-up it is possible that after innovation has occurred the incomplete
steady state is reached.
6.2 Evolving Technological Beliefs
So far the analysis was restricted to cases where the probability that a backstop
arrives, p, is constant. However, this is not necessarily the case. Depending on
the underlying process of picking discoveries out of the pool of feasible ideas the
outcome of a R&D project provides information on the expected success rate of
future research. This gives rise to endogenously evolving beliefs about the probability
to develop a backstop. Two specific evolutions of p are studied. The first is dubbed
’technology optimist’, where the social planner believes to know both the number
of feasible technologies M as well as the number of backstops BS in this pool of
40
ideas. The second is labeled ’technology pessimist’ and it is assumed that while the
planner believes to know M , he is aware that his belief on the number of backstops
BS is just a guess.
6.2.1 The Technology Optimist
This scenario where both M and BS are believed to be known, matches the well
known set up of random draws from an urn without replacement.1 The two types
of balls in the urn are backstops and boomerangs. The probability of drawing a
backstop given that all previous n draws produced boomerangs is given by
pn+1 =
BS
M − n (6.3)
which is increasing in the number of previous R&D projects n. By picking out the
boomerangs, the probability to get a backstop next time increases. If p increases the
threshold pollution level that triggers R&D decreases. Hence, if the first innovation
is a boomerang, further R&D occurs earlier and more often than in a situation
with the same initial but constant p. See Figure 6.1 for such an optimal pollution
and R&D program (here: M = 7, BS = 3). The innovation triggers are again
indicated by the dotted lines. In contrast to Figure 5.1 where p is constant, they are
decreasing in n. Interestingly, it is optimal to develop up to 3 additional boomerangs
in this situation, i.e. Nˆ = 4. Although after three research ’failures’ a further R&D
project would, according to the planner’s beliefs, produce a backstop with certainty
in this specific case, it is not optimal to spend R a fourth time. This somewhat
surprising result is driven by the fact that even a ’failure’, i.e. the development of a
boomerang technology, relaxes the dynamic constraint to some extend. The benefit
of decoupling and hence the incentives for further R&D are decreasing in the number
of technologies in the portfolio. In the specific case presented here, the resolution of
uncertainty, i.e. increase of p to p = 1, occurring when the fourth boomerang arrives
is outweighed by the reduced benefits a backstop is able to generate. Hence, R&D
optimally stops although a backstop is ’just around the corner’.
Stocks overshoot if innovation occurs at least once and M is not binding. How-
ever, in contrast to the case with a constant probability, the latter is not a necessary
condition. Overshooting can occur even if M is binding. Since pollution thresholds
decrease in the number of developed technologies it is possible that even with a
1It is assumed that the planner’s beliefs are correct. Otherwise it would be necessary to specify
an updating rule for the case when observations contradict beliefs, e.g. if the number of boomerangs
drawn from the urn exceeds M −BS.
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Figure 6.1: Technological Optimist: Optimal evolution of stock and R&D sequence
(N=4 ) when R&D fails to develop a backstop (M = 7, BS = 3).
binding M the long-run steady state is below the initial trigger levels. Moreover,
in a scenario of technological optimism, it is possible that innovation occurs be-
fore pollution stocks of existing technologies have converged. Compared with the
same initial but constant p, the maximum number of technologies developed in the
’technological optimist’ scenario is larger. The effect on the expected number of
technologies is ambiguous, since both p and Nˆ increase.
Note that the case with a constant probability to develop a backstop is a limiting
case of the technology optimist scenario. If M (and maybe also BS) becomes very
large the marginal effect of an increase of n on p becomes negligible. In the limit, p
is constant.
6.2.2 The Technology Pessimist
The planner believes to know M but is aware that his belief on the number of back-
stops, BS, is just a guess. Given some prior B˜S he updates it using Bayes’ rule after
observing the outcome of each completed R&D project. Based on these posterior
beliefs the planner then decides whether and when to engage in research again. As
before, the appropriate stochastic setting is one of drawing from an urn without
replacement. However, the updating process in a setting without replacement is
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excessively complicated if one intends to allow for sufficient flexibility with respect
to the maximum number of draws, M , and the prior held by the social planner.
For the limiting case where M approaches infinity, the concepts with and without
replacement converge. In the case with replacement, draws provide information
with respect to the number of backstops in the urn. Since only draws that produce
boomerangs are relevant for the updating, the expected probability to acquire a
backstop decrease in n. Without replacement, there is an additional effect, namely
a reduction in the number of further technological solutions available. Given any
belief B˜S with E(B˜S) > 0 a decrease in the number of remaining solutions, ceteris
paribus, increases the probability to get a backstop by the next draw. Hence, the
case with replacement yields an evolution of p that represents a lower bound on the
corresponding path of p in the case without replacement. In order to use a tractable
specification an urn with replacement is assumed.
The prior p˜ = B˜SM of the social planner is assumed to be a beta distribution over
the interval of feasible probabilities [0, 1]
f (p˜|BS,M −BS) = 1
B(BS,M −BS)p
BS−1(1− p)M−BS−1. (6.4)
Since the social planner is risk neutral, he uses the expected value of p˜ to make
his decision. For the first R&D project (i.e. the second technology) this is given
by pE2 = Eβ(p˜|BS,M − BS + 1) = BSM+1 . After observing the outcome of the first
R&D project he updates his beliefs which again yields a beta distribution. This,
however, is only of interest if a boomerang is produced. If a backstop is developed
research ceases anyway and the belief about p is no longer relevant to any of the social
planner’s decisions. After the draw of n boomerangs (including the initially available
technology) the expected probability that the n+ 1st technology is a backstop is
pEn+1 = Eβ(p˜|BS,M −BS + n) =
BS
M + n
. (6.5)
This is decreasing in n. The pollution threshold level therefore increases in the
number of technologies already developed (see Figure 6.2). Similar to the baseline
scenario innovation occurs only when all technologies have symmetric stocks and
are hence used simultaneously. Overshooting can occur if innovation occurs at least
once and M is not binding. However, in contrast to the situation with a constant
p the latter is no longer a sufficient condition. Since threshold levels increase in
n, the long-run steady state can be above the threshold level of the last technology
developed. In this case no overshooting occurs althoughM is not binding. Moreover,
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in contrast to the case with a constant p, it is possible to end up in the incomplete
steady state even after innovation has occurred and if M is not binding. Again,
compared to a similar initial but constant p, the maximum number of technologies
is lower. The effect on the expected number of technologies is ambiguous since both
p and Nˆ decrease.
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Figure 6.2: Technological Pessimist: Optimal evolution of stock and R&D sequence
(N=3 ) when R&D fails to develop a backstop (M = 4, B˜S = 3).
The case of a constant probability to develop a backstop discussed in chapter
5 can be seen as a limiting case of both scenarios where beliefs are evolving. If
the number of feasible technological solutions M approaches infinity, an additional
draw has only a negligible effect on p. The probability to develop a backstop is
approximately constant, both in the technology optimist and the pessimist scenario.
Hence, if the pool of ideas to (partially) achieve a decoupling of goods production
and damage is sufficiently large, a constant p is a reasonable approximation. With a
limited pool of ideas however, how the planner evaluates information on the number
of backstops in this pool is crucial. Continuing failures of R&D projects results
in quite distinct evolutions of beliefs and hence research trajectories, depending on
whether the planner believes to have knowledge about BS or not.
44
6.3 Generalized functional specifications
Here a generalization of the social welfare function from (3.6) to (3.3) is considered
which allows for asymmetry between technologies. As a result, additional R&D
motives that are determinants of empirically observable innovation and pollution
activities will now enter into the analysis. In contrast to the previous section, both
the R&D and the pollution policy are now directly affected.
A first step in the analysis is to consider the social planner’s problem (3.7) now
based on the general instantaneous welfare function (3.3) while retaining all linearity
assumptions such that β = 1 and ci (qi, t) = ciqi. With the symmetry assumption
regarding technologies removed, the n + 1st technology can improve on the nth
technology in the form of a lower accumulation rate per unit of output, αn+1 < αn,
a faster rate of stock decay, δn+1 > δn, a lower marginal damage of pollution,
dn+1 < dn, or a lower cost of production, cn+1 < cn. The long-run properties of the
pollution stocks now take into account the heterogeneity of pollutants such that the
long-run equilibrium stock of pollutant i given n technologies is
S∗i (n) =
(δi + r) (1− ci − κn)
αidi
, (6.6)
where
κn =
∑n
i=1
δi(δi+r)(1−ci)
αidi
− 1∑n
i=1
δi(δi+r)
αidi
,
is the steady-state shadow price of the output constraint given n technologies. Since
the n+1st technology unambiguously improves on the nth technology, κn+1−κn > 0
and the difference increases with the magnitude of the improvement. The long-run
pollution stocks of all previous technologies therefore decrease with the number of
technologies used and they decrease by more than in the case of symmetric technolo-
gies. While the long-run steady-states targeted by pollution policy therefore reflect
the heterogeneity in technologies, the fundamental properties of the approach paths
remain unchanged on account of the linearity of the pollution control problem. As
before, the optimal pollution policy involves a sequence of at most (a) a most-rapid
approach (of the singular solution), (b) a convergent singular solution path, and (c)
a stationary singular solution (the steady state). With the optimal pollution policy
qualitatively unchanged, a period of exclusive use of the most recent technology does
still exist.
An important implication of (6.6) is that heterogeneity in all parameters other
than cost ci has no qualitative impact on the optimal pollution policy: With ci = c
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< 1, αi > 0 and di > 0 for all i, all long-run stocks will be positive, implying that
all technologies will be used simultaneously in the steady state. If - on the other
hand - R&D delivers improvements in the cost of production such that cn+1 < cn
for all n > 1 then there exist numbers of technologies n1, n2, ... for which the long
run stock of the first, second and so on technology will be zero and the technology
will be permanently discontinued in the steady-state. This implies that while the
long-run steady-state will feature the use of several technologies at once, the steady
state is no longer guaranteed to include all available technologies.
Even under the retention of the linearity assumptions, the optimal R&D policy
remains inconclusive without the imposition of considerable structure on the char-
acteristics of new technologies. On the one hand, technological improvements in
subsequent technologies provide greater initial incentives for R&D. In the present
set-up, these additional incentives are reflected in the optimal innovation point t∗n+1
determined by (5.6). Improvements in technological characteristics of the n + 1st
technology enter into (5.6) via a lower shadow price µ∗n+1, thus making it optimal
ceteris paribus to engage in R&D earlier. On the other hand, (5.6) also implies that
greater initial incentives for R&D do not necessarily translate into more cumulative
R&D overall: Compared with a setting of symmetric technologies, returns from in-
vesting in the n + 1st technology are ceteris paribus lower the better the portfolio
of the previously developed n technologies. This ’competitive pressure of the past’
is reflected in the weighted shadow prices of previous technologies
∑n
i=1 µ
∗
i q
∗
i and
a result of the substitutability of technologies in production. The net effect can
be fully derived for specific R&D production functions only (in terms of expected
properties of novel technologies) and is the subject of future research.
Other possible generalizations of the model include non-linearities in the social
welfare function, e.g. the cases of β < 1 and c (q, t) = c (q) with dcdq > 0. As discussed
in chapter 3, in the case of β < 1, the policy-maker faces decreasing marginal returns
from production in each single technology and R&D incentives exist for reasons of
product differentiation. Similarly, with increasing marginal cost of production in
each technology, diversification of production allows escaping from decreasing net
returns, leading to similar R&D incentives as in the case of β < 1. With the general
direction clear, considering the specific impact of these generalizations on the results
requires a restatement of both the optimal R&D and the optimal pollution policy.
The reason is that with the linearity in the optimal pollution policy removed, the
results change not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. The result will be
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pollution policies that are characterized (a) by the absence of discontinuities in
production shares by different technologies on account of the concavity of the net
benefit function and (b) more cumulative R&D on account of the additional rents
from technology differentiation (Gancia and Zilibotti 2005).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion of Part I
In much of the literature on environmental R&D, it is common to assume that the
outcome of the next (or most recent) R&D effort will be a backstop technology that
resolves the intertemporal constraints of the environmental problem forever. This is
a productive modeling shortcut that has enabled important results on the optimal
timing of R&D to be derived under very general conditions. However, its premise is
empirically at least arguable, as illustrated with prominent examples. In this part,
a situation in which the next R&D effort generates two possible types of technol-
ogy, either a backstop technology or another polluting technology (referred to as a
’boomerang’), is considered. The type of technology generated is only revealed after
R&D expenditure has been incurred. The impact of this technological uncertainty
on the optimal R&D and pollution policy for a policymaker faced with stock pol-
lution and costly R&D is analyzed. A simple and tractable model is developed in
which recent results on the necessary conditions of multi-stage optimal control prob-
lems are applied and extended to include technological uncertainty. This allows an
intuitive and natural representation of the discrete nature of technological change. A
small, but novel extension of the theory to simple discrete probability distributions
over possible stages based on the policymaker’s beliefs about the relative likelihood
of a backstop or a ’boomerang’ is presented.
Chapter 5 provides a full characterization of the optimal policy in the context
of the model. Given the optimal pollution policy, the degree of technological uncer-
tainty does not affect the fundamental structure of the optimal R&D policy, which
is strictly sequential and has an endogenous stopping point. However, the timing
of innovations and the maximum size of the technology portfolio are affected: To
the extent that invention of a backstop becomes less likely, R&D is carried out later
and the maximum number of technologies is smaller. The lower productivity of
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R&D in expected terms spills over into environmental policy in the form of higher
equilibrium pollution stocks.
The properties of the optimal policy depend technically on the assumptions
about the welfare function, the symmetry of boomerang technologies, the capacity
constraint in output, and the specific characterization of R&D. Some qualifications
are therefore in order. In chapter 6 it is shown that both (a) varying costs of
R&D and (b) evolving beliefs over the probability to develop a backstop change the
timing and amount of research but leave pollution policies unaffected, while only the
former can result in an infinite sequence of R&D; (c) asymmetries among boomerang
technologies leave, with the exception of cost differentials, the qualitative nature of
pollution policies intact. The effect on the amount of R&D carried out depends
crucially on the expectations about the properties of future technologies. If costs
differ between technologies, the optimal portfolio may exclude the more expensive
types forever, even if no backstop is developed. (d) In the case of decreasing marginal
returns in each technology, the pollution policy will be characterized by an absence
of discontinuities in production and more R&D overall due to additional gains from
product differentiation. Generalized pollution dynamics (see e.g. Tahvonen and Salo
(1996)) would lead in some cases to ambiguous effects on the optimal policy choice.
It is generalizations of this type that are important areas for future research.
This part focused exclusively on the social planner’s problem. Hence the results
state what ought to be, abstracting from what is actually feasible in a decentralized
economy. The next two parts attend to the issues of implementation, considering
taxes and permits to internalize pollution externalities and patents to stimulate
private R&D. Chapter 14 of part II presents the implementation strategy to achieve
static efficiency while chapter 21 of part III discusses the feasibility of dynamic
efficiency.
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Part II
Green Horizontal Innovation:
Implementation1
1This part is based on Perino (2007).
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Chapter 8
Introduction to Part II
Inducing technological progress that reduces damage to the environment per unit
of output is at the heart of modern environmental policy. The performance of
environmental regulation depends on a number of factors including its ability to
internalize externalities, the type of incentives it creates to adopt existing advanced
technologies (Milliman and Prince 1989, Jung et al. 1996, Requate and Unold 2003)
and the degree to which it stimulates R&D.1
The full set of issues has so far been explored only by a small number of papers.
In a two-period, competitive output market model Laffont and Tirole (1996b) study
a very specific type of innovation where the new technology is perfectly clean. In
this situation permits achieve static efficiency but completely expropriate the patent
holding firm if the government can adjust policy after innovation has occurred.
This type of analysis has been extended by Denicolo` (1999), who considers a more
general type of innovation where the new technology still emits pollution but has
a lower emission-output ratio. Since private costs of production are assumed to be
the same, the new technology is strictly superior to the established one. Without
pre-commitment by the government and an exogenous quality of innovation both
taxes and permits implement the static first best allocation and induce positive and
identical R&D incentives.2 Fischer et al. (2003) confirm the equivalence result. In
a recent paper, Requate (2005a) studies a situation with heterogeneous firms where
partial adoption is socially optimal. In a situation with flexible policies he finds
that neither taxes nor permits are able to implement the static first best allocation
due to monopoly pricing by the patent holding firm. Moreover, the two instruments
1See Requate (2005b) for a recent review.
2The case considered by Laffont and Tirole (1996b) is a special case where the equivalence still
holds but research incentives are zero.
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are no longer equivalent. This contrasts the case of pure adoption, i.e. without
patents, by symmetric firms where permits always implement the optimal mix while
taxes create multiple equilibria of which only one is efficient (Requate and Unold
2003). Both taxes and permits induce efficient adoption of an advanced abatement
technology if firms are heterogeneous (Requate and Unold 2001).
What all previously mentioned papers have in common is that they consider
a vertical innovation process: Goods and pollutants produced by new technologies
are identical to those produced by old technologies, although emissions per unit
of output are lower. Hence, unless the installation of the new technology involves
real costs or firm heterogeneity (as in Requate and Unold (2001), Requate (2005a))
complete adoption is optimal.
In the tradition of Laffont and Tirole (1996b), Denicolo` (1999) and Requate
(2005a) this part studies how taxes, permits and patents perform in regulating ex-
ternalities and stimulating research when innovation is horizontal. Chapters 9 to 13
concentrate on a two period, two technology version of green horizontal innovation.
In this situation both taxes and permits can fail to implement the static optimum
if a mix of technologies is first best. However, it is shown that by combining both
instruments one can implement the static first best. The simultaneous use of emis-
sion taxes and permits is feasible, since under green horizontal innovation there are
two pollutants that can be regulated using separate instruments. Moreover, some
results have implications for vertical environmental innovation by qualifying previ-
ous findings. Chapter 14 then extents the framework to the continuous time and
multiple technologies model introduced in part I.
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. Chapter 9 sets up the 2x2
model. The social optimum is derived in chapter 10. Chapter 11 analyzes permits,
while taxes are treated in chapter 12. Chapter 13 shows how inefficiencies can be
tackled by a mix of instruments. The model is extended to continuous time and
multiple innovations in chapter 14. The last chapter concludes this part.
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Chapter 9
The Model
As in Denicolo` (1999), consider two succeeding periods in a competitive market
for a non-durable consumption or intermediate good q. In the first period only
one production technology, denoted by the subscript 1, is available. If the research
firm successfully engages in R&D, a second technology, denoted by the subscript 2,
producing a perfect substitute to q and emitting a second type of pollution becomes
available in period 2.1 The market’s downward sloping inverse demand function in
each period is
P = P (q) ,
where q = q1 + q2 is aggregate output.
Individual firms have U-shaped cost functions and are assumed to be small.
Entry into the market is free. The industry’s aggregate cost function is assumed
to exhibit constant returns to scale, i.e. C (q1, q2) = c1q1 + c2q2, where ci is the
constant marginal cost of technology i at the industry level. The robustness of
results to changes in the cost structure is discussed in later sections.
Each technology i emits pollution as a joint product at a constant ratio to output
qi. Technology 1 - the established one - produces only emissions of type 1. The new
technology 2 emits less or no emission of type 1 and - this point is central to this
paper - emissions of type 2. The social damage function D is assumed to be of the
following form
D(q1, q2) = D1(q1 + α · q2) +D2(q2), with 0 ≤ α < 1,
where both D1 and D2 are increasing and convex. α is an exogenous parameter
1The assumption of perfect substitutes is realistic if the new technology is an end-of-pipe equip-
ment or as far as consumers do not care about the origin of the electricity they use, the type of
refrigant that cools their food and the type of fuel used by their cars.
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indicating by how much technology 2 is cleaner than technology 1 with respect to
emission type 1. In a richer game, the research firm can be expected to have some
influence - but also uncertainty - on α. In what follows, it is assumed that the type
of the new technology is common knowledge and exogenous. By adding D1 and D2
the environmental damages of emission types are assumed to be independent, i.e.
they do not increase or offset the damage done by the other pollutant. This form
of the damage function allows on the one hand perfect green horizontal innovation
where the new technology emits emissions of type 2 only (i.e. α = 0) and on the
other hand comes arbitrarily close to vertical environmental innovation if D2 is very
small compared to D1.
In the first period research is undertaken by a single research firm. The proba-
bility ρ that the new technology is available in period 2 is a function of the effort R
put into R&D (with ρ(0) = 0, ρ′ > 0, ρ′′ < 0 and limR→∞ ρ(R) = 1) measured by
the firm’s research expenditure.
In what follows, production and emission control in period 1 are ignored as
there is nothing new to be learned. In the first period only the research investment
matters. If the research firm’s efforts remain fruitless, nothing changes compared
to the first period. However, if research is successful and technology 2 becomes
available in period 2 the timing is as in Laffont and Tirole (1996b) and Denicolo`
(1999). After the new technology has arrived and its properties are known, the
benevolent government adjusts regulation and grants a patent to the research firm.
Regulatory adjustment is crucial as otherwise horizontal environmental innovation
allows to substitute a regulated pollutant for a non-regulated one. This would clearly
create inefficiencies (Devlin and Grafton 1994). Imitation of the new technology is
ruled out. Second, the research firm chooses the level of the license fee f . Third,
firms decide to enter or exit the industry, which technology to use and how much to
produce.
The government uses either pollutant specific tax rates or permit quantities to
regulate environmental externalities. The license fee set by the research firm is
assumed to be linear in output of technology 2. Since firms are small, identical
and produce at an optimal scale this mimics a fixed fee per firm adopting the new
technology.
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Chapter 10
The Social Optimum
The social planner’s solution is presented as a benchmark in this chapter. More-
over, the last section indicates how it could be implemented using forms of research
stimulation other than patents.
10.1 Static Post-Innovation Efficiency
Given the new technology has arrived, the social planner aims to achieve the static
optimum in period 2. He therefore maximizes the social welfare function
W2 (q1, q2) =
∫ q
l=0
P (l)dl − c1q1 − c2q2 −D (q1, q2) .
This yields the following first order conditions
P (q) ≤ c1 + ∂D1
∂q1
(q1 + αq2) , (10.1)
P (q) ≤ c2 + ∂D1
∂q2
(q1 + αq2) +
∂D2
∂q2
(q2) , (10.2)
defining unique solutions qS1 and q
S
2 , where (10.1) is binding if technology 1 has a
strictly positive output and (10.2) is binding if technology 2 has a strictly positive
output.
The use of both technologies at the same time is desirable if and only if the
marginal social cost of producing the first unit by technology i is smaller than the
marginal social cost of producing the last unit by technology j. The analysis in
subsequent chapters focuses on the interesting case where it is socially optimal to
use both technologies at the same time. Some interesting features of other cases are
mentioned along the way. For a detailed analysis of those, the interested reader is
referred to Perino (2006).
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10.2 Optimal Level of R&D
Given that the social planner is able to implement the static optimum in the second
period, how much should be spent on R&D in the first period? In the first period
the social planer’s problem is
max
R
W = −R+ ρ(R) ·∆W,
where ∆W is the welfare gain of innovation in period 2 and discounting is ignored.
The corresponding first order condition is
ρ′(R) ·∆W = 1. (10.3)
This defines RS where the marginal benefit from R&D equals the marginal cost of
research. Conditions (10.1), (10.2) and (10.3) fully specify the social optimum under
green horizontal innovation.
10.3 Implementation Without Restrictions on Instru-
ments
In an ideal world where there are no restrictions on instruments used and the benev-
olent government is able to make credible commitments, the social optimum can be
implemented using pollution specific permits E¯1, E¯2 and an R&D prize.
The equilibrium of the production stage is determined by
P (q) = c1 + γ1,
P (q) = c2 + αγ1 + γ2,
q1 ≤ E¯1 − αq2,
q2 ≤ E¯2,
where γi is the permit price for emissions of type i. In equilibrium output is given
by q1 = E¯1 − αE¯2 and q2 = E¯2 and permit prices are γ1 = P (q) − c1 and γ2 =
(1−α)P (q)+αc1+c2. Hence, the government can control output of both technologies.
The optimal second period allocation can be implemented by setting
ES1 = q
S
1 + αq
S
2 , E
S
2 = q
S
2 .
In addition, a research prize of size ∆W would induce the optimal research effort.
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However, the use of a research prize involves at least two restrictive conditions.
First, the government has to credibly commit that it indeed pays if the new technol-
ogy arrives. Second, the size of the prize has to equal the welfare gain of innovation
and has to be known to the research firm in period 1. Otherwise, the level of research
efforts is inefficient. Information and commitment requirements are substantial and
restrictive. Hence, if the information and commitment ability of the government
is constrained, research prizes fail to implement the first best optimum. Theory
(Wright 1983) and their widespread use suggest that patents are usually better able
to cope with these constraints. However, patents come at a cost. Granting monopoly
power in the post-innovation period is likely to cause distortions and research in-
centives are not bound to equal the social gain of innovation. In what follows, the
analysis concentrates on how patents affect static efficiency in the case of green
horizontal innovation in industries regulated by taxes or permits.
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Chapter 11
The Market Equilibrium with
Patents and Permits
In this chapter patents stimulate research while tradeable permits are used to reg-
ulate environmental externalities. The timing is as follows. After arrival of the new
technology, the government issues emission permits E1 and E2 to regulate pollution
types 1 and 2, respectively. Second, the research firm sets a linear license fee f tak-
ing permit quantities as given. In the last stage, firms choose technologies and the
market is cleared. The game is solved backwards. The qualitative results derived
in this section carry over to more general cost structures like decreasing returns to
scale at the industry level, e.g. due to the use of scarce inputs (Perino 2006).
11.1 Production Stage
In the free entry equilibrium of the production stage price equals average costs and
permit constraints hold.
P (q) = c1 + γ1 if q1 > 0, (11.1)
P (q) = c2 + αγ1 + γ2 + f if q2 > 0, (11.2)
q1 + αq2 ≤ E1, (11.3)
q2 ≤ E2, (11.4)
where γ1 and γ2 are the equilibrium permit prices for pollution type 1 and 2, respec-
tively. The equilibrium quantities qper1 and q
per
2 are determined by (11.1)-(11.4). In
what follows, it is assumed that permit quantities are set to impose at least a weak
constraint on output, i.e. given a zero license fee at least one of (11.3) or (11.4) is
binding. Otherwise, permits have no effect. The level of the license fee f defines
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three situations with respect to the number and type of technologies used: exclusive
production by the established or the new technology and a mix of technologies.
Technology 1 is used exclusively (qper2 = 0): This holds if and only if either
E2 = 0 or if the average cost of the new technology c2+αγ1+ γ2+ f is higher than
the average cost of the established technology c1 + γ1. Since q2 = 0, it follows that
γ2 = 0. γ1 is defined by (11.1). Hence, if the license fee is sufficiently high, i.e.
f > f
per(E1) = (1− α)P (E1) + αc1 − c2, (11.5)
equilibrium quantities are qper1 = E1 and q
per
2 = 0.
Technology 2 is used exclusively (qper1 = 0): This holds if the average cost of the
established technology is higher than the average cost of the new technology, i.e.
c1 + γ1 > c2 + αγ1 + γ2 + f. (11.6)
How the license fee threshold for exclusive production of the new technology is
defined depends on which permit constraint, if any, is binding on q2 (see appendix).
They are summarized by
f < fper(E1, E2) =

c1 − c2 : q2 < min[α−1E1, E2]
P (E2)− c2 : q2 = E2
(1− α)P (α−1E1) + αc1 − c2 : q2 = α−1E1
.(11.7)
Furthermore, if α = 0 the new technology produces exclusively if E1 = 0 and E2 > 0.
Equilibrium quantities are qper1 = 0 and q
per
2 = q2(E1, E2, f).
Both technologies are used at the same time: This holds if the average costs of
both technologies are the same, i.e.
c1 + γ1 = c2 + αγ1 + γ2 + f. (11.8)
Equilibrium quantities in this case are qper1 = q1(E1, E2, f) and q
per
2 = q2(E1, E2, f).
Note that this does not define a unique f but a whole set of license fees, fper ≤ f ≤
f
per, since γ1 and γ2 are functions of f .
11.2 License Fee Stage
The patent holding firm maximizes profits pi = f · qper2 with respect to f given the
demand qper2 (E1, E2, f) for the new technology and subject to q
per
2 ≤ min[α−1E1, E2].
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The profit maximizing license fee therefore satisfies
−∂q
per
2
∂f
f
qper2
≥ 1. (11.9)
Condition (11.9) allows for two types of equilibria. First, an interior solution where
(11.9) holds as an equality. In this case permit constraints on the new technology are
not binding since the research firm restricts qper2 even more. Second, a corner solution
where (11.9) holds as a strict inequality. Permits constrain profit maximizing of the
patent holding firm. It would prefer a lower license fee and higher output of the new
technology than feasible under the permit scheme.
11.3 Policy Stage
Anticipating the license fee choice of the patent holding firm and the market clearing
conditions the government maximizes the following objective function with respect
to E1 and E2
W2(E1, E2) =
∫ qper(E1,E2)
l=0
P (l)dl − c1qper1 (E1, E2)− c2qper2 (E1, E2)
−D (qper1 (E1, E2), qper2 (E1, E2)) . (11.10)
The first order conditions are
P (q)
[
∂q1
∂E1
+
∂q2
∂E1
]
=
[
c1 +
∂D1
∂q1
]
∂q1
∂E1
+
[
c2 + α
∂D1
∂q2
+
∂D2
∂q2
]
∂q2
∂E1
, (11.11)
P (q)
[
∂q1
∂E2
+
∂q2
∂E2
]
=
[
c1 +
∂D1
∂q1
]
∂q1
∂E2
+
[
c2 + α
∂D1
∂q2
+
∂D2
∂q2
]
∂q2
∂E2
. (11.12)
Note that when both permit quantities are binding in equilibrium, i.e. if ∂q1∂E1 > 0,
∂q2
∂E2
> 0 and ∂q2∂E1 = 0, conditions (11.11) and (11.12) are equivalent to the conditions
for static efficiency (10.1) and (10.2).
In what follows it is assumed that static efficiency requires that both technologies
are used in production. It is analyzed under which conditions the government is able
to implement the first best static allocation. Since the static optimum can only be
implemented if both permit quantities are binding, there is only one combination
of permit quantities, ES1 = q
S
1 + αq
S
2 and E
S
2 = q
S
2 , that is a candidate to achieve
static efficiency. Both ES1 and E
S
2 are binding if and only if the patent holding firm
has no incentive to deviate from the static first best allocation by setting a higher
license fee. Hence, static efficiency is feasible with permits if there is a license fee
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fper that satisfies the following conditions evaluated in the social optimum
P (qS) = c1 + γ1, (11.13)
P (qS) = c2 + αγ1 + fper, (11.14)
−∂q
per
2
∂f
(fper)
fper
qS2
≥ 1, (11.15)
fper
(
qS1 , q
S
2
)
< fper < f
per (
qS1 , q
S
2
)
. (11.16)
Solving (11.13) for γ1 and substituting into (11.14) yields fper = (1 − α)P (qS) +
αc1 − c2. (11.15) is a restriction on the price elasticity of the demand of the patent
holding firm. It requires that the patent holding firm has no incentive to increase
f and therefore reduce q2 below qS2 in order to raise profits. This is restrictive
since it imposes an upper bound on the slope of the demand curve in the static
optimum, in which case (11.16) is always met. The research firm will never set a
license fee above fper and ES2 = q
S
2 implies that a reduction in f such that none of
the permit constraints would be binding is impossible. Simultaneous non-binding
permit constraints are only relevant if exclusive use of the new technology is first
best. (11.15) is therefore a sufficient condition for feasibility of the static first best
allocation. If (11.15) does not hold there are three types of inefficiency: aggregate
output is too low, the relative shares of technologies are distorted and marginal
social costs of technologies differ. Monopoly pricing reduces qper2 below q
S
2 , hence
the mix is not optimal. Since the established technology is dirtier with respect to
pollutant 1, the increase in qper1 does not fully compensate the reduction in q
per
2 .
Aggregate output is therefore below the first best optimum. Since qper1 > q
S
1 and
qper2 < q
S
2 marginal social costs are not equalized across technologies.
Proposition 11.1 If a mix of technologies is statically first best, a government
using permits and patents is able to implement the optimal allocation if and only
if condition (11.15) holds. Otherwise, monopoly pricing by the patent holding firm
distorts output in a way that the permit constraint on the new pollutant is no longer
binding. Only second best allocations determined by (11.11) and (11.12) are feasible
in this case.
In contrast to the one pollutant case studied by Requate (2005a) where permits are
never able to implement the optimal mix, an efficient allocation is feasible with green
horizontal innovation at least in some cases. The second pollutant characteristic of
green horizontal innovation generates an additional means of control available to
the government. Using two instead of only one permit quantity, the government
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can impose different restrictions on the two technologies and thereby implement the
static optimal mix at least in some cases. With respect to government’s control on
output, horizontal innovation is an intermediate case between vertical innovation
with one pollutant and patents where permits are never optimal (Requate 2005a)
and pure adoption of advanced technologies without monopoly power where permits
always implement the efficient mix (see Requate and Unold (2003)).
Optimal R&D incentives are not warranted. The optimal license fee fS is a
function of pre-innovation welfare. The equilibrium license fee is not affected by this
and hence in general fper 6= fS .
11.4 The Case of a Superior New Technology
This subsection briefly considers the case where the new technology is superior to
the established one and should hence be used exclusively in the static optimum.
In this case the problem effectively reduces to one with two technologies and one
pollutant. A special case of this situation (c1 = c2 = c) has been analyzed by
Denicolo` (1999). He finds that the government can implement the static first best
allocation with permits. However, his result depends on the implicit assumption
that in equilibrium all permits are used by the new technology.1 However, the
patent holding firm sometimes can increase profits by raising the license fee above
the threshold level fper which reduces output of the new technology and triggers
production by the established one (see Perino (2006)). Again, monopoly pricing
results in three inefficiencies. First, aggregate output is below the social optimum.
Second, the established technology produces although it should not. Third, marginal
social costs of both technologies are not the same. The condition that all permits
are used by the new technology and hence the static first best is implemented (if
α−1E1 = qS2 ) is
−∂q
per
2
∂f
(fper)
fper
qS2
≥ 1, (11.17)
which is a condition on the price elasticity of the demand function qper2 . (11.17)
is a necessary and sufficient condition that the government is able to implement
the static social optimum. It is also necessary for the static equivalence of instru-
ments and thereby qualifies a result by Denicolo` (1999). Monopoly pricing restricts
the performance of permits not only when both technologies are used at the same
time (see previous subsection and the case studied by Requate (2005a)). Moreover,
1Fischer et al. (2003) also assume full adoption of the new technology.
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both green horizontal innovation and pure emission reductions are affected by this
interaction between patents and permits.
Proposition 11.2 If the new technology is superior, condition (11.17) is necessary
and sufficient to implement the static first best allocation with permits. Otherwise,
monopoly pricing by the patent holding firm excessively restricts output of the new
technology.
Optimal R&D incentives are not warranted. The optimal license fee fS that max-
imizes expected welfare, including the R&D stage, is given by fS = ∆W
qS2
. Where
∆W is the welfare gain of innovation (see section 10.2). The equilibrium license fee
depends on qS2 and the slope of the demand curve in the optimum. Properties of
the established technology that affect the social gain of innovation and hence fS are
irrelevant for fper.
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Chapter 12
The Market Equilibrium with
Patents and Taxes
In this chapter patents stimulate research while taxes are used to regulate environ-
mental externalities. First, the subgame perfect equilibria are derived for the case of
constant returns to scale at the industry level. Section 12.4 discusses qualifications
for decreasing returns to scale at the industry level.
The timing of the game is as follows. After the new technology has arrived, the
government uses linear emission taxes τ1 and τ2 to regulate pollution types 1 and 2,
respectively. Second, the research firm sets the linear license fee f taking tax levels
as given. In the last stage, firms produce until price equals average costs. The game
is solved backwards.
12.1 Production Stage
The free entry equilibrium of the production stage is determined by
P (qtax) = c1 + τ1, if qtax1 > 0, (12.1)
P (qtax) = c2 + ατ1 + τ2 + f, if qtax2 > 0, (12.2)
where price equals average costs. The level of the license fee f again defines three
situations in with only the established, only the new or both technologies produce.
With constant returns to scale at the industry level it is a trivial bang-bang solution
qtax2 (τ1, τ2 + f) =

0 : f > f tax(τ1, τ2)[
0, qtax (τ1, τ2 + f)
]
: f = f tax(τ1, τ2)
qtax (τ1, τ2 + f) : f < f
tax(τ1, τ2)
, (12.3)
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where f tax = c1 − c2 + (1 − α)τ1 − τ2. Note that when both technologies are used
simultaneously, i.e. if f = f tax, individual equilibrium quantities are not uniquely
defined. Only aggregate output is determined, since both technologies face the same
private costs of production. Any output mix satisfying qtax1 + q
tax
2 = q
tax (τ1, τ2 + f)
is an equilibrium. Which one is actually chosen can not be determined ex-ante.
With constant returns to scale at the industry level, taxes are not able to implement
specific mixes of technologies (see also Requate and Unold (2003)).
12.2 License Fee Stage
The patent holding firm maximizes profits pi = f · qtax2 with respect to f given the
demand qtax2 (τ1, τ2 + f) for the new technology.
If f tax ≤ 0, output of the new technology is zero and the license fee choice
irrelevant. If f tax > 0, the equilibrium license fee will never exceed f tax. Output
qtax2 and profit pi would be zero. This can not be profit maximizing since a license
fee that just undercuts f tax yields both positive output and profit.
There are two candidates for the profit maximizing license fee. The first is the
corner solution that just undercuts the threshold f tax, i.e. f = c1− c2+(1−α)τ1−
τ2− , where  is an arbitrarily small number. The second is a true interior solution
satisfying −∂qtax2∂f f
tax
qtax2
= 1. Whether a true interior solution exists and thereby
whether f tax imposes a binding constraint, depends on τ1 and τ2.
Due to the research firm’s license fee choice the simultaneous use of both tech-
nologies is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, regardless of the tax rates set by the
government. Patents therefore eliminate the continuum of equilibria where both
technologies are used (one of which is efficient) present in pure adoption games
(Requate and Unold 2003).
12.3 Policy Stage
Anticipating the license fee choice of the patent holding firm and the market clearing
conditions the government maximizes the following objective function
W2 (τ1, τ2) =
∫ qtax(τ1,τ2)
l=0
P (l)dl − c1qtax1 (τ1, τ2)− c2qtax2 (τ1, τ2)
−D (qtax1 (τ1, τ2) , qtax2 (τ1, τ2)) . (12.4)
However, the influence of the government on equilibrium outcomes is quite limited
with taxes. Regardless of the tax rates, only one technology will produce. Hence,
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given the focus on situations where it is socially optimal to use both technologies,
the government is unable to achieve the static first best. The government’s choice is
limited to the choice of the technology used exclusively and to determine its output.
If the exclusive use of the established technology is second best, the equilibrium
tax rates are τ1 = ∂D1∂q1
(
qsb1
)
and τ2 > c1 − c2 + (1 − α)∂D1∂q1
(
qsb1
)
. The former
internalizes the pollution damage of production by the established technology caused
at the second best level of production qsb1 . The latter ensures that it is not profitable
to use the new technology. Any tax rate on the new pollutant above the threshold
is sufficient to achieve this.
If the exclusive use of the new technology is second best, again the tax on
pollutant 1 is used to internalize the external damages of pollution, since it im-
poses a binding upper bound on the license fee. The second best tax rates are
τ1 = c2 − c1 + α∂D1∂q2
(
qsb2
)
+ ∂D2∂q2
(
qsb2
)
and any τ2 satisfying τ2 < α(c1 − c2) + (1 −
α)
[
α∂D1∂q2
(
qsb2
)
+ ∂D2∂q2
(
qsb2
)]
and large enough to ensure that f tax is indeed a corner
solution just undercutting the threshold f tax. Note that τ2 = α(c1 − c2) + (1 −
α)
[
α∂D1∂q2
(
qsb2
)
+ ∂D2∂q2
(
qsb2
)] −  always satisfies both conditions. For this tax rate
on the new pollutant the equilibrium license fee and profits of the research firm are
zero. The choice of τ2 from within this interval does not affect the mix or output of
technologies but instead the equilibrium license fee and hence research firm’s prof-
its. Unless there is some commitment to the (newly introduced) tax on the new
pollutant, the research firm faces the risk of complete expropriation when investing
in R&D in the first period.
Proposition 12.1 If a mix of technologies is statically first best and there are con-
stant returns to scale at the industry level, a government using taxes and patents is
not able to implement the optimal mix of technologies. The second best allocations
are optimal given only one technology is used.
12.4 Robustness of Results to Alternative Cost Struc-
tures
The above result is robust to some but not all variations in the cost structure.
The case of constant returns to scale at the industry level requires a perfectly elastic
supply of all inputs in the relevant range and that firms are small. Laffont and Tirole
(1996b), Denicolo` (1999) and Requate and Unold (2003) restrict their analysis to
such situations. End-of-pipe equipments like scrubbers or catalytic converters are
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typical examples of such technologies. According to Harrison and Antweiler (2003)
end-of-pipe technologies are of great practical importance in industry’s abatement
activities. Taxes also fail to implement specific technology mixes if all scarce inputs
(that give rise to decreasing returns to scale at the industry level) are shared by
both technologies. Proposition 12.1 holds in these cases (Perino 2006).
However, if some scarce inputs are specific to one of the technologies or firms
are asymmetric, the result breaks down. There is no longer a threshold level where
the output of the new technology is perfectly elastic with respect to the license
fee. Instead of the bang-bang solution there is a region with a strictly decreasing
demand for the new technology. Uniquely defined mixes of technologies therefore
become feasible with taxes. This sometimes requires negative tax rates, i.e. subsidies
on pollution, in order to neutralize monopoly pricing by the research firm. If such
subsidies are not feasible for fiscal or political reasons, the set of parameters that
allows implementation of the static optimum is considerably reduced (Perino 2006).
However, the government cannot implement the static first best in all cases even
without restrictions on tax rates. The pattern is similar to the one for permits
presented above. For some parameter values the static first best is feasible while for
others monopoly pricing by the research firm still distorts output.
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Chapter 13
Instrument Mix
The previous sections revealed that both taxes and permits fail to implement the
optimal mix of technologies in some cases. The purpose of this section is to show
that, if combined, their respective shortcomings cancel out. Since there are two
pollutants to be regulated, it is possible to use both instruments at the same time.
Proposition 13.1 If a mix of technologies is statically first best and there are con-
stant returns to scale at the industry level, a government using taxes for the estab-
lished pollutant, permits for the new pollutant and patents to reward research is able
to implement the optimal mix of technologies.
To prove Proposition 13.1, it is shown that τS1 =
∂D1
∂q1
(
qS1 + αq
S
2
)
and ES2 = q
S
2
implement the static optimum.
The equilibrium in the production stage is determined by
P (qmix) = c1 + τS1 , if q
mix
1 > 0, (13.1)
P (qmix) = c2 + ατS1 + γ2 + f
mix, if qmix2 > 0, (13.2)
qmix2 ≤ ES2 . (13.3)
The resulting permit price is γ2 = P (qmix)−c2−ατS1 −fmix. The profit maximizing
license fee is fmix = P (qmix) − c2 − ατS1 − , i.e. the equilibrium permit price is
zero. The average private cost of the new technology is therefore just below that
of the established technology. Hence, its output is bound by the permit constraint,
i.e. qmix2 = q
S
2 . Deviations from this license fee unambiguously reduce research
firm’s profit: an increase in fmix results in an indetermined or even zero market
share (see (12.3)) while a reduction of fmix leaves output of the new technology
unaffected since the permit constraint is binding. The output of technology 2 is
therefore optimal.
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The established technology is marginally more expensive than the new one. But
since the output of technology 2 is constrained by permits, there is still a demand for
technology 1 of size qmix1 = q
(
c1 + ∂D1∂q1
(
qS1 + αq
S
2
)) − qS2 . However, this is exactly
the first best quantity qS1 . The first best allocation is therefore implemented by a
combined use of taxes and permits.
Research incentives are given by the research firm’s profit, i.e. pi = fmix ·qS2 > 0.
Although strictly positive, they are not first best, since they are unaffected by the
welfare gain induced by innovation.
In the absence of commitment, i.e. when the government chooses (as is assumed
here) both the instrument and stringencies at the beginning of the second period,
it has a weak preference for the mixed tax-permit scheme. With constant returns
to scale it weakly dominates permits and is strictly better than taxes, since the first
best mix of technologies can always be implemented.
This implementation strategy does not work for general cost structures. A key
requirement for the combined use to implement the static optimum is that the tax
rate on the established pollutant imposes a binding upper bound on the license fee.
This is necessary to correct the inefficiencies present under pure permit regulation. If
there are technology specific scarce inputs, this is no longer the case. The mechanism
that improves the performance of a pure tax scheme reduces that of the mixed tax-
permit scheme.
Requate (1993) also uses a combination of price and quantity controls to correct
for market power. In a duopolistic setting where firms emit a homogeneous pollutant
he shows that permits and a subsidy on output implements the social optimum.
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Chapter 14
Implementation of the Optimal
Pollution Policy for Multiple
Green Horizontal Innovations
So far this part focused on a simplified game with two discrete periods and at most
two technologies. In such a situation a mix of instruments is able to implement
the optimal post-innovation allocation. However, research incentives are not opti-
mal in general and potential problems arising from multiple innovations have been
ignored. In this chapter the insights regarding the regulation of technologies with
specific pollutants are used to check if and how the social planner’s pollution policy
derived in part I can be realized in a decentralized economy. Hence, it generalizes
the implementation strategy presented in the previous chapter to situations with
multiple innovations, and hence multiple patent holding firms, and continuous time.
The implementation of the optimal research policy is presented in chapter 21 since
additional instruments introduced in part III are required to this end.
This chapter extends the analysis of part I to a situation where the industry
faces a strictly downward sloping demand function but is not subject to a capacity
constraint. This allows to study cases where market power of patent holding firms
is a real issue.
14.1 The Decentralized Version of the Part I Economy
Recall the model presented in chapter 3. In what follows it will be adjusted in
order to represent a decentralized economy where the social planner is replaced by
a benevolent government and private production and R&D sectors. The demand
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for the consumption good q is perfectly elastic, with a marginal social gain of out-
put equal to one and aggregate production is bound from above by (3.4). Both
assumptions are highly stylized and made to facilitate the presentation of the so-
cial optimum in part I. The case of a downward sloping demand function without
a capacity constraint on output will be discussed. It turns out that while the ac-
tual implementation strategies are somewhat different from the baseline case, the
conditions for the feasibility of the first best trajectories are very much alike.
It is assumed that the initially available boomerang technology is not protected
by patents and thereby its output is supplied competitively. New technologies can
be developed by spending a fixed amount R on R&D. Hence, in contrast to the
previous chapters of this part, the arrival of a new technology is certain once R has
been spent. Research is undertaken by a single research firm that earns a patent
for each technology invented.1 A patented technology i, with i ∈ {2, ..., N}, once
invented, can be used by production firms by paying a technology specific license
fee fi set by the patent holding firm.
The benevolent government can use emission fees, tradeable permits and combi-
nations thereof to regulate the industry. Note that permits and taxes are assumed to
be pollution specific. There is no banking or borrowing of permits. The government
is credibly committed to grant a patent to any new technology developed. This
assumption will be relaxed in chapter 21.
The optimal output mix derived in chapter 4 and illustrated in Figure 5.1 has
a number of distinct phases. First, there is an initial phase when the unprotected
technology produces at full capacity. Second, after innovation, there is a period
of convergence where only the new technology is active. Third, there are intervals
when all existing technologies produce simultaneously. Moreover, there are two
phases not present in Figure 5.1: the incomplete steady state defined by (4.9) and
exclusive production by a backstop technology. The aggregate output constraint
(3.4) is not binding in the incomplete steady state. However, in the baseline model
this is optimal only if innovation is not desirable in finite time. Hence, it is the
relatively well explored case of regulating an industry using a single technology
where research incentives can be ignored.
1Similar to the previous chapters in this part, the modeling of the research sector is highly
stylized and ignores any inefficiencies arising from its internal structure. For discussions of such
issues see Reinganum (1985), Aghion and Tirole (1994).
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14.2 Optimal Pollution Policy with a Downward Slop-
ing Demand Function
This section sketches the optimal pollution policy in a situation where the demand
function has a strictly decreasing slope. This allows in later sections to study imple-
mentation in situations where market power of patent holding firms has the potential
to distort output. In the case with a perfectly elastic demand function and a ca-
pacity constraint presented in part I market power will not induce inefficiencies and
hence is less realistic.
The model is adjusted as follows. Let
P (Q), (14.1)
be the inverse demand function with ∂P∂Q < 0 where Q =
∑n
1 qi is aggregate output.
Hence condition (4.1) in chapter 4 becomes
e−rtP (Q(t)) + αµBoomni (t) = 0, (14.2)
while condition (4.2) remains unaffected. Note that there is no capacity constraint
and hence no κ. Hence, there will be no distinction between an ’incomplete steady
state’, a ’complete steady state’ and an ’approach path’. In contrast to the baseline
model, condition (14.2) is a function of aggregate output Q. In general, aggregate
output is therefore restricted due to the associated damages. Optimal output is a
function of the shadow price of pollution and hence of the pollution stock. Again,
at each point in time all technologies with strictly positive output have identical
pollution stocks and by symmetry also the same individual output. Note that in
case a backstop is developed the optimal policy is as before, i.e. only the backstop
produces with qBackn = P
−1(0).
Explicitly solving for the optimal pollution and R&D policy is not straight-
forward. However, the different possible phases can be classified along the same
categories as in the case with a perfectly elastic demand function: exclusive use of
the unprotected technology, exclusive use of the most recent technology and simul-
taneous use of all (or any subset of) technologies. Fortunately, these qualitative
results are sufficient to discuss the feasibility of implementation.
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14.3 Exclusive Use of the Unrestricted Technology
This case contains two of the phases distinguished above: the initial phase charac-
terized by production by the initially available technology at the capacity constraint
and, in the baseline model, the incomplete steady state. With a perfectly elastic de-
mand function cum capacity constraint the former is trivial in that it does not require
any intervention by the government. The unregulated market equilibrium matches
the social optimum. Although production at full capacity involves pollution and
hence externalities, marginal damages are strictly smaller than the marginal benefit
of production within the interval [0, t˜]. Here t˜ is either the point in time where the
first innovation optimally occurs, i.e. t∗2, or when marginal damages of production
start to outweigh marginal gains and hence the incomplete steady state is reached.
The incomplete steady state can be implemented by issuing a number of permits
corresponding to the optimal amount of output.
For the case with a downward sloping demand function, both a tax of t1 =
P (Q∗(t)) or permit quantity E1 = α1Q∗(t) on the first pollutant solve the problem.
14.4 Exclusive Use of the New Technology
The new technology n is always protected by a patent and hence subject to monopoly
pricing of the patent holding firm. However, due to the somewhat peculiar, perfectly
elastic demand function, this does not result in socially undesirable reductions in
output. Nevertheless, the optimal allocation can also be implemented, using strate-
gies developed in the previous chapter, where the industry faces a downward sloping
demand function.
The exclusive use of the new technology can be achieved as follows: do not
regulate the new technology, impose zero permit quantities for all other technologies,
except the unprotected one which faces an emission tax τ1 ≥ 0. The actual level
of τ1 does not matter for static efficiency in the special case with a perfectly elastic
demand function. However, with a downward sloping demand it should be set equal
to τ1 = P (Q∗(t)) and combined with a permit constraint on the new pollutant
En = αnQ∗(t) if technology n is a boomerang and τ1 = 0 if it is a backstop. This
imposes an upper bound on the license fee (see chapter 13) and thereby avoids
inefficiencies arising from monopoly pricing by the patent holding firm.
The patent holding firm will set a license fee fn that just undercuts the emission
tax or the reservation price of consumers and hence results in production at the
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capacity constraint. No other technology will produce since it is either effectively
forbidden or not profitable due to a tax that exceeds the license fee. This policy is
optimal during convergence, i.e. in the interval [tn, tˆn], and from tn to infinity if n
constitutes a backstop technology.
14.5 Simultaneous Use of All Technologies
After convergence and before any subsequent innovation the simultaneous use of
all available boomerang technologies is optimal. Again, implementation using a
combination of taxes and permits is straightforward. Issue permit quantities Ei =
αiq
Boom∗n
i for all i = 2, ..., n and set a tax rate τ1 ≥ 0. Again, with a downward
sloping demand function the tax rate is uniquely defined as τ1(t) = P (Q∗(t)), while
it does not matter for static efficiency in the context of a perfectly elastic demand
function.
For the case with a downward sloping demand function, using only taxes and
permits as instruments, research incentives are completely determined after imple-
menting the optimal pollution policy. Hence, in general they are not optimal. For
the case with a perfectly elastic demand function the tax rate on the unprotected
technology is usually not uniquely defined and therefore can be used to adjust re-
search incentives without jeopardizing static efficiency. However, it affects all tech-
nologies and hence all patent holders at the same time. Feasibility of the optimal
R&D program, hence, is unlikely. Part III introduces additional instruments that
are observed in real world regulatory schemes and that give additional control to the
government. These more flexible instruments are first discussed in two period, two
technology settings before the optimal R&D policy for the case of multiple innova-
tions is discussed in chapter 21. Without such additional instruments only second
best policies can be implemented. This chapter showed that static efficiency is feasi-
ble. In the absence of commitment by the government this is also the unique closed
loop equilibrium, given the set of instruments.
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Chapter 15
Conclusion of Part II
Green horizontal innovation, where new technologies reduce pollution of one type
while causing a new type of damage, is highly relevant but not sufficiently consid-
ered in the economics literature so far. This part considers such a situation to study
the performance of taxes and permits in regulating externalities in the presence of
patents. The focus is on situations where the simultaneous use of multiple tech-
nologies is optimal. Cases with a superior technology are equivalent to the single
pollutant case and are already covered in the literature.
In a simplified model with two periods and two technologies permits can imple-
ment the static optimum at least in some cases where both technologies are used
at the same time. This contrasts their performance under vertical environmental
innovation (i.e. where only one pollutant is emitted), in which case the optimum
mix is never feasible with the use of patents (see Requate (2005a)).
The reason that permits fail to implement the optimum in some situations is
their very nature of imposing upper bounds on quantities. Although environmental
externalities in general ensure that the first best output is below the unregulated
output, this does not necessarily hold here. There is an additional market failure in
the form of market power created by patents. Hence, under certain conditions the
patent holding firm restricts output below the social optimum by monopoly pricing.
This creates up to three types of inefficiency: reduced aggregate output, suboptimal
mix of technologies and violation of the equimarginal principle.
With constant returns to scale at the industry level, taxes suffer from the inability
to implement specific technology mixes, which is well known from the literature on
vertical innovation (Requate and Unold 2003). For other cost structures, however,
the optimal mix can in some cases be implemented using taxes. This contrasts the
case of vertical innovation, where under both taxes and permits monopoly pricing
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by the research firm always distorts outcomes (Requate 2005a).
Although both instruments fail to implement the static optimum in general,
their weaknesses cancel each other out if both are used at the same time. The basic
feature of green horizontal innovation is that there are different pollutants causing
different types of damages. Hence, it is possible to regulate the established pollutant
via a tax and the new one by permits. This mixed tax-permit scheme is shown to
achieve an efficient technology mix when there are constant returns to scale at the
industry level. This is exactly the situation where the failure of a pure tax scheme is
most severe. Existing tax schemes should hence be supplemented by permits rather
than another tax when an alternative technology emitting a new pollutant emerges.
In addition to the new insights created for green horizontal innovation, some
previous results on vertical innovation are qualified. It is shown that monopoly
pricing is also an issue in situations with only one pollutant and a strictly superior
technology if permits are used. It is a general pattern that granting patents to induce
private innovation incentives triggers monopoly pricing by the successful research
firm. This in turn restricts the performance of economic instruments to regulate
environmental externalities in the post-innovation period. In itself, this is not a
surprising result. However, previous studies in this area have somewhat obscured
this fact by basically assuming it away. Both, the evaluation of its empirical relevance
and its effect on the desirability of patents compared to other instruments, await
further research.
In chapter 14 the insights derived in previous chapters of this part are applied
to an economy underlying the analysis in part I. It is possible to specify a sophisti-
cated policy using hybrid tax-permit schemes that is able to implement the socially
optimal pollution trajectories for a decentralized version of such an economy. This
implementation strategy is robust to generalizations such as an economy with a
downward sloping demand function.
More flexible instrument designs that allow for additional control over post-
innovation allocation and research incentives are studied in the next part.
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Part III
Endogenous Design of
Environmental Regulation,
Commitment and Intellectual
Property Rights
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Chapter 16
Introduction to Part III
Environmental policy often faces commitment problems when firms invest in abate-
ment technologies. Once investments are sunk, even a social planner might want
to deviate from the policy previously announced to induce investments in order to
improve static efficiency. Solving this problem of time-inconsistency requires credi-
ble commitment by the government. Overcoming the commitment problem through
contracts is not trivial in a setting involving firms and government since there is no
third party with the necessary power to enforce them (Acemoglu 2003).1 Although
an independent judicacy can force a government to stick to its own rules, the gov-
ernment can change the very rules at will. If commitment devices are thus limited,
there are two key determinants of the time-inconsistency problem. First, the choice
set of the government and second, its objective function. This part considers both
dimensions. The link between the organization of government and its ability to
commit are studied in part IV.
Different reasons for time-inconsistency to arise have been discussed in the liter-
ature. In Gersbach and Glazer (1999), future environmental policies announced to
induce firms to invest involve excessive social costs in the absence of investment. The
government therefore has no credible threat point. They show that grandfathered
permits, i.e. a commitment to a specific instrument, can solve the hold-up problem.
Policies in Marsiliani and Renstro¨m (2000) are time-inconsistent because investment
is irreversible. Hence, after firms have invested the government has incentives to re-
duce the emission tax in order to implement the ex-post static optimum. They study
earmarking of tax revenues as a commitment device given earmarking is credible.
1In a recent paper Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that restrictions on predatory practices of
governments has been more important to the prosperity of nations than the enforcement of private
contracts.
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Thereby they introduce a complimentary instrument where commitment is assumed
to be feasible. A somewhat different source of time-inconsistency, focusing on gov-
ernment’s objective function, is presented by Abrego and Perroni (2002). They study
the case where environmental regulation affects the distribution of income while the
government has an distributional objective. Abrego and Perroni (2002) show that
investment subsidies can substitute for policy commitment.
These approaches have in common that investments are firm specific and rep-
resent adoption of abatement technology. However, in the medium and long run
original R&D is the prime source of new abatement technologies and private incen-
tives to undertake research are therefore essential. A firm that invests into R&D
produces new knowledge, i.e. a public good. Unless the government ex-post grants
and protects intellectual property rights, e.g. in the form of patents, the research
firm can appropriate only a small fraction of the social benefits of its investment.
However, patents come at a cost to society. They create static inefficiencies due
to monopoly pricing (see part II). Hence, even a benevolent government faces a
commitment problem because ex-post it would increase static efficiency if the new
technology is used by all firms at its marginal cost.
Laffont and Tirole (1996b) study this problem in a setting where pollution is
regulated by permits and R&D yields a perfectly clean technology. They show that,
even if intellectual property rights are perfectly enforced, without commitment on
environmental policy there will be no R&D because ex-post the government sets
a permit quantity that drives the license fee down to zero. The research firm is
effectively expropriated and anticipating this the R&D sector does not invest in
the first place. However, Denicolo` (1999) shows that this is only a special case. If
the new technology does still emit some pollution, research incentives are positive,
though not first best. This holds both for taxes and permits. This result has recently
been confirmed by Requate (2005a) who studies a type of innovation where partial
adoption of the new technology is optimal.
Building on Laffont and Tirole (1996b) and Denicolo` (1999) the contributions of
this part are threefold. First, the choice set of the government is extended. It is no
longer confined to only one parameter per instrument (e.g. a tax rate or a permit
quantity). Instead, the environmental instrument and its design are endogenous.
This increase in flexibility is achieved by allowing that permits have an upper and
lower bound on prices (Roberts and Spence 1976, Pizer 2002). Both taxes and
plain permits are special cases of this more general scheme. Second, the objective
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function of the government is extended. In addition to welfare maximization in a
first best setting, the paper analyzes how a revenue objective of the government
does affect static and dynamic performance. Intuitively, putting additional weight
on government’s revenues should increase its predation propensity. In some cases
this intuition is confirmed. However, in other situations a revenue objective turns
out to be a research stimulating commitment device. Third, the class of innovation
types is extended. Four types, including vertical innovation (Laffont and Tirole
1996b, Denicolo` 1999), a clean but expensive substitute (Abrego and Perroni 2002)
and multiple green horizontal innovations are analyzed. In contrast to previous parts
situations involving only one type of pollution are studied.
In the real world, the choice set of the government is considerably larger than
assumed by previous studies. Contrary to the standard assumptions, neither the
instrument of regulation nor its design are fixed. For example, the rules of the
sulphur trading program in the U.S. state explicitly that permits do not constitute
property rights and might be removed without compensation. But even if permits
continue to be used, whether they are grandfathered or auctioned, the design of
auctions and complementary instruments are subject to change. Such changes in
design can effectively alter the nature of an instrument, e.g. if they impose explicit
or implicit bounds on permit prices.
Reservation prices are used in auctions of oil and gas leases (Opaluch and Gri-
galunas 1984, Hendricks et al. 1994). An additional tax on emissions (or related
inputs) and an abatement subsidy have the same effect. Emission taxes have been
used in the U.S. permit scheme for ozone-depleting substances (ODS) and in some
European countries (e.g. Germany) carbon taxes supplement the European Union
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).
Upper price bounds can be implemented by fixed penalties for excessive emissions
not covered by permits. This was done in the former Denmark carbon and U.S. ODS
permit programs (OECD 2003). In the UK renewables obligation program firms are
allowed to buy themselves out at a pre-specified price. This option has been used
extensively (DTI 2004).2 A similar approach is currently discussed in Switzerland.
There firms will be able to choose to be subject to a carbon tax or to participate in
the EU emission trading scheme.
2Another common variant is a fixed penalty combined with the requirement to provide the
missing permits in the following year. This is implemented e.g. in the U.S. acid rain and European
carbon trading schemes. Effectively, this allows for borrowing of permits at a surcharge specified
by the penalty.
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The objective function of a government often deviates from pure welfare maxi-
mization in a first best world. For example, it might put some weight on its budget.
The impact of such a revenue objective, caused by e.g. distortionary taxation else-
where in the economy3, is studied. Revenue objectives do play a role in real world
environmental policy. The tax on CFC production in the ODC program has been
introduced to capture windfall rents after the establishment of the permit scheme
and have subsequently been raised almost fourfold (OECD 2003). The desire to
raise funds for the German pension system was an important motivation to set up a
carbon tax at the end of the 1990s and revenue objectives are the reason for reserva-
tion prices in U.S. oil and gas lease auctions. This paper complements the literature
on environmental regulation with previous tax distortions (Bovenberg and de Mooij
1994, Babiker et al. 2003, Fullerton and Wolverton 2005) by explicitly considering
research investment effects. Laffont and Tirole (1996a,b) model revenue objectives
in related frameworks, but while Laffont and Tirole (1996a) concentrates on adop-
tion decisions without patents, the results in Laffont and Tirole (1996b) do not hinge
on the revenue objective.
It is assumed that environmental regulation is the only way by which the gov-
ernment is able to raise additional revenues. Patent rights are perfectly enforced
and discretionary profit taxes are ruled out. Credible commitment is lacking only
with respect to the design of environmental regulation in order to focus on this is-
sue. This is consistent with previous approaches to model the dynamic performance
of environmental regulation.4 It is reasonable because, in contrast to patent law,
environmental regulation has to be more flexible in order to adjust to new insights
about damages and to new technologies (see part IV). Moreover, the assumption
of credible patent law is not necessary to establish most of the results. Except for
one case, with endogenous environmental regulation the government turns out to be
at least indifferent to patents at the point in time it has to grant them. In what
follows, time-inconsistency is therefore less of an issue for patent law.
The key results of this part are that the additional flexibility of the government in
designing environmental policy makes implementation of the static post-innovation
optimum feasible in a number of cases. However, flexibility often decreases research
incentives while it is necessary for dynamic efficiency in the case of multiple green
horizontal innovations. The effect of a revenue objective on R&D efforts is ambigu-
3For other reasons see Grossman (1991), McGuire and Olson (1996).
4See Laffont and Tirole (1996a,b), Denicolo` (1999) and Requate (2005a).
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ous. Depending on the type of innovation it can increase or destroy these efforts.
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. The next chapter presents the
model. Chapter 18 analyzes the effects of flexible instrument design and a revenue
objective in the standard case of vertical environmental innovation. In chapter 19
the case of a polluting industry facing a clean but expensive substitute is considered.
Chapter 20 studies a clean industry that faces entry of new polluting technology.
The implementation of the optimal R&D trajectory for the case of multiple green
horizontal innovations is analyzed in chapter 21. The last chapter concludes.
84
Chapter 17
The Model
Like Laffont and Tirole (1996b) and Denicolo` (1999) consider two succeeding periods
in a competitive market for a non-durable consumption or intermediate good q. In
the first period only one production technology labeled 1 is available. If the research
sector successfully engages in R&D in the first period, a new technology 2 producing
a perfect substitute to q becomes available in the second period. The market’s
downward sloping inverse demand function in each period is
P = P (q) ,
where q = q1 + q2 is the sum of technologies output.
Individual firms are small, have U-shaped cost functions and entry is free. Both
technologies are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale at the industry level.
The industry’s cost function is therefore given by
C (q1, q2) = c1q1 + c2q2.
This cost structure is more general than that of Laffont and Tirole (1996b) and
Denicolo` (1999) by allowing for real economic costs associated with the installation of
the new technology (i.e. c2 > c1). So far the model is similar to the one presented in
chapter 9. However, the damage function introduced next is different. It is assumed
that at most one type of pollution is emitted and each technology is allowed to be
perfectly clean.
Technologies might emit pollution as a joint product at a constant ratio to output
qi. The social damage function D is assumed to be
D(q1, q2) = D(a1q1 + a2q2),
where D is increasing and convex and ai ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2} and a1 + a2 >
0. The latter condition ensures that at least one of the technologies is polluting
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and the problem therefore relevant for environmental regulation. ai are exogenous
parameters indicating by how much technology 2 is cleaner than technology 1 or vice
versa. This specification of the cost and damage functions allow for a number of
innovation types. Vertical innovation where the new technology is cleaner, equally
costly and hence strictly preferred (c1 = c2, a1 > a2) analyzed by Denicolo` (1999)
and perfect vertical innovation (c1 = c2, a2 = 0) considered by Laffont and Tirole
(1996b) are special cases of the more general types discussed in this part.1
The research sector invests into R&D according to the expected value of future
patents. In case of development of a new technology, the successful research firm is
granted a patent in the second period. It is assumed to set a license fee f linear in
output of the new technology.2 Imitation of the new technology is ruled out, hence
patents are strong and of sufficient breadth.
The government is allowed to have a revenue objective. The objective function
of the government is therefore
G =W + λB, (17.1)
where W is social welfare in the absence of distortions elsewhere in the economy, B
is the amount of public revenue raised by environmental regulation and λ ≥ 0 is the
weight of the revenue objective. λ might be positive because raising public funds
requires distortionary taxation elsewhere in the economy. Thus, the marginal cost
of public funds is allowed to be above unity.3
In the absence of a commitment on either taxes or plain permits, the government
uses the following instrument to regulate pollution. Permit quantity E is auctioned
at a reservation price τ or if τ is negative, given away together with a subsidy on
pollution. If the permit price exceeds an upper bound τ , the quantity constraint
ceases to be binding and additional permits are sold at this price. This design en-
ables the government to choose endogenously between price and quantity regulation
by adjusting stringencies within a given legal framework. The distinction made in
the literature between a commitment on instruments and on stringencies becomes
obsolete. The situation where the government has full flexibility on all policy vari-
ables in the post-innovation period is compared to a commitment on taxes and plain
1Not all types of innovation consistent with the above specification are considered. Instead the
focus is on exemplary cases that nevertheless extend considerably the set studied by Laffont and
Tirole (1996b), Denicolo` (1999).
2This is equivalent to a fixed fee per firm as firms are small and face U-shaped cost functions.
3In what follows, it is ignored that the introduction of environmental regulation might affect
the size of λ (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994).
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permits that has frequently been assumed in the literature.
In what follows, production and emission control in period 1 are ignored as
there is nothing new to be learned. In the first period only the research investment
matters. If the research sector’s effort remains fruitless, nothing changes compared
to the first period. However, if research is successful and technology 2 becomes
available in period 2 the timing is like in Denicolo` (1999) and Laffont and Tirole
(1996b). After the new technology has arrived and its properties are known, the
government adjusts regulation and grants a patent to the successful research firm.
Second, the research firm chooses the level of the license fee f . Third, firms decide
to enter or exit the industry, which technology to use and how much to produce.
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Chapter 18
Vertical Environmental
Innovation
Assume that the new technology is equivalent to the established one but emits less of
the same pollutant (0 < a2 < a1, c1 = c2 = c, see Figure 18.1). The new technology
is strictly preferred and innovation is therefore vertical. Without loss of generality
assume that a1 = 1. This case has been studied by Denicolo` (1999) both with and
without commitment on future tax rates and permit quantities. Laffont and Tirole
(1996b) analyze a limiting case where the new technology is perfectly clean (a2 = 0).
Price
Output
P(q)
c
c + D’(q )1
c + D’(a q )2 2
ô
q *2q *1
Figure 18.1: Vertical environmental innovation
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18.1 No Revenue Objective
Assume that the government has no revenue objective (λ = 0). First, consider the
case of plain permits without upper or lower bounds on the permit price. As will be
seen, they are not always able to implement the static first best allocation. Second,
it is shown that the inefficiencies can be removed by an upper bound on permit
price.
In the plain permit scheme the equilibrium conditions in the market clearing
stage are given by
P (q) = c+ γ, (18.1)
P (q) = c+ a2γ + f, (18.2)
q1 + a2q2 ≤ E, (18.3)
where γ is the equilibrium permit price. Firms are indifferent between using the
established and the new technology if f = (1 − a2)γ. A profit maximizing patent
holding firm will ensure that the license fee always satisfies this condition. If f <
(1 − a2)γ, it could raise the fee without affecting output of the new technology
due to the permit constraint or, if f > (1 − a2)γ, the new technology is not used
at all. Note that this does not yet define the equilibrium license fee. The permit
price depends on aggregate output which is itself a function of f implicitly defined
by (18.1)-(18.3). The patent holder can influence both aggregate output and that
of the new technology (Requate 2005a). Hence, the patent holding firm has some
discretion on f while maximizing its profits pi = f · q2(f) subject to the permit
constraint (18.3) that is always binding. The first order conditions yield q2 = Ea2
and q2+f ∂q2∂f = 0 for q2 <
E
a2
. Substituting in f , (18.1), q and ∂q2∂f =
[
(1− a2)2 ∂P∂q
]−1
yields q2 +
P (E+(1−a2)q2)−c
(1−a2) ∂P∂q |q=E+(1−a2)q2
for the left hand side of the latter equation.
The government aims to implement q2 = Ea2 = q
∗
2 and q1 = q
∗
1 = 0, where an as-
terisk denotes static first best levels. However, it follows from the profit maximizing
behavior of the patent holding firm that this is only possible if
−(1− a2)2 ∂P
∂q
∣∣∣∣
q=q∗2
q∗2
P (q∗2)− c
≤ 1. (18.4)
Otherwise, the patent holder increases the license fee above f = (1− a2) [P (q∗2)− c]
and thereby reduces output of the new technology below the optimal level and
triggers production by the established one. This qualifies a result by Denicolo` (1999)
who finds that permits are efficient given the new technology is superior by assuming
that q = Ea2 (see also section 11.4).
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An upper bound τ on the equilibrium permit price can avoid this source of static
inefficiency. If γe = min[γ, τ ] is the effective permit price and τ = P (q∗2) − c, this
imposes an upper bound of (1 − a2) [P (q∗2)− c] on the license fee. For license fees
exceeding this threshold, the permit constraint ceases to be binding and the entire
output is produced by the established technology. This can not be in the interest of
the patent holding firm. Hence, with τ = P (q∗2) − c any E ≤ a2q∗2 implements the
first best static optimum. This includes E = 0, i.e. a standard emission tax.
Note, in all cases where the advanced design increases static efficiency patent
holder’s profits and hence research incentives are strictly lower under the flexible
design than under plain permits. The bound on permit price restricts profit maxi-
mizing of the research firm.
Plain permits fail to implement the static first best in general, while taxes are
equivalent to the flexible scheme. The government is therefore indifferent between
a tax and the flexible instrument.
Proposition 18.1 If innovation is vertical and the government has no revenue ob-
jective, the first best static allocation is feasible with permits if bounds on permit
prices are available (but not otherwise). Research incentives are less under the flex-
ible scheme whenever flexibility is of value. The flexible design is equivalent to a
pollution tax both in static and dynamic terms.
Research incentives are positive because the externality requires a reduction in out-
put of the new technology compared to a situation without market failures. Thereby
firms have a positive willingness to pay for the new technology given the static op-
timal regulation.1 The patent holding firm can appropriate this amount by license
fees. However, unless plain permits are used, there is no monopoly pricing in a sense
that distorts the allocation. Hence, there is no time-inconsistency with respect to
patent law. Granting intellectual property rights is a credible promise. However,
the dynamic incentives created are solely determined by the size of the externality
of the new technology and therefore only by chance first best.
18.2 With Revenue Objective
In case λ is strictly positive the government faces a trade-off between static efficiency
and revenue maximization (see equation (17.1)). It can control output using either
1This does not hold if the new technology is perfectly clean, i.e. a2 = 0 (Laffont and Tirole
1996b).
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the flexible instrument or a tax. For the ease of presentation the case of a tax τ is
used in the remainder of this section.
The amount of public revenue raised by environmental regulation is given by
B = a2τ · q2. Profits of the research firm are pi = f · q2 = (1− a2)τ · q2 > 0. Hence,
the government’s objective function can be rewritten as
G =W + λ
a2pi
1− a2 .
Public revenue is linear and increasing in patent holder’s profit. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, a revenue objective of the government increases research incentives. In this
partial equilibrium model the welfare effect of an increase in λ depends amongst
others on whether one starts in a situation with over or under provision of research.
However, if the reason for the revenue objective is distortionary taxation elsewhere
in the economy, an increase in λ would of course require to escalate these distortions.
Proposition 18.2 If innovation is vertical and the government has a revenue ob-
jective, research incentives are positive and increasing in the weight of the revenue
objective.
The reason for the revenue objective of the government and research incentives to
be in line with each other is due to the characteristics of vertical environmental
innovation and, moreover, purely static. Hence, it is not based on the dynamic
argument that a government with a revenue objective has a self interest in restricting
future expropriation in order to increase productivity and thereby the tax base.2
This would require commitment which is ruled out here.
Note that patent law faces time-inconsistency in this case. If innovation has
occurred, the government can increase revenues by not granting a patent. With
patents public revenues are B = a2τ · q∗2 = [P (q∗2)− c− f ] · q∗2 while without patents
they would be Bˆ = a2τˆ ·q∗2 = [P (q∗2)−c]·q∗2. This is the only situation where credible
commitment to patent law is crucial in this part.
2The latter argument has been put forward e.g. by McGuire and Olson (1996).
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Chapter 19
A Polluting Industry Facing a
Clean Substitute
In this chapter a different type of innovation is considered. Contrary to the type
in the previous chapter, the new technology has higher marginal costs than the
established one (c1 < c2) but is perfectly clean (a2 = 0). Assume that the new
technology is socially desirable but not strictly superior to the established one (see
Figure 19.1). This case has been studied by Abrego and Perroni (2002) but for
adoption decisions instead of R&D. Again, the model by Laffont and Tirole (1996b)
is a limiting case where the private costs of production of the new technology become
arbitrarily close to that of the established technology (c1 +  = c2). Electricity
production is a case in point where wind and solar power are clean but so far more
expensive alternatives to nuclear power and fossil fuels. Similarly, fuel cells provide
a clean substitute to traditional combustion engines but currently at higher private
costs.
19.1 No Revenue Objective
Assume that the government has no revenue objective. The equilibrium of the
production stage with the flexible scheme is given by
P (q) = c1 + γ,
P (q) = c2 + f,
q1 ≤ E, if γ < τ,
where γ is the equilibrium permit price. The above system of equations determines
the equilibrium output quantities q1 and q2 and the equilibrium permit price γ =
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min[c2− c1+f, τ ]. Note that only an upper bound on the permit price is considered
here.1 Allowing for a reservation price would not change the results.
Price
Output
P(q)
c1
c + D’(q )1 1
c2
q*q *1
Figure 19.1: A clean but expensive substitute
In the previous stage the patent holding firm faces a residual demand
q˜2 (f) =
 0 : f > c1 − c2 + τq(c2 + f)− E : 0 ≤ f < c1 − c2 + τ
The research firm maximizes profits pi = f · q˜2 (f) over f given the residual
demand function. The equilibrium license fee is therefore f = min[fˆ , c1− c2+ τ − ],
where fˆ is defined by the standard monopoly pricing condition − ∂q∂P fˆq˜2(fˆ) = 1 and 
is arbitrarily small. The maximum permit price τ thereby imposes an upper bound
on the license fee.
The government sets the policy variables E and τ to maximize post-innovation
static welfare. Due to the assumption that the new technology is socially desir-
able the maximum permit price has to ensure that the new technology is used in
equilibrium, i.e. τ > c2 − c1. Any increase of τ above this threshold results in a
rise of f and therefore in a price increase and a reduction of aggregate output. In
the absence of any revenue objective on the side of the government (λ = 0), the
static social optimum is implemented by setting τ = c2 − c1 +  and E such that
D(E) = c2 − c1. Hence, f = 0. Market power and research incentives, purposely
1This is the regulatory instrument used in Pizer (2002) and effectively embodied in most permit
schemes by the imposition of penalties for excess emissions.
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generated by patent law, are destroyed by an opportunistic use of environmental
regulation. Hence, commitment on patent law is irrelevant if environmental regula-
tion can be freely adjusted in the post-innovation period. At the point in time the
government issues the patent it is indifferent between doing so or not.
Since a specific maximum permit price is necessary to implement the static first
best, the government strictly prefers the flexible scheme over plain permits. Taxes
are also not able to achieve the static first best. Due to constant returns to scale
either one technology is used exclusively or if firms are indifferent, a random mix of
technologies results.
Proposition 19.1 Assume the established technology is polluting and the new one
is socially desirable and clean but not strictly superior and the government can set a
permit quantity and a maximum permit price and has no revenue objective. Then the
government strictly prefers the flexible instrument over both taxes and plain permits.
In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium research incentives are zero as the patent
holding firm would be completely expropriated.
19.2 With Revenue Objective
If λ > 0, an increase in τ results in an increase in the equilibrium permit price
which augments public revenue. The government therefore faces a trade-off between
raising public funds and implementing the static optimal allocation. Formally, ∂G∂τ =
−∂W∂τ + λE. Hence, there is a threshold level λˆ such that for all λ > λˆ it holds that
∂W
∂τ
∣∣
τ=0
< λE. Research incentives are zero for all λ ≤ λˆ and positive and increasing
in λ for all λ > λˆ. Note that λˆ is decreasing in c2 because the optimal E is decreasing
in c2 (Figure 19.1). Hence, the cheaper and therefore the more desirable the new
technology, the higher the threshold level λˆ necessary to trigger research.
Proposition 19.2 If assumptions of Proposition 19.1 hold but the government has
a revenue objective, it effectively expropriates the patent holding firm if the weight of
the revenue objective is at or below λˆ. For λ > λˆ there is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium where research incentives are positive and increasing in the weight of the
revenue objective.
Here, in the absence of commitment, a revenue objective can be essential in re-
stricting predation by the government. The aim of the government to achieve static
efficiency that spoils research incentives is counterbalanced by its desire to raise
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revenues. Note that an increase in the upper price bound on permits increases rev-
enues only due to monopoly pricing. Hence, if λ > λˆ the government is no longer
indifferent between granting patents or not. It strictly prefers patents to be granted
at the beginning of the post-innovation period.
This analysis might suggest that increasing the revenue objective of the gov-
ernment might be a good idea. However, this is more costly than apparent in this
partial equilibrium model. If it is caused by distortionary taxation elsewhere in the
economy, raising λ requires to escalate these inefficiencies.
In this setting, patents alone are insufficient in creating research incentives even
if they are credible and rule out any form of imitation. Additional interventions,
such as R&D subsidies, are essential to create private research incentives for this
type of innovation.
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Chapter 20
Clean Industry and Polluting
Substitute
This chapter analyzes the case of a clean industry (i.e. a1 = 0) facing entry by a
polluting technology (a2 = 1). Assume that the new technology is socially desirable
but not strictly superior to the established one (see Figure 20.1). c1 > c2 is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for this to hold.
Price
Output
P(q)
c1
c + D’(q )2 2
c2
q*q *2
A
B
Figure 20.1: A cheap but polluting substitute
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20.1 No Revenue Objective
Prior to innovation only technology 1 is available. Optimal output is given by
P (q) = c1 and is supplied by the established technology. After successful innovation,
technology 2 is available. First best aggregate output is still given by P (q) = c1 but
a mix of technologies is optimal.
The equilibrium of the market clearing stage is given by
P (q) = c1, (20.1)
P (q) = c2 + τ + β + f, (20.2)
q2 ≤ E, (20.3)
where β is the equilibrium permit price on top of the reservation price τ . The
reservation price is sufficient to establish the result and hence the upper bound on
the permit price is ignored to save on notation. Equations (20.1)-(20.3) determine
aggregate output q, the mix of technologies q1, q2 and the additional equilibrium
permit price β.
In the previous stage the research firm faces a residual demand function
q˜2 (f) =

0 : f > c1 − c2 − τ
E : f < c1 − c2 − τ
(0, E) : f = c1 − c2 − τ
.
The firm just undercuts the threshold by setting a license fee of f = c1− c2− τ − ,
where  is arbitrarily small.
In the first stage the government decides on the policy variables E and τ . Given
that the new technology is socially desirable but not strictly superior, it holds that
0 < E < P−1(c1). The government’s objective function reduces to
G (E, τ) = (c1 − c2)E −D(E2) + λτE. (20.4)
Given λ = 0 this is independent of the reservation price on permits. Hence, any
τ ∈ [0, c1 − c2] implements the static first best. Since τ = 0 is included in this set,
the government is indifferent between the flexible scheme and plain permits.
The social gain from innovation is equivalent to the shaded area A in Figure 20.1
while research incentives are in the range from 0 to A+B depending on τ . Hence,
optimal as well as over and under supply of research is possible under the flexible
scheme. Plain permits induce excessive research incentives of size A+B.
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A tax on emissions is not able to implement the static first best allocation. With
constant returns to scale either one technology will be strictly preferred or, if effective
marginal costs are the same, technologies are randomly mixed.
Proposition 20.1 Assume the established technology is clean and the new one is
socially desirable and polluting but not strictly superior and the government can set
a permit quantity, a minimum permit price and has no revenue objective. Then the
government is able to implement the static first best both by plain permits and the
flexible instrument. Plain permits induce excessive research while under the flexible
scheme optimal as well as over and under supply of R&D is possible.
Here, commitment is much less of a problem than in the previous chapters. Static
and dynamic efficiency are no longer mutually exclusive. The first best allocation
(static and dynamic) is implemented by a feasible reservation price that induces
research incentives of size A. Time-consistency is purely a problem of equilibrium
selection. Hence, a pure coordination instrument can serve as a credible commitment
device. The same applies to the decision to grant patents.
20.2 With Revenue Objective
If λ > 0, equation (20.4) is linear and increasing in τ . Hence, the optimal reservation
price is τ = c1− c2− . Regardless of the weight of the revenue objective, the license
fee is driven down to zero. The successful research firm does not make any profits
and anticipating expropriation the research sector will not engage in R&D in the
first place.
Proposition 20.2 If assumptions of Proposition 20.1 hold but the government has
a revenue objective, it is able to implement the preferred allocation using the flexible
instrument only. The patent holding firm would be expropriated and hence private
research incentives are zero.
In this case the revenue objective jeopardizes research incentives. By increasing λ it
becomes more difficult to achieve commitment on environmental policy. However,
commitment on patents is again not an issue. The government does not object to
grant them.
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Chapter 21
Implementation of the Optimal
R&D Policy for Multiple Green
Horizontal Innovations
As in the previous part, the endogenous and more flexible design of environmental
regulation has first been studied in a two period, two technology setting. In this
chapter the insights are applied to the multiple technology, continuous time decen-
tralized economy of part I and chapter 14. This allows the joint implementation of
the first best pollution and research policies.
In order to achieve this it has to be assumed that the government is able to
commit to future environmental policies if and only if they do not create time-
inconsistencies. This is a very weak form of commitment since it merely allows
to pre-select one of several options that all yield the same welfare. This degree
of commitment is compatible with closed loop equilibria, since time-inconsistency
of equilibrium strategies is ruled out. However, it is restrictive in a sense that it
eliminates an infinite set of other closed loop equilibria that would occur in the
absence of this commitment assumption.
Chapter 14 described the pollution policy that implements the social optimum
given a number of technologies n and their status of protection. The second crucial
part of an implementation strategy is to ensure that the right amount of private
research incentives are created at the desired points in time (and only at these
points). Research incentives at time tn are given by the expected present value of
revenues A generated by an additional technology
An(tn) = E
[∫ ∞
tn
e−rtfn(t)qn(t)dt
]
. (21.1)
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In order for the research pattern induced by the policy to be optimal the following
condition has to be met
An(tn) = R, if and only if tn = t∗n, ∀n = 2, ..., N. (21.2)
21.1 Perfectly Elastic Demand cum Capacity Constraint
In the case where the demand function is perfectly inelastic, implementation of the
optimal R&D program is feasible given the optimal pollution policies and the ability
of the government to commit on one of several (ex-post) payoff equivalent paths. If
the government is restricted to use only either a price or a quantity instrument on
each pollutant and hence technology, the expected gain from the n+1st technology
is
An(tn) = E
[∫ ∞
t∗n+1
e−rtq∗n+1(t)τ1(t)dt
]
. (21.3)
This gives only one choice variable, the tax rate on the unprotected technology τ1,
to determine the research incentives of N − 1 technologies. The system is therefore
overdetermined. In general, a such constrained implementation strategy does not
achieve the socially optimal research trajectory.
Proposition 21.1 In general, the optimal pollution and research trajectories de-
rived in chapters 4 and 5 can not be implemented in a decentralized economy using
only pure emission taxes, permits and patents.
However, in principle there is nothing to rule out that each pollutant is regulated
both by a price and a quantity instrument. Permits might be sold at a reservation
price or be subject to a (potentially negative) tax. Allowing for such hybrid schemes
the first best research program becomes feasible.1 The expected present value of
technology n+ 1 is now
An(tn) = E
[∫ ∞
t∗n+1
e−rtq∗n+1(t)(τ1(t)− τn+1)dt
]
. (21.4)
Hence, there are N choice variables and N − 1 conditions (see (21.2)), leaving one
degree of freedom. The additional price instruments introduced are used to fine
1This works only if the government has no revenue objective and the marginal costs of public
funds are zero. Otherwise, there is a trade-off between creating research incentives and efficiency
losses due to distortionary taxation elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, even the second best
policy requires credible commitment in order to overcome the time-inconsistency of giving (or not
taking) money to (from) the patent holding firm at a stage where innovation has already occurred.
See chapter 20 for a discussion of these issues.
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tune the research incentives of each technology without affecting the allocation of
output. Note that the optimal set of τi’s might involve both taxes and subsidies
on pollution. Since any τi < min[τ1, 1] does not affect output but only the license
fee fi on technology i the government’s commitment requirement satisfies the weak
condition specified above.2 It is merely a pre-selection of one of several (ex-post)
payoff equivalent policies.
Proposition 21.2 The optimal pollution and research trajectories derived in chap-
ters 4 and 5 can be implemented in a decentralized economy using hybrid tax-subsidy-
permit schemes and patents.
Conventional policies to adjust research incentives such as patent length are not
sufficient to achieve the first best allocation. Even with an infinite lifetime the in-
centives created by patents might not suffice to trigger R&D at the optimal point in
time. A feasible alternative to the hybrid tax-permit scheme proposed are discrimi-
natory taxes and subsidies on the patent holders revenues combined with standard
tax and permit regulation.
21.2 Downward Sloping Demand Function
As indicated in chapter 14 there are fewer degrees of freedom left after implementing
the optimal output mix at each point in time, given the number of technologies.
More specific, the tax rate on the initially available and competitive technology
1 is uniquely defined at each point in time. This directly results from the effect
any license fee choice by a patent holding firm has on output. Hence, by the very
nature of a downward sloping demand function prices and quantities are no longer
independent of each other. The tax rate on the competitively operated technology
1 is τ1(t) = P (Q∗(t)) at each point in time. Hence, (21.4) becomes
An(tn) = E
[∫ ∞
t∗n+1
e−rtq∗n+1(t) [P (Q
∗(t))− τn+1] dt
]
, (21.5)
if the demand function is downward sloping. Plugging this into conditions (21.2)
the resulting system is exactly determined.
Proposition 21.3 Pollution and research trajectories as derived in chapters 4 and 5
can be implemented using hybrid tax-subsidy-permit schemes and patents in a decen-
tralized economy with a downward sloping demand function and without a capacity
constraint on aggregate output.
2The upper bound is due to the marginal benefit of production being equal to one.
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Note that for a backstop technology P (Q∗(t)) = 0 for all t ≥ t∗n. Moreover, there
is no pollution that could be subsidized.3 Hence, a perfectly clean technology does
not create any private incentives for R&D although it is the socially most desirable
outcome. This reflects the basic trade-off between static efficiency and the creation
of research incentives by granting patents and hence monopoly power. If the new
technology creates pollution externalities there is some scope to align the two issues
since up to a certain point both market failures call for a reduction in output. A price
above private marginal costs is socially optimal and the revenues can be channeled
to patent holders. With perfectly clean technologies this is impossible (Laffont and
Tirole 1996b, Denicolo` 1999). However, since it is assumed that a research firm has
no influence on the arrival probability of a backstop p implementation of the optimal
research trajectory is still feasible if p < 1. Revenues generated by a boomerang
technology have to be sufficiently high so that conditions 21.2 can still be met as is
ensured by (21.5).
Credibility of patents is not an issue in this situation. The optimal pollution
policy ensures that the market power of patent holding firms does not distort output
decisions. Hence, after innovation has occurred the government is indifferent between
granting a patent and not granting it. The weak form of commitment assumed above
is therefore sufficient to implement the optimal research trajectory.
Note that so far no explicit solutions for a socially optimal pollution and research
policy for a problem similar to the on presented in part I exist for the case with a
downward sloping demand function. However, their qualitative features derived in
chapter 14 are sufficiently to establish that implementation is feasible using the
strategy described above.
3Subsidizing output instead would distort entry and exit decisions.
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Chapter 22
Conclusion of Part III
Real world environmental policies are often more complex than a glance at the exist-
ing literature on instrument choice might suggest. Permit schemes involve auctions
with reservation prices, fixed penalties for excessive emissions and are complemented
by taxes. Extending the choice set of the government to take this into account en-
hances its ability to achieve post-innovation static efficiency. However, since static
efficiency contradicts monopoly pricing by a patent holding firm, research incen-
tives often decrease if instrument design is endogenous. In some cases flexibility in
instrument design results in full expropriation of intellectual property. A lack of
commitment on details such as auction rules, penalties or the set up of a compli-
mentary tax scheme, on the one hand, can therefore pose a serious threat on the
effectivity of patents in stimulating private research.
On the other hand, a more flexible tax-subsidy-permit scheme is able to im-
plement the first best R&D policy for multiple green horizontal innovations. This
applies both to the case with a perfectly elastic demand function with a capacity
constraint and to a situation with a downward sloping demand function. Hence, the
optimal pollution and R&D trajectories derived in part I can be implemented in a
decentralized economy.
Moreover, standard welfare maximization is not necessarily the sole objective of
a government. The public funds raised by environmental regulation are sometimes
treated as a value in its own right. Such a revenue objective of the government affects
private research incentives in very different ways. R&D efforts can be increasing
in the weight of public funds, which e.g. is the case with vertical environmental
innovation. A certain threshold weight might even be a prerequisite for the existence
of research incentives. However, a revenue objective is not proposed as a solution to
under provision of R&D. First, it can trigger expropriation of the patent holding firm
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for other types of innovation and second, raising the weight of the revenue objective
is feasible only by inducing additional distortions elsewhere in the economy.
When environmental policy is endogenous, patent law itself does usually not face
a time-inconsistency problem. The government is at least indifferent to grant intel-
lectual property rights or might even be strictly in favor to do so ex-post. The entire
time-inconsistency is concentrated in environmental regulation. The case of vertical
innovation with revenue objectives is the only exception where a commitment on
patent law is relevant.
The next part aims to shed some light on how a sovereign government is able to
make credible commitments. In addition, instruments that do not face the problem
of time-inconsistency, such as R&D subsidies, might be able to provide alternative
means to solve this kind of problem.
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Part IV
Commitment by Delegation
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Chapter 23
Introduction to Part IV
Time-inconsistency features prominent in many policy areas.1 For a sovereign cred-
ible commitment is especially hard to achieve, since by definition she has discre-
tionary scope that cannot be restricted. She can change any law or constitutional
amendment she passes at later stages. This is in line with rule of law and merely
reflects that the sovereign has the authority to legislate.
Several solutions to the time-inconsistency problem have been proposed. Trigger
strategies (Barro and Gordon 1983), reputation (Barro 1986) and delegation (Rogoff
1985) are most prominent. In this part the focus is on the latter, which is popular
in monetary economics, is supported by empirical evidence (Berger et al. 2001) and
is also being considered in other policy areas (Levine et al. 2005, Roelfsema 2007).
McCallum (1995, 1997) formulated a fundamental criticism to the idea that
delegation increases commitment. ”The problem [...] is that such a device does not
actually overcome the motivation for dynamic inconsistency; it merely relocates it.”
(McCallum 1995, p. 210) Instead of committing to the policy itself the sovereign has
to commit to an institution, since sovereignty implies the power to remove delegation
or override a bureaucrat’s decision.2 Delegation is not credible by definition but
the level of independence or accountability of a bureaucrat depends on the degree
of commitment the sovereign attributes to the institution. McCallum therefore
1E.g. monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro and Gordon 1983), utility regulation
(Gilbert and Newbery 1994), trade policy (Staiger and Tabellini 1987), political economy (Besley
and Coate 1998, Acemoglu 2003) and environmental regulation (see chapters 19, 20 and Laffont
and Tirole (1996b)).
2See Balla (2000) and McCubbins and Schwartz (1984). The latter write: ”The problem [with
delegation] is that the bureaucracy might not pursue Congress’s goals. [...] Then Congress can
intervene to rectify the violation. Congress has not necessarily relinquished legislative responsibility
to anyone else. It has just found a more efficient way to legislate.” (p. 175)
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regards it a fallacy to discuss time-inconsistency only for specific policies but not
in the context of institutions. Either a commitment device exists and hence the
sovereign can commit to either of them, or it does not, in which case commitment
is feasible for neither of them. Unless there is something that makes changes in
institutions fundamentally different from any other decision by the sovereign, this
seems to contradict the validity of delegation as a commitment device.3
This part formalizes McCallum’s critique. Both a specific policy and the insti-
tutional structure are subject to the same commitment technology that allows for
an endogenous level of credibility. McCallum’s ’second fallacy ’ is confirmed in a
complete information setting. However, if there is a trade-off between flexibility and
credibility due to exogenous shocks affecting the state of the economy, delegation is
able to relax this trade-off if the bureaucrat’s response to a shock is at least some-
what in line with sovereign’s preferences. This effect induces the sovereign to invest
more in credibility under delegation. Hence, while delegation does not increase
commitment per se it makes credibility more attractive. The observed commitment
effect of delegation can therefore be explained even if the commitment technologies
for delegation and discretionary regulation are identical as is the case in lawmaking
by a sovereign. McCallum’s critique does not hold in this case.
Hence, the present part establishes gains from delegation although it abstracts
from asymmetric information between the sovereign and the bureaucrat. Alesina
and Tabellini (2007a,b) and Ludema and Olofsgard (2007) investigate effects arising
from the interaction between asymmetric information and time-inconsistency.
However, like most contributions on the commitment effect of delegation4, they
take its credibility for granted. Exceptions are Lohmann (1992), Jensen (1997),
Moser (1999) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003). In Jensen (1997) commitment is
provided by tit-for-tat punishment strategies in a repeated game. He shows that
delegation has no effect on credibility of policies if overriding is costless. However, if
changes in policies set by an agency are costly (and increasingly so in the size of the
adjustment) then time-inconsistency can be partially resolved. However, the degree
of commitment, defined as the set of discount factors that support optimal monetary
policy is reduced, since punishment is less severe. Jensen (1997) concludes that del-
egation diminishes commitment. Recently, Driffill and Rotondi (2006) showed that
the opposite holds if more general incentive contracts for central bankers are consid-
3For reasons such differences might exist see Lohmann (2003).
4See e.g. Rogoff (1985), Walsh (1995), Maskin and Tirole (2004), Levine et al. (2005).
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ered. However, the differences in the costs of overriding a policy set by the sovereign
compared to one set by an agency are somewhat ad hoc and seem hard to defend in
general. Overriding delegated policies might even be easier if the bureaucrat acts as
a ’scapegoat’ (Fiorina 1982, Alesina and Tabellini 2007b).
Moser (1999) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) use heterogeneous veto players
to induce commitment and find that delegation enhances credibility. They take the
initial level of commitment both to the policy as well as to the institutional design as
exogenously given. Hence, the effect present in their papers is complementary to the
one established here since the latter requires at least some discretion of the sovereign
with respect to the initial level of commitment that might involve but does not
depend on multiple veto players. The discretion over the level of commitment, that
is crucial for the following results, stems from the ability of a sovereign to influence
the costs involved in future policy changes, e.g. by setting different majority rules.
Lohmann (1992) provides an analysis of monetary policy where the sovereign has
control over the level of commitment represented by the cost incured to adjust the
policy ex-post. However, she does not explicitly solve the optimal policy without
delegation and, in contrast to the present part, does not treat commitment as an
investment.
There is also a link to formal and real authority as discussed by Aghion and
Tirole (1997). Here, as in their model, the sovereign has formal and real authority
in the case of discretion. However, if she delegates she keeps formal authority but
at least in some cases real authority rests with the agent. In contrast to Aghion and
Tirole (1997), it is not asymmetric information but the desire to commit that drives
the institutional structure. Moreover, in this part, delegation is not modeled as a
binary choice to transfer formal authority but the sovereign can choose the degree
to which she relinquishes authority.
This part presents a solution to the puzzle of how delegation can improve com-
mitment. It combines two features: an endogenous level of commitment in the form
of a policy adjustment cost and a bureaucrat that reacts to exogenous shocks to the
state of the economy. It is shown that even if credibility of delegation is provided
by the same commitment technology as for any other policy (i.e. McCallum’s basic
assumption holds), a sovereign invests more in commitment if she delegates. Hence,
delegation is associated with higher levels of commitment than policies set directly
by the sovereign.
The mechanism driving this result is as follows. Without delegation, an increase
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in the level of commitment by a sovereign inherently raises the costs to adjust a
policy ex-post. Accommodation of exogenous shocks is therefore imperfect and
creates a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. However, with delegation and
a bureaucrat whose response to such shocks is at least somewhat in line with that
desired by the sovereign this trade-off is less severe. Although the commitment
technology is the same, the sovereign invests more in credibility if she delegates
than if she sets the policy herself.
Hence, the demand for flexibility to adjust to exogenous shocks is crucial for
delegation to a bureaucrat to be desirable. This contrasts recent results by Alesina
and Tabellini (2007b) and Ludema and Olofsgard (2007). They find that when flex-
ibility is valuable the politician (here: sovereign) is preferred over the bureaucrat
to carry out the task. The difference in results originates from the way commit-
ment and delegation are modeled. Alesina and Tabellini (2007b) and Ludema and
Olofsgard (2007) rule out ex-post overriding of a bureaucrat’s decisions and do not
consider commitment by the sovereign. The endogenous degree of independence or
accountability of the bureaucrat and the symmetry of the commitment technology
with respect to both institutions and specific policies are key features of the present
part.
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. The baseline model is set
up in the next chapter. Chapter 25 formalizes McCallum’s ’second fallacy ’. In
chapter 26 the model is extended to a repeated game with some exogenous shock
occurring between periods. This is shown to be sufficient to establish a higher level
of commitment associated with delegation, even if it is costly to delegate. The last
chapter concludes this part.
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Chapter 24
The Model
In this chapter the deterministic baseline model is presented. The issue at hand
is the choice of a one-dimensional policy variable p such as an interest rate, a tax
or a tariff. Three agents are involved in the policy game: a sovereign, a subject
and a bureaucrat. The sovereign holds the power to pass and change regulations,
laws and amend the constitution and thereby determine both institutions and the
specific policy. For simplicity she is modeled as a single agent, although one best
thinks of her as a parliament. The subject is anyone who is not directly involved in
policy making but affected by the policy under concern. The bureaucrat is a person
appointed by the sovereign to perform a specific task with at least some discretionary
scope.
The timing of the game is as follows (see Figure 24.1). First, the sovereign decides
whether to delegate the policy task to the bureaucrat and in the case of delegation
also the level of commitment c ∈ [0,∞).1 The latter is defined by the cost to codify
the policy which has to be incured for the first time simultaneously to its choice.
This reflects that administrative procedures, laws and constitutional amendments
require different efforts and majorities to be passed. The costs of decision making
by a sovereign are potentially substantial. One reason is that at least in some cases
the number of people involved is quite large, the other reason is that a sovereign is
the prominent political authority and hence responsible for all policy areas. Due to
capacity constraints she can not attend to all potentially beneficial reforms but has
to set a political agenda. The cost of writing a particular law therefore includes the
opportunity cost of the gain not realized by pursuing a reform in a different policy
area. Moreover, this cost is a commitment device since at the same time it specifies
1If the sovereign delegates, c = 0 corresponds to the case of ’integration’ and c→∞ to the case
of ’full delegation of formal authority’ in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
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Figure 24.1: Timing of the game
the minimum cost to adjust the policy at a later stage.2 Second, depending on the
institutional choice in the first stage, either the sovereign or the bureaucrat sets
the policy level p. In the case of discretionary policy setting by the sovereign, she
also chooses (and incurs) c. Third, the subject forms expectations about the policy
level actually implemented and takes an irreversible decision, e.g. an investment or
signing of a long term contract. Fourth, the sovereign is able to adjust the policy
level under both delegation and discretion by again incuring c. Finally, payoffs of
all players realize.
Note that the bureaucrat’s decision costs are normalized to zero. This might be
perceived as a rather strong assumption. However, the basic point is that a sovereign
is able to impose decision costs onto herself that exceed that of a bureaucrat. While
the sovereign can choose zero decision cost for herself this turns out not to be
optimal due to the time-inconsistency problem. The only asymmetry between the
two players with respect to decision costs is that the bureaucrat can not raise his own
costs. However, since by definition he is not prone to time-inconsistency nothing is
gained by giving him this option.
2It is thereby assumed, that both the technology and opportunity costs of decision making are
constant over time.
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In contrast to earlier contributions (Lohmann 1992, Jensen 1997, Keefer and
Stasavage 2003) commitment is an investment. Besides a loss in flexibility it is
inherently costly to commit. This makes an endogenous level of commitment inter-
esting even in the deterministic one period game of chapter 25.3
The sovereign has the following objective function with respect to the policy
problem under concern
w(p, i(p)), (24.1)
where p is the policy implemented, c is the costs of an ex-post adjustment of p and
i(p) is the best response of the subject to the policy p. The one shot game depicted
in Figure 24.1 is therefore a game of complete information. Let
v(p) (24.2)
be the reduced form of (24.1), with ∂v∂p =
∂w
∂p +
∂w
∂i
∂i
∂p and
∂2v
∂p2
< 0, where p˜∗ is the
unique optimal ex-ante policy that maximizes both (24.2) and (24.1).
However, given the subject’s decision is already fixed, the sovereign’s objective
function is
vˆ(p, pE), (24.3)
where ∂vˆ
∂pE
= ∂w(p,i)∂i
∂i(pE)
∂p ,
∂2vˆ
∂p2
< 0 and ∂vˆ∂p =
∂w(p,i)
∂p . p
E(p, c) is the subject’s
expectation with respect to the policy actually implemented in stage 4. The unique
optimal ex-post policy is pˆ∗. Note that if the subject’s expectations turn out to be
correct, (24.2) and (24.3) coincide, i.e. v(p) = vˆ(p, p). If ∂w∂i
∂i
∂p 6= 0 the optimal ex-
ante and ex-post policies differ and the sovereign faces a time-inconsistency problem.
Without loss of generality assume that ∂w∂i
∂i
∂p > 0 and hence, pˆ
∗ < p˜∗.
Assume for a moment that the sovereign is unable to commit and delegation
is not feasible. Ex-ante she is keen to promise a policy level of p˜∗. However, the
subject anticipates that for pE = p˜∗, she implements pˆ∗ < p˜∗ ex-post. Implementing
p˜∗ in the fourth stage is not subgame perfect and hence, the second stage promise to
do so not credible. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, the subject’s expectations
turn out to be correct and hence pE = pˆ∗.
Considering the full game with commitment and delegation, the bureaucrat’s
preferences and constraints become relevant. The bureaucrat is best thought of as
3Lohmann (1992) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) consider stochastic games while Jensen
(1997) has an exogenous cost of policy adjustments.
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the director or board of a specialized agency. The agency itself would be needed
to implement and enforce the policy anyway. Delegation implies that it also gets a
clearly defined discretionary scope. The bureaucrat’s objective function is
gB =
 g
(
pB
)
, pBis credible,
0 , else,
(24.4)
where g(pB) has a unique global maximum at the optimal ex-ante policy level p˜∗ and
is strictly monotone both to the left and the the right of this peek. Moreover, g(pB) >
0 for all pB. Hence, in this deterministic setting it is assumed that the sovereign
can perfectly determine the preferences of the bureaucrat and hence chooses them
to match her ex-ante objective. This is implemented by means of administrative
procedures or incentive contracts (Walsh 1995). However, this assumption is relaxed
in latter chapters where uncertainty becomes relevant and the sovereign’s control
over the bureaucrat’s responses to such unforeseen events will be imperfect.
In addition, the bureaucrat does not like to be overridden by the sovereign.
This is regarded a strong signal that he failed to do his job properly and thereby
diminishes his future career and earning abilities. Sovereignty is not restricted by
delegation since the sovereign is able to override the bureaucrat before the policy is
actually implemented.4
The next chapter analyzes policy choices in this baseline model. A repeated
game with uncertainty over the future state of the world is considered in chapter 26.
4See also Lohmann (1992), Jensen (1997), Aghion et al. (2004).
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Chapter 25
McCallum’s Second Fallacy
In this chapter it is shown that in the complete information model presented above
equilibrium commitment is positive and McCallum’s second fallacy holds. The tim-
ing of events is as outlined in Figure 24.1. It is assumed that there is no history in
the relevant policy area.
25.1 Discretion
First consider the case where the sovereign does not opt for delegation. Given the
policy, p and the commitment level, c, set in stage 2 she adjusts the policy in stage
4 if and only if the following condition holds
vˆ(pˆ∗, p)− vˆ(p, p) > c. (25.1)
This is equivalent to vˆ(pˆ∗, p) − v(p) > c. Hence, for all p < p(c) and p > p¯(c)
adjustment occurs while all p ∈ [p(c), p¯(c)] are credible, where p(c) and p¯(c) are
determined by
vˆ(pˆ∗, p)− v(p) = c. (25.2)
The costs to adjust the policy ex-post determines the set of credible policies. This
is in line with Lohmann (1992) and Jensen (1997).
In the third stage, subjects decide on i according to their expectations of the
policy implemented that are as follows
pE =
 p , p ∈ [p(c), p¯(c)],pˆ∗ , else. (25.3)
In the second stage the sovereign chooses both p and c simultaneously
max
p,c
LDis = v
(
pE(p, c)
)− c. (25.4)
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Since LDis is strictly decreasing in c unless pE = p(c) or pE = p¯(c) the credibility
constraint is always binding. Moreover, since pˆ∗ < p˜∗ it is the upper bound that
binds. The optimal c and hence p¯(c) is determined by
∂v(p)
∂p
∂p¯(c)
∂c
= 1. (25.5)
Total differentiation of (25.2) and plugging into (25.5) yields
−
∂v
∂p
∂vˆ
∂p
= 1, (25.6)
which yields c∗ and hence p∗ = p¯(c∗) < p˜∗.
Proposition 25.1 If commitment is a costly investment, the optimal level of com-
mitment depends on the marginal gain from credibility and is at most partial.
Proof. See appendix.
Here, partial commitment means that in equilibrium the sovereign invests a
non-negative, finite amount in credibility and the policy level p∗ is strictly below the
’full’ commitment solution. Note that, in contrast to quasi-commitment discussed
by Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), partial does not imply that the sovereign re-
neges in some cases. Since the one period game is deterministic, partial commitment
merely reflects the investment character of commitment.
25.2 Delegation
Now consider the case with delegation. Stages 3 and 4 of the game are as ana-
lyzed above. In the second stage the bureaucrat chooses the policy anticipating
the subject’s decision and the set of credible policies. Given the properties of the
bureaucrat’s objective function gB(pB), the policy level chosen by the bureaucrat is
either pB = p˜∗ if this is credible, i.e. p˜∗ ∈ [p(c1), p¯(c1)], or pB = p¯(c1) otherwise.
Since the policy choice of the bureaucrat perfectly mirrors the ex-ante preferences
of the sovereign, the only difference to the case of discretion is the timing. While
under discretion c and p are set simultaneously, they are chosen sequentially here.
However, this does not affect the optimality condition. The equilibrium values are
exactly the same as without delegation (see (25.6)), i.e. yield c∗ and p∗.
Proposition 25.2 In a deterministic game a sovereign is indifferent between dele-
gating a policy task and full discretion. Delegation does neither affect commitment
nor the payoff of the sovereign or the subject.
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Since the subgame perfect policies of both delegation and discretion are equivalent,
the sovereign is indifferent between both institutional designs. This confirms the
fundamental insight of McCallum’s second fallacy that delegation does not solve the
commitment problem but merely relocates it. Neither the ability nor the desire of
a sovereign to commit is improved by delegation.
In a deterministic game the equivalence of delegation and discretion breaks down
only if for some reason the commitment technologies for delegation and discretionary
policy making differ. The next chapter shows that, with symmetric commitment
devices, the equivalence also breaks down if a flexibility-credibility trade-off is con-
sidered.
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Chapter 26
Beyond the Fallacy
In contrast to the previous chapter, now the policy game is played more than once.
However, in order to avoid to import some credibility by folk theorem type argu-
ments the number of repetitions N is assumed to be finite. In fact, to derive the main
results it is perfectly sufficient to look at the case of N = 2. Extension to N > 2 is
straightforward. Moreover, reputation effects are ruled out. Both assumptions are
imposed to keep the focus of the analysis on the effect of delegation and are by no
means meant to imply that the former effects do not matter in the real world. How-
ever, the results of this chapter suggest that there is a complementary mechanism
at work by which delegation becomes associated with improved credibility.
If the game is played twice, there is a history in the second round. Periods are
indicated by subscripts. The policy p1, the costs to adjust the policy c1 and not
least the institutional structure itself chosen in the first round are inherited to the
second one. Hence, if the sovereign prefers a change in any parameter (including
c2 < c1), this costs c1 in the first stage of period 2.
Moreover, between the two rounds, the state of the world changes which is re-
flected by v2(p− s). This can either be due to an exogenous shock to the economy
or to the sovereign’s ex-ante preferences. This results in a change of the preferred
ex-ante policy from p˜∗1 to p˜∗2 = p˜∗1 + s. The distribution of the shock s has a density
φ(s) with a zero mean.
In case the inherited institution is delegation, the shock is assumed to affect the
bureaucrat’s objective function analogously but dampened by a factor a ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, in contrast to the previous chapter the bureaucrat does no longer perfectly
reflect the sovereign’s preferences in all states of the world. More specifically a
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bureaucrat of type a maximizes the following objective function
gB2 =
 g2
(
pB − as) , pB ≤ p¯(c1),
0 , else,
(26.1)
where g2 differs from g1 due to the exogenous shock s. More precisely, the bureaucrat
sets the second period policy according to
pB2 (c1, a, s) =

p¯(c1) , p˜∗1 + as > p¯(c1),
p(c1) , p˜∗1 + as < p(c1),
p˜∗1 + as , else.
(26.2)
Note, that a = 1 reflects ’perfect’ delegation in the sense that the bureaucrat per-
fectly reflects the sovereign’s response to the exogenous shock. The type of the
bureaucrat is exogenous but common knowledge at the beginning of the first pe-
riod. Hence, if a = 1, the sovereign anticipates that any shock occurring in the
second period will be costless neutralized by the bureaucrat. On the other hand, if
a = 0, the policy preferred by the bureaucrat remains at p˜∗1 and hence, delegation
and discretion are again equivalent.1
26.1 The Final Period
Only stages 1 and 2 of period 2 are analyzed, since stages 3 to 4 are as before. The
optimal policy after the shock is derived in what follows.
First, consider the level of commitment. For the second and therefore last period,
the optimal commitment level in the absence of any inherited value is c∗ (see (25.6)).
However, given c1 it is never optimal to choose a c2 < c1. It would not reduce
adjustment costs but would reduce the benefits of commitment. Moreover, in what
follows the analysis is restricted to the cases where c1 > c∗. The case where c2 > c1
is treated in the appendix and yields the same qualitative results.
Second, consider the optimal policy level p2. If the optimal ex-ante policy in the
second period is credible p˜∗2 ∈ [p(c1), p¯(c1)] it is of course best to implement it, in
case adjustment is worthwhile. However, if this is not feasible due to the credibility
constraint the best available policy is to choose the credible policy closest to the
preferred level, i.e. p2 = p(c1) if p˜∗2 < p(c1) and p2 = p¯(c1) if p˜∗2 > p¯(c1).
The sovereign pursues the reform only if the benefits of regulatory action at least
cover its costs (Mulligan and Shleifer 2005). For the case where discretion is the
1This corresponds to the situation discussed by Ludema and Olofsgard (2007).
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inherited institutional structure, the relevant condition is
v (p2(c1, s)− s)− v (p¯(c1)− s) > c1. (26.3)
This defines a set of states SDis(c1) =
(−∞, sDis(c1)[, with ∂sDis∂c1 < 0, where the
sovereign intervenes for all s < sDis (proof see appendix). The benefit to change
the policy setting from c1 and p1 to c2 and p2 has to outweigh the costs of doing
so. Note that if s = 0 the sovereign is pleased with the heritage from the previous
period. Hence, any incentive of the sovereign to engage in this policy area again is
driven by an exogenous change in the state of the world. Note that positive shocks
(s > 0) never induce the sovereign to adjust the policy in the second period, since
the best available policy level is p¯(c1) < p˜∗1. Hence, the shock has to be sufficiently
negative for (26.3) to be met.
If the sovereign has chosen to delegate in the first round, further political action
is worthwhile in period 2 if
v (p2(c1, s)− s)− v
(
pB2 (c1, a, s)− s
)
> c1. (26.4)
This defines a set of states SDel(c1, a) =]p(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a , s
Del(c1, a)[ where the sovereign
intervenes (proof see appendix).
Remark 26.1 Interventions are strictly less likely when delegation is the inherited
institution, i.e. SDel(c1, a) ⊆ SDis(c1).
Proof. See appendix. 
As in the one period game, in stage 4 the sovereign does not renege on the
policy announced. However, at the beginning of the second period the institutional
structure or the policy itself might be meddled with by the sovereign. Hence, in
contrast to Lohmann (1992), an exogenous shock can trigger an intervention by
the sovereign in equilibrium. Note that this type of intervention does not affect
time-inconsistency since it happens before subjects form their expectations.
A direct implication of Remark 26.1 is
Corollary 26.1 The expected payoff in the final period is weakly higher if the policy
has been delegated in the past.
Proof. If a > 0 and c1 > 0, then for all s2 ∈ IR \ SDel(c1, a), the sovereign is (at the
beginning of the final period) better off if delegation rather than discretion was the
institutional structure in period 1. For all s2 ∈ SDel(c1, a) and if a = 0 or c1 = 0,
the sovereign is indifferent about the established institutional structure, since the
equilibrium policies after intervention are the same (Proposition 25.2).
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26.2 The First Period
In the first round of the two period game, the set of choices and the timing is equiv-
alent to the one shot game in chapter 25. However, incentives and hence optimal
policies are different. The expected payoffs of the second period are anticipated and
discounted by a discount factor r. This does not affect any of the choices in stages
3 to 4. However, in the first stage (and the second stage in case of discretion), the
sovereign faces a more complex optimization problem than in a one shot game. In
case she opts for discretion in stage one it is of the following type in stage two
max
c1
v(p¯(c1))− c1 + r ·
{∫ sDis(c1)
−∞
φ(s) [v (p2(c1)− s)− c1] ds (26.5)
+
∫ +∞
sDis(c1)
φ(s)v (p¯(c1)− s) ds
}
.
Note that p1 = p¯(c1).
If the sovereign chooses delegation, the optimization problem in stage one is
max
c1
v(p¯(c1))− c1 + r ·

∫ p(c1)−p˜∗1
a
−∞
φ(s)v
(
p(c1)− s
)
ds (26.6)
+
∫ sDel(c1,a)
p(c1)−p˜∗1
a
φ(s) [v (p2 − s)− c1] ds+
∫ +∞
sDel(c1,a)
φ(s)v
(
pB(c1, a)− s
)
ds
}
.
Proposition 26.1 In a repeated game, the sovereign prefers to delegate in the first
period, if the bureaucrat is at least somewhat responsive to exogenous shocks and is
indifferent between delegation and discretion if not.
Proof. If and only if a = 0, the optimization problems (26.5) and (26.6) are identical
and, hence, the sovereign is indifferent between the two institutional structures. If
a > 0, the payoff of the first period does not depend on the institutional structure
directly (Proposition 25.2). However, the expected payoff of the final period is
strictly larger when the policy is delegated in the first period (Corollary 26.1). Unless
a = 0, the sovereign has a strict preference to delegate policy tasks when she faces
a time-inconsistency problem.
Both institutions are again perfectly equivalent if the bureaucrat does not (par-
tially) adjust to the exogenous shock. Hence, McCallum’s fallacy holds in the re-
peated version of the game if a = 0. The advantage of delegation stems from the
reduction in the trade-off between credibility and flexibility. Bureaucrats of types
a > 0 provide some flexibility that does not conflict with credibility since it does
not involve costly interventions by the sovereign.
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Is there an equally unambiguous ranking of institutions with respect to their
level of credibility? To answer this question, take the first order conditions of (26.5)
and (26.6) with respect to c1. They yield (using (26.3) and (26.4) that hold as an
equality at the threshold levels)
∂v
∂p
∂p¯
∂c1
− 1 + r ·
[∫ sDis(c1)
−∞
φ(s)
[
∂v
∂p
∂p2
∂c1
− 1
]
ds+
∫ +∞
sDis(c1)
φ(s)
∂v
∂p
∂p¯
∂c1
ds
]
= 0(26.7)
and
∂v
∂p
∂p¯
∂c1
− 1 (26.8)
+r ·
∫ p(c1)−p˜∗1a
−∞
φ(s)
∂v
∂p
∂p
∂c1
ds+
∫ sDel(c1,a)
p(c1)−p˜∗1
a
φ(s)
[
∂v
∂p
∂p2
∂c1
− 1
]
ds+
∫ +∞
sDel(c1,a)
φ(s)
∂v
∂p
∂pB
∂c1
ds
 = 0
respectively. The first terms in both conditions reflect the effect on first period
payoffs and hence do not justify any difference in commitment or policy levels in
their own right. However, the expected marginal impact of an increase in c1 on
second period payoffs differs across institutions and is unambiguous.
Proposition 26.2 In a repeated game, the sovereign chooses a (weakly) higher level
of commitment in the first period if she delegates than she would, ceteris paribus,
if she is restricted to set the policy herself, i.e. cDis1 ≤ cDel1 . If a > 0, the level of
commitment is strictly larger cDis1 < c
Del
1 .
Proof. See appendix 
The intuition is as follows. The exogenous shock occurring between periods
makes it desirable to change the policy implemented in the first period. Without
delegation the cost for such an adjustment is at the same time the commitment
device imposed to reduce time-inconsistency. Hence, the need for flexibility directly
conflicts with the desire to commit. With delegation, however, this trade-off is
relaxed. Given that the bureaucrat is at least somewhat responsive to the shock, i.e.
a > 0, there is some accommodation of the new state of the world - at zero costs.
Hence, for some shocks, the bureaucrat’s reaction is sufficient such that the conflict
between flexibility and credibility is reduced. Ex-ante the sovereign does therefore
invest more in commitment if she delegates. Note that delegation does not create
additional credibility per se but creates conditions under which being credible is
more attractive.
If the sovereign faces time-inconsistency, delegation of policy tasks is both pre-
ferred by the sovereign and associated with higher levels of commitment. This holds
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although the commitment technologies for delegation and discretionary regulation
are perfectly equivalent, reputation is ignored and the time horizon of the sovereign
is limited.
26.3 Costly delegation
So far delegation was for free. However, granting discretionary scope to a bureaucrat
is likely to be associated with additional costs, e.g. paying skill premiums and more
sophisticated hiring processes. This gives rise to an extra cost of delegation payed
in each period where delegation is in place.
Adding this cost to (26.6) reduces the attractiveness of delegation. Hence, Propo-
sition 26.1 does no longer hold. Depending on the costs of delegation and the
responsiveness of the bureaucrat a either discretion or delegation is the preferred
institutional structure. Ceteris paribus by an increase in the costs of delegation or
a decrease in a delegation becomes less attractive.
However, given that the commitment technology is still the same for both in-
stitutional structures, Proposition 26.2 holds. The commitment technology and the
greater flexibility of delegation are not affected. Delegation is still associated with
a higher credibility which now, however, comes with a price attached.
26.4 Endogenous choice of bureaucrat’s type
If the sovereign can choose the type a of a bureaucrat by a screening mechanism
or if complete contracts are available, she would always prefer ’perfect’ delegation
(a = 1). The objective function in (26.6) is strictly increasing in a since an improved
match between the sovereign’s and bureaucrat’s preferences has three beneficial ef-
fects. First, it reduces the loss due to the bureaucrat’s deviation in the implemented
policy if there is no intervention by the sovereign in the second period. Second,
costly interventions are less frequent and third, the trade-off between credibility and
flexibility is reduced which allows to improve on the time-inconsistency problem.
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Chapter 27
Conclusion of Part IV
The solution of time-inconsistency in policy making has received considerable atten-
tion in the economic literature. Delegation to an independent agency or bureaucrat
has been proposed as a feasible and effective commitment device (Rogoff 1985).
However, McCallum (1995) criticized this view by pointing out that independence
itself requires commitment on delegation to be effective. One response to this cri-
tique was to assume that delegation is for some reason easier to commit on than
a specific policy. Another was to combine an independent sources of commitment
such as punishment strategies in infinitely repeated games or checks and balances
with delegation (Jensen 1997, Moser 1999, Keefer and Stasavage 2003, Driffill and
Rotondi 2006). The latter approach has produced mixed results with respect to the
additional effect of delegation. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence, especially in
monetary policy, finds a strong correlation between delegation and the credibility of
policies.
This part contributes to this ongoing debate. Using a setting for which McCal-
lum’s ’second fallacy ’ holds under complete information, it is shown that introducing
uncertainty that creates a trade-off between credibility and flexibility is sufficient
to establish a positive relation between delegation and an increased level of com-
mitment as is observed in the real world. This holds even if delegation is costly.
However, delegation does not increase credibility per se but creates conditions that
make investments in commitment more attractive. The key feature is that delega-
tion reduces the trade-off between credibility and flexibility. Incentives to invest in
credibility are therefore higher with delegation than without.
There are two basic requirements for this result to hold. First, the sovereign has
to have some influence on the degree of the commitment she enters. This is the case
for most legislators since they can influence the cost of a future policy change by
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their choice of the majority rule. Second, the bureaucrat’s response to exogenous
shocks have to be at least somewhat in line with the sovereign’s preferences. This is
a straightforward extension of the type selection argument standard in the literature
on strategic delegation.
The internal organization of government matters for the credibility of policies.
This result is relevant for the implementation of environmental policies discussed in
previous parts as well as for a wide range of other policy areas. Hence, the contri-
bution of this final part reaches far beyond the realm of environmental economics.
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Chapter 28
Conclusion
28.1 Summary of Results and Policy Implications
28.1.1 Optimal Green Horizontal Innovation
Allowing for new technologies that do not solve the pollution problem once and
for all, substantially alters the optimal pollution policy and timing of R&D. In
general, a one step search for a backstop no longer represents an appropriate way
to model environmental innovation. Research might repeatedly fail to deliver the
much wanted backstop raising the question how to manage the increasing number of
available polluting technologies and the amount and timing of R&D investment. For
the baseline model presented in chapter 3 a number of clear cut results have been
established: (a) the optimal R&D sequence is strictly sequential, i.e. at most one
technology is developed at any point in time; (b) there is a tight link between the
optimal pollution policy and the optimal R&D trajectory since there is a constant
threshold pollution stock that triggers new innovations; (c) the optimal pollution
portfolio is finite, even if no backstop is developed; (d) contrary to previous results
in the literature, the simultaneous use of many technologies is the rule rather than
the exception; (e) pollution stocks overshoot, i.e. there are (repeated) periods where
stocks are above their long run steady state.
The analysis of green horizontal innovation can inform the political arena on a
number of relevant topics. Given a set of technologies, each of which has strings
attached, the question might not be to choose the lesser evil and use it exclusively
but how to mix them best. The ban of a polluting technology - such as nuclear power
in Germany - is likely to be an exaggerated measure unless a viable clean alternative
is at hand. The resulting shift to fossil fuels in electricity production contributes
to global warming, an environmental problem of comparable size. Moreover, both
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the stock of nuclear waste and the carbon dioxide concentration might optimally
overshoot their long run level.
Technological uncertainty has several effects. While the maximum number of
technologies developed is increasing in the probability to develop a backstop, this
relation does not hold for the expected size of the portfolio. A greater chance to
acquire a clean technology by R&D increases the expected return from investment.
Hence, at any given point where no backstop is feasible, research incentives are larger
and hence R&D is undertaken more often. For the expected number of available
technologies there are two countervailing effects: first, the potential number of inno-
vations is larger, but second the probability to get a backstop and hence stop R&D
are also larger. The combination of both results in a non-monotonic, but overall
decreasing, relationship between the chance to develop a backstop technology and
the expected long run size of the available portfolio. However, the overall pattern
of the optimal pollution and research policies remain intact if the beliefs about the
feasibility of a backstop are fixed. If they evolve due to learning from the outcome
of previous R&D projects, this has effects on the optimal timing of innovations. If
updating increases the belief in a backstop, then innovation occurs earlier and more
often. The threshold level triggering R&D decreases in the number of past R&D
projects technologies. The reverse holds if the belief is decreasing in the number
of past ’failures’. However, the maximum portfolio is always finite and, hence, the
optimal R&D program is fully determined regardless of the nature of the updating
process. This result contrasts the case of varying costs of R&D where potentially
infinite sequences of R&D can occur. A case for which no necessary conditions for
the optimal timing of innovations have been established yet.
28.1.2 Implementing Policies for Green Horizontal Innovation
Green horizontal innovation poses new challenges to the implementation of the op-
timal pollution and R&D policies. The following issues are especially important:
the simultaneous regulation of different pollutants emitted by the same industry
and the creation of research incentives via patents and, at the same time, limiting
the distortions caused by monopoly power. Part II establishes a series of results
on this matter. In general, both taxes and permits can fail to implement optimal
mixes of technologies and optimal research incentives if used exclusively. In contrast
to vertical innovations, they achieve static efficiency at least in some cases where
patents have been granted for one active technology. However, differentiated pollu-
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tants allow for a differentiated regulatory instrument. Using taxes to regulate the
established and permits to restrict the use of any new pollutant allows the govern-
ment to implement the optimal mix of technologies if there are constant returns to
scale at the industry level. This result requires that all inputs are in perfectly elastic
supply, e.g. due to provision by the world market.
In practice mixes of different instruments are common. The additional flexibility
created by such hybrid schemes is both, a curse and a blessing. While an increase in
the choice set of the government unambiguously increases static efficiency, the effect
on dynamic efficiency is less straightforward. Part III presents a number of cases
where research incentives decrease or vanish completely. However, for the imple-
mentation of the optimal R&D program with multiple green horizontal innovations
presented in part II, flexibility is crucial.
For research incentives to be optimal, the instrument used has to be even more
sophisticated. The permits issued for new pollutants have to be sold/auctioned at
a reservation price in case research incentives are excessive or pollution has to be
subsidized if incentives for R&D are too small. Note that subsidies do not increase
emissions neither in the short nor in the long run, since aggregate emissions of the
respective pollutant is bound by permits. Hence, in effect, subsidies are a pure
transfer to the patent holding firm.
Given that such subsidies are costless and politically feasible, both, the optimal
pollution and the optimal R&D trajectory can be implemented without any serious
commitment necessary. If, as is likely, public funds are costly, both the optimal
amount of subsidization and the credibility of such a policy are changed. Promising
to transfer public money to an innovator or, alternatively, not collecting revenue,
is no longer credible if the government puts a positive value on public funds. Ex-
post the government would like to renege on such a promise and, in the absence
of a binding commitment, research firms will not invest in R&D. The ability to
credibly commit on the design of future environmental regulation is therefor crucial
for the stimulation of environmental R&D - even if intellectual property rights are
granted and perfectly enforced. Hence, in practice it is not only important which
instrument is used to internalize environmental damages and how stringent future
environmental regulation will be, but also auction rules and punishments in case of
excessive emissions are important for an optimal policy design.
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28.1.3 Commitment and the Internal Organization of Government
The means to achieve governmental commitment are still much debated among
economists. Repeated interaction and the internal organization of a government are
the two main instruments that are believed to make commitment feasible. Each is
based on two separate lines or reasoning: while repeated interaction is necessary
to build up reputation and also gives rise to folk theorem type of arguments, the
internal organization of government can involve joint responsibility by more than
one actor. These can be actors at the same level of hierarchy (multiple veto players)
or a sovereign and a subordinate bureaucrat (delegation).
The role of delegation in generating and increasing commitment has been much
debated. Part IV contributes some new insights to this discussion. While delegation
is unable to improve commitment per se and much less to generate it in the first
place, it makes commitment more attractive. When uncertainty over future states of
the world and, hence, optimal future policies is relevant, there is a trade-off between
credibility and flexibility. Delegation allows to relax this trade-off. With delegation
credibility depends on the costs to change the institutional structure and, hence,
on the (endogenous) decision making costs of the government. On the contrary,
flexibility depends on the decision making costs of the bureaucrat. Under discretion
both types of cost concerns, credibility and flexibility, are inherently linked since
any change of the policy involves the same costs - regardless of the motivation for
the adjustment to occur.
Delegation is therefore an effective tool to induce more credibility into policies.
This result applies to all areas of policy making and, therefore, is of interest beyond
the realm of environmental economics.
28.2 Caveats and Areas of Further Research
It remains to point out that, so far, none of the results has been tested empirically
so that they remain hypotheses. Further research should therefore test whether the
theory lives up to a broader set of real world observations. Moreover, the models
presented are highly stylized. Reducing complexity allows to concentrate on the
specific question at hand and allows to solve the problem analytically, deriving
explicit solutions. In particular the model in part I is highly stylized. The discussion
in chapter 6 shows that relaxing almost any of the assumptions makes analytical
solutions hard if not impossible. Partly, numerical methods can be used to enrich the
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model. However, for other extensions the methodology to address the mathematical
complications is yet to be developed. For example, so far, no necessary conditions for
optimal control problems with an infinite number of stages have been established.
While chapter 5 presents new necessary conditions for the case of technological
uncertainty, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to tackle the issue of infinite stages.
Hence, there are two avenues for further research. One is to use computerized
models to relax some of the assumptions in order to better fit the model to real
world applications (e.g. in integrated assessment models used by climate change
economists). The other lies in the area of economic theory and aims at an extension
of the mathematical toolkit available for dynamic optimization.
With respect to the implementation of policies it is important to keep in mind
that the taming of monopoly pricing requires an area of perfectly elastic demand.
Effectively addressing market power is feasible only if the returns to scale are con-
stant at the industry level. Hence, inputs have to be in perfectly elastic supply and
firms have to be symmetric. Otherwise, a patent holding firm facing a downward
sloping demand might find it worthwhile to increase the license fee and thereby re-
duce output of the protected technology to a suboptimal level. The implementation
strategies suggested in parts II and III are nonetheless able to improve efficiency
compared to standard tax or permit schemes. However, they might fail to achieve
first best. Further exploration of these relations for more general industry structures
is desirable.
A major contribution of this thesis is to extend the set of technologies con-
sidered in the environmental economics literature. It is analyzed how they affect
optimal pollution and R&D policies and how to implement them when technological
change is endogenous. Although the incentives to innovate are explicitly modeled
one important dimension of research has been treated exogenously: the direction
of technological change. An interesting next step would be to use the insights de-
rived in this thesis and use them to enrich available models of directed technological
change. It might be particularly interesting to study the different incentives faced by
R&D firms in such models. They can choose to invest either in a vertical innovation
(reducing private costs or pollution intensity and, therefore, in the spirit of Aghion
and Howitt (1992), rendering an existing one obsolete) or in green horizontal in-
novations that complement existing technologies. A more explicit representation of
the R&D sector, including technological leaders and followers, is therefore in order.
Part IV provides a new perspective to the debate on the role of delegation in
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a government’s ability to credibly commit. It reconciles the main two opposing
lines of argument. It does so by establishing conditions that allow delegation to
be used as a mean to improve the credibility of policies even if both the policy
and the institutional structure are subject to the same commitment technology.
A question not addressed in this thesis is where this initial commitment comes
from. Besides from reputation, the commitment might originate, as suggested, from
capacity constraints in parliamentary decision making and flexibility in the choice
of the majority rule.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Part I
A.1 Proof of Necessary Conditions (5.3) and (5.4)
The first variation of J (see (5.1)) is1
δJ =
{
Hn (tn+1) + (1− p)n−1e−rtn+1rR−Hn+1 (tn+1)
}
δtn+1 (A.1)
+

n∑
j=2
[
p(1− p)j−2
j∑
i=1
µ
Backj
i (tn+1)
]
+(1− p)n−1
n∑
i=1
µBoomni (tn+1)
−
n+1∑
j=2
(
p(1− p)j−2
j∑
i=1
µ
Backj
i (tn+1)
)
+(1− p)n
n∑
i=1
µ
Boomn+1
i (tn+1)
]}
δS(tn+1),
where δtn+1 and δS(tn+1) are perturbations in t∗n+1 and S(t∗n+1)∗. (A.1) simplifies
to
δJ =
{
Hn (tn+1) + (1− p)n−1e−rtn+1rR−Hn+1 (tn+1)
}
δtn+1 (A.2)
+
{
(1− p)n−1
n∑
i=1
µBoomni (tn+1)
−
[
p(1− p)n−1
n∑
i=1
µ
Backn+1
i (tn+1)
+(1− p)n
n∑
i=1
µ
Boomn+1
i (tn+1)
]}
δS(tn+1),
since no innovation occurs at tn+1 in all cases where a backstop has been developed in
the past. For these cases, shadow prices are continuous at tn+1. For any admissible
1See (Kamien and Schwartz 1993, chp. 13)
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permutation δJ must be non-positive at all switching instants n = 1, ..., N − 1. The
first row of (A.2) therefore yields (5.4).
The coefficient of δS(tn+1) has to be zero and the resulting condition can be
simplified to
n∑
i=1
µBoomni (tn+1) = p
n∑
i=1
µ
Backn+1
i (tn+1) + (1− p)
n∑
i=1
µ
Boomn+1
i (tn+1). (A.3)
Making use of the symmetry assumptions regarding technologies, this yields (5.3).
A.2 Combining the Necessary Conditions: (5.3) and
(5.4) to (5.5) and (5.6)
Condition (5.4) requires thatG(t∗n+1) = H∗n
(
t∗n+1
)
+(1−p)n−1e−rt∗n+1rR−H∗n+1
(
t∗n+1
)
is non-negative for all δtn+1 < 0 and non-positive for all δtn+1 > 0. Otherwise, there
exist perturbations for which (5.4) becomes positive. G(t∗n+1) = 0 is therefore a nec-
essary condition for all t∗n+1 > 0. For t∗n+1 = 0, G is allowed to be negative. First
consider innovation at some t∗n+1 > 0, where
H∗n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ (1− p)n−1e−rt∗n+1rR = H∗n+1
(
t∗n+1
)
, (A.4)
is a necessary condition. Substituting (5.2) into (A.4) and simplifing yields
e−rt
∗
n+1
[
n∑
i=1
(
q
Boom∗n
i −
d
2
S∗2i
)
+ rR
]
+
n∑
i=1
µBoomni
(
αq
Boom∗n
i − δS∗i
)
=
(1− p)
{
e−rt
∗
n+1
n+1∑
i=1
(
q
Boom∗n+1
i −
d
2
(S
Boom∗n+1
i )
2
)
(A.5)
+
n+1∑
i=1
µ
Boomn+1
i
(
αq
Boom∗n+1
i − δS
Boom∗n+1
i
)}
+p
{
e−rt
∗
n+1
n+1∑
i=1
(
q
Back∗n+1
i −
d
2
(S
Back∗n+1
i )
2
)
+
n+1∑
i=1
µBacki
(
αq
Back∗n+1
i − δS
Back∗n+1
i
)}
.
Using
∑n
i=1 q
Boom∗n
i =
∑n+1
i=1 q
Boom∗n+1
i =
∑n+1
i=1 q
Back∗n+1
i = 1, S
Boomn+1
n+1 (t
∗
n+1) =
S
Backn+1
n+1 (t
∗
n+1) = 0 and the optimal pollution policy in case a backstop arrives it
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reduces to
e−rt
∗
n+1
[
1−
n∑
i=1
d
2
S∗2i + rR
]
+
n∑
i=1
µBoomni
(
αq
Boom∗n
i − δS∗i
)
= (A.6)
(1− p)
{
e−rt
∗
n+1
[
1−
n∑
i=1
d
2
(S
Boom∗n+1
i )
2
]
+
n∑
i=1
µ
Boomn+1
i
(
αq
Boom∗n+1
i − δS
Boom∗n+1
i
)
+ αµBoomn+1n+1 q
Boom∗n+1
n+1
}
+p
{
e−rt
∗
n+1
[
1−
n∑
i=1
d
2
(S
Back∗n+1
i )
2
]
−
n∑
i=1
µ
Backn+1
i δS
Back∗n+1
i + αµ
Backn+1
n+1
}
.
Using the pollution shadow prices’ matching condition (5.3), a straightforward stock
matching condition and the absence of a stock constraint for the backstop µBackn+1n+1 =
0, the optimal pollution policy with boomerangs (4.18) and (4.19) and rearranging
terms yields
rR = α
[
(1− p)µBoomn+1j −
n∑
i=1
µBoomni q
Boom∗n
i
]
ert
∗
n+1 . (A.7)
Note that for all optimal pollution policies
∑n
i=1 µ
Boomn
i q
Boom∗n
i = µ
Boomn
n . Using
(5.3) again, (A.7) simplifies to (5.6).
The proof for t∗n+1 = 0 works analogously and yields (5.5).
A.3 Shadow Prices When a Backstop Arrives: (5.7)
If a backstop arrives at t∗n+1 the stock of all polluting technologies deteriorates
according to SBackn+1i (t) = S
Boomn
i (tn+1)e
−δ(t−tn+1). Using (4.2) yields
µ
Backn+1
i (t) = e
δ(t−t∗n+1) ·
[
µ
Backn+1
i (t
∗
n+1) (A.8)
+
de2δt
∗
n+1
r + 2δ
SBoomni (t
∗
n+1)
(
e−(r+2δ)t
∗
n+1 − e−(r+2δ)t
)]
.
The transversality condition (4.3) requires that the limit for t → ∞ of the optimal
Hamiltonian with the final technology portfolio is zero. Substituting (A.8) and the
optimal pollution policy with a backstop technology into (4.3) yields (5.7).
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A.4 Proof That Innovation Is Sequential (Proposition
5.2)
In order to prove that innovation is strictly sequential one has to allow for multiple
innovations at the same point in time and show that this is not an optimal strategy.
If more than one technology is developed at some tn the optimal pollution policy is a
straightforward extension of the one presented in chapter 4. The optimal quantities
after during convergence are
qBoom
∗
i (t) = 0 ,∀t ∈
[
tn, tˆn
]
, i = 1, ..., n− k, (A.9)
qBoom
∗
j (t) =
1
k
,∀t ∈ [tn, tˆn] , j = n− k + 1, ..., n, (A.10)
replacing policies (4.18), (4.19), (4.26) and (4.27). The evolution of pollution stocks
between innovation and convergence change accordingly. The point in time when
stocks have converged is therefore
tˆn = tn +
1
δ
ln
[
δk
α
Si(tn) + 1
]
. (A.11)
If more than one technology is developed (k > 1) only the expected shadow prices of
new technologies enter condition (5.6). Pollution stocks for both are zero. Reasoning
along identical lines as in the proof for Proposition 5.1, one obtains E
(
µˇ∗n+k
(
t∗n+1
))
=
E
(
µˇ∗n+k−1
(
t∗n+1
))
. Incorporating this into (5.6) yields that research is sequential
unless R&D is for free (R = 0) or the social planner infinitely patient (r = 0). 
A.5 Shadow Price of a New Technology at t∗n+1 > 0: (5.9)
During convergence following t∗n+1, (4.20) and (4.21) describe the evolution of stocks
for technologies n and n+1. Using (4.2) one gets the following shadow price dynamics
µBoomn+1n (t) = e
δ(t−t∗n+1) · [µBoomn+1n (t∗n+1) (A.12)
+dSBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
e2δt
∗
n+1
(
e−(r+2δ)t
∗
n+1 − e−(r+2δ)t
r + 2δ
)]
µ
Boomn+1
n+1 (t) = e
δ(t−t∗n+1)
[
µ
Boomn+1
n+1
(
t∗n+1
)
+
αd
δ
eδt
∗
n+1 (A.13)
·
(
e−(r+δ)t
∗
n+1 − e−(r+δ)t
r + δ
− e
−(r+δ)t∗n+1 − e−(r+2δ)t+δt∗n+1
r + 2δ
)]
.
At tˆn+1, stocks and hence the shadow prices of incumbent and new technologies
converge. Hence, from µBoomn+1n
(
tˆ∗n+1
)
= µBoomn+1n+1
(
tˆ∗n+1
)
and (A.12), (A.13) and
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(4.22) it follows that
µ
Boomn+1
n+1 (t
∗
n+1) = µ
Boomn+1
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+
d
r + 2δ
e−rt
∗
n+1 × (A.14)
[
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+
α
δ
] [
1−
(
δ
α
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ 1
)− r+2δ
δ
]
− αd
δ(r + δ)
e−rt
∗
n+1
[
1−
(
δ
α
SBoom
∗
n
n
(
t∗n+1
)
+ 1
)− r+δ
δ
]
.
Further simplifying yields (5.9).
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Appendix B
Appendix to Part II
The new technology is used exclusively, if
f < c1 − c2 + (1− α)γ1 − γ2.
If none of the permit constraints is binding, both permit prices are zero. The
threshold level is therefore given by
f < c1 − c2.
If the permit constraint for the new pollutant, i.e. E2 is binding, the permit price
for the first type of permits is γ1 = 0 and γ2 is determined by (11.2). This yields a
threshold level (where γ2 = 0) of
f < P (E2)− c2.
If the permit constraint for the established pollutant, i.e. α−1E1 is binding, the
permit price for the second type of permits is γ2 = 0 and γ1 is determined by (11.2).
This yields a threshold level of
f < (1− α)P (α−1E1) + αc1 − c2.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Part IV
C.1 Proof of Proposition 25.1
For (25.6) to hold ∂v∂p(s) and
∂vˆ
∂p(s) have to have opposite signs. This is the case only
if p˜∗(s) < p∗(s) < pˆ∗(s). Hence, the implemented policy p∗(s) is strictly between
the full commitment and the no commitment policy. This corresponds to a strictly
positive but finite c. In this sense commitment is partial.
C.2 Proof of SDis(c1)
If p˜∗2 is not credible because s < p(c1)−p˜∗1, (26.3) becomes v
(
p(c1)− s
)−v (p¯(c1)− s) >
c1 which holds if s < sDis1 (c1).
If the ex-ante optimal second period policy p˜∗2 = p˜∗1+s is credible (26.3) becomes
v (p˜∗1) − v (p¯(c1)− s) > c1 which never holds for s = p¯(c1) − p˜∗1 which is the largest
s for which p˜∗2 is credible. However, at the lowest s for which p˜∗2 is credible it holds
for some values of c1. Hence, there is a level sDis2 (c1) where the sovereign is just
indifferent between adjustment and the inherited policy.
However, for all s > p¯(c1)− p˜∗1, (26.3) becomes v (p¯(c1)− s)− v (p¯(c1)− s) > c1
which is zero for all s.
The threshold level sDis(c1) is thus defined as
sDis(c1) =
 sDis1 (c1) , s < p(c1)− p˜∗1,sDis2 (c1) , p(c1)− p˜∗1 ≤ s. (C.1)
Hence, the set of s where the sovereign adjusts the policy in the second period is
SDis(c1) = (−∞, sDis(c1)[.
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C.3 Proof of SDel(c1, a)
Five cases have to be considered: a) neither p˜∗2 = p˜∗1+s nor pB = p˜∗1+as are credible
because they are smaller than p(c1), b) pB = p˜∗1 + as is credible but not p˜∗2, c) both
are credible, d) p˜∗2 is credible but not pB = p˜∗1 + as and e) neither p˜∗2 = p˜∗1 + s nor
pB = p˜∗1 + as are credible because they are larger than p¯(c1).
a) s ∈ (−∞, p(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a [
Here, v
(
p(c1)− s
) − v (p(c1)− s) = 0 hence, (26.4) cannot hold. The sovereign
therefore never adjusts if s <
p(c1)−p˜∗1
a .
b) s ∈ [p(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a , p(c1)− p˜∗1[
Here, (26.4) becomes v
(
p(c1)− s
) − v (p˜∗1 − (1− a)s) > c1 which does not hold for
the lowest s in this set, but holds for some a for the largest admissible s. Hence,
there is a sDel1 (c1, a) for which for all admissible s < s
Del
1 (c1, a) the sovereign ad-
justs the policy. Note that for some a > a1, sDel1 (c1, a) > p(c1) − p˜∗1 in which case
sDel1 (c1, a) is irrelevant.
c) s ∈ [p(c1)− p˜∗1, p¯(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a ]
Here, (26.4) becomes v (p˜∗1)− v (p˜∗1 − (1− a)s) > c1 which holds for some a1 ≤ a ≤
a2, in the set of admissible s. Hence, there is a sDel2 (c1, a) for which for all admissible
s < sDel2 (c1, a) the sovereign adjusts the policy.
d) s ∈] p¯(c1)−p˜∗1a , p¯(c1)− p˜∗1]
Here, (26.4) becomes v (p˜∗1) − v (p¯(c1)− s) > c1 which holds for some a2 < a ≤ 1,
in the set of admissible s. Hence, there is a sDel3 (c1, a) for which for all admissible
s < sDel3 (c1, a) the sovereign adjusts the policy.
e) s ∈]p¯(c1) − p˜∗1,+∞) Here, v (p¯(c1)− s) − v (p¯(c1)− s) = 0 hence, (26.4) cannot
hold. The sovereign therefore never adjusts if s > p¯(c1)− p˜∗1.
The threshold level sDel(c1, a) is thus defined as
sDel(c1, a) =

sDel1 (c1, a) , 0 ≤ a < a1,
sDel2 (c1, a) , a1 ≤ a ≤ a2,
sDel3 (c1, a) , a2 < a ≤ 1.
(C.2)
Hence, the set of s where the sovereign adjusts the policy in the second period is
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SDel(c1, a) =
[
p(c1)−p˜∗1
a , s
Del(c1, a)
[
.
C.4 Proof of Remark 26.1
For all a > 0 it holds that −∞ < p(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a . Moreover, s
Del(c1, 1) = sDis(c1) and
sDel(c1, a) < sDis(c1) for all a < 1. Hence, SDel(c1, a) ⊆ SDis(c1).
C.5 Proof of Proposition 26.2
To proof that cDis1 ≤ cDel1 it is shown that the expected marginal benefit of c1 is
larger under delegation than under discretion, i.e. the term in accolades is larger in
(26.8) than in (26.7).
• For s ∈ (−∞, p(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a [ this holds, since under discretion the marginal increase
in adjustment cost shows up and ∂v∂p
∂p2
∂c1
≤ 0 and ∂v∂p
∂p
∂c1
> 0
• For s ∈ [p(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a , p(c1) − p˜∗1[ and s < sDel(c1, a) it holds, since ∂v∂p ∂p¯∂c1 < 0 <
∂v
∂p
∂p2
∂c1
(Note, ∂v∂p < 0 and
∂p2
∂c1
≤ 0 since p˜∗2 ≤ p2(c1) in the admissible set of s.)
• For s ∈ [p(c1)−p˜
∗
1
a , p(c1)− p˜∗1[ and s > sDel(c1, a) it holds, since ∂v∂p ∂p¯∂c1 − 1 < 0 <
∂v
∂p
∂pB
∂c1
.
• For s ∈ [p(c1)− p˜∗1,+∞) and s < sDel(c1, a) it holds, since −1 < ∂v∂p ∂p2∂c1 − 1.
• For s ∈ [p(c1) − p˜∗1,+∞) and sDel(c1, a) < s < sDis(c1) it holds, since −1 <
0 < ∂v∂p
∂pB
∂c1
.
• For s ∈ [p(c1)− p˜∗1,+∞) and s > sDis(c1) it holds, since ∂v∂p ∂p¯∂c1 ≤ ∂v∂p
∂pB
∂c1
.
C.6 Case with c2 > c1
If the optimal level of credibility is higher in the second period, than in the first one,
the optimal policy level after an adjustment changes to
p2(c2, s) =

p¯(c2) , s > p¯(c2)− p˜∗1,
p(c2) , s < p(c2)− p˜∗1,
p˜∗2 , else.
(C.3)
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C.6.1 The adjustment decision under discretion
• if s < p(c2)− p˜∗1 (26.3) becomes v
(
p(c2)− s
)− v (p¯(c1)− s) > c2 which holds
if s < sDis1 (c1, c2).
• if p(c2)− p˜∗1 ≤ s ≤ p¯(c2)− p˜∗1 (26.3) becomes v (p˜1)− v (p¯(c1)− s) > c2 which
holds if s < sDis2 (c1, c2).
• if s > p¯(c2)− p˜∗1 (26.3) becomes v (p¯(c2)− s)− v (p¯(c1)− s) > c2 which holds
if s > s¯Dis(c1, c2).
The threshold level sDis(c1, c2) is thus defined as
sDis(c1) =
 sDis1 (c1, c2) , s < p(c2)− p˜∗1,sDis2 (c1, c2) , p(c2)− p˜∗1 ≤ s. (C.4)
Hence, the set of s where the sovereign adjusts the policy in the second period is
SDis(c1, c2) = (−∞, sDis(c1, c2)[∪]s¯Dis(c1, c2),+∞).
C.6.2 The adjustment decision under delegation
• if s < p(c2)−p˜
∗
1
a (26.3) becomes v
(
p(c2)− s
)− v (p¯(c1)− s) > c2 which holds if
s < sDel1 (c1, c2, a).
• if p(c2)−p˜
∗
1
a ≤ s < p(c2)−p˜∗1 (26.3) becomes v
(
p(c2)− s
)−v (p˜∗1 − (1− a)s) > c2
which holds if s < sDel2 (c1, c2, a).
• if p(c2)− p˜∗1 ≤ s ≤ p¯(c2)−p˜
∗
1
a (26.3) becomes v (p˜1)−v (p˜∗1 − (1− a)s) > c2 which
holds if s < sDel3 (c1, c2, a).
• if p¯(c2)−p˜∗1a ≤ s ≤ p¯(c2) − p˜∗1 (26.3) becomes v (p˜1) − v (p¯(c1)− s) > c2 which
holds if s < sDel4 (c1, c2, a).
• if s > p¯(c2)− p˜∗1 (26.3) becomes v (p¯(c2)− s)− v (p¯(c1)− s) > c2 which holds
if s > s¯Del(c1, c2, a).
The threshold level sDel(c1, c2, a) is thus defined as
sDel(c1, c2, a) =

sDel1 (c1, c2, a) , s <
p(c2)−p˜∗1
a ,
sDel2 (c1, c2, a) ,
p(c2)−p˜∗1
a ≤ s < p(c2)− p˜∗1,
sDel3 (c1, c2, a) , p(c2)− p˜∗1 ≤ s ≤ p¯(c2)−p˜
∗
1
a ,
sDel4 (c1, c2, a) ,
p¯(c2)−p˜∗1
a < s ≤ p¯(c2)− p˜∗1.
(C.5)
Hence, the set of s where the sovereign adjusts the policy in the second period is
SDel(c1, c2, a) = (−∞, sDel(c1, c2, a)[∪]s¯Del(c1, c2, a),+∞).
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C.6.3 Remark 26.1 and Corollary 26.1
Both hold for the case c2 > c1 as well, since sDel(c1, c2, a) ≤ sDis(c1, c2) and
s¯Dis(c1, c2) ≥ s¯Del(c1, c2, a).
C.6.4 The optimization problems
The optimization problems corresponding to (26.5) and (26.6) are
max
c1
v(p¯(c1))− c1 + r ·
{∫ sDis(c1,c2)
−∞
φ(s) [v (p2(c2, s)− s)− c2] ds (C.6)
+
∫ s¯Dis(c1,c2)
sDis(c1,c2)
φ(s)v (p¯(c1)− s) ds+
∫ +∞
s¯Dis(c1,c2)
φ(s) [v (p¯(c2)− s)− c2] ds
}
,
and
max
c1
v(p¯(c1))− c1 + r ·
{
+
∫ sDel(c1,c2,a)
−∞
φ(s) [v (p2(c2, s)− s)− c2] ds (C.7)
+
∫ s¯Del(c1,c2,a)
sDel(c1,c2,a)
φ(s)v
(
pB(c1, a)− s
)
ds+
∫ +∞
sDel(c1,c2,a)
φ(s) [v (p2(c1, c2, s)− s)− c2] ds
}
,
respectively.
The first order conditions are
∂v
∂p
∂p¯
∂c1
− 1 + r ·
∫ s¯Dis(c1,c2)
sDis(c1,c2)
φ(s)
∂v
∂p
∂p¯
∂c1
ds = 0 (C.8)
and
∂v
∂p
∂p¯
∂c1
− 1 + r ·
∫ s¯Del(c1,c2,a)
sDel(c1,c2,a)
φ(s)
∂v
∂p
∂pB
∂c1
ds = 0.
Again, the marginal gain from commitment is larger under delegation than under
discretion since Remark 26.1 holds and ∂v∂p
∂p¯
∂c1
≤ ∂v∂p ∂p
B
∂c1
for all admissible s. Propo-
sition 26.2 therefore holds for the case c2 > c1.
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